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
Vol. 20, No. 497

NEW YORK, MONDAY, JULY 24, 1922

Ten Cents

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THE ANNALIST

A Magazine of Finance, Commerce
and Economics

Published Every Monday Morning by The New
York Times Company, Times Square, New York

Subscription Rates

	One Year.	Three Mos.	Six Mos.
In United States, Mexico and United States territories.....	\$5.00	\$1.25	\$2.50
Canada (postpaid).....	5.50	1.40	2.75
Other countries (postpaid).....	6.00	1.50	3.00
Single Copies, 10 Cents			
Binder for 26 Issues, \$1.50			

Entered as second-class matter March 21, 1914, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under Act of March 3, 1879

Vol. 20, No. 497

NEW YORK, MONDAY, JULY 24, 1922

Ten Cents

The Nationalization of Basic Industries

By Edward A. Bradford



HE present coal and railway strikes have a quality which distinguishes them from all others in our country's experience. Never before have both anthracite and bituminous disputes regarding wages and

working conditions been up for settlement together on a nation-wide contract. Now a settlement is demanded in both trades which was denounced as contrary to public interest when made in one trade. The Roosevelt Anthracite Commission was as authoritative in intellect, character and sympathy for labor as labor itself could ask. But that commission refused what is conceded by the President of the United States without full appreciation of the effect of his position, it may be hoped.

The United Mine Workers are demanding that they shall be signatories to a universal contract which shall settle conditions for both trades, for all workers. There are public charges that the "check-off" financed the coal war in West Virginia, in accordance with an arrangement between the coal operators and the miners. The operators were willing to pay higher wages if they could be relieved of the competition with coal produced at lower rates of wages which yielded larger annual incomes to the miners. The miners wanted a monopoly of the jobs, and higher rates of wages, although these resulted in attracting excess of labor to the mines and caused intermittent employment. The details are interesting and convincing, but apart from the present point. It must suffice to say that the award refused the "check-off," and several renewals of the contract under it were signed by unionists as individuals, not as officials.

The mine workers have consistently pressed the point, and seem now for the first time near the establishment of their legalized monopoly of coal trade labor. To the United Mine Workers "recognition" of them signifies refusal of recognition of any other workers. President Harding's Fourth of July speech takes a position on that which leaves nothing to be desired, and which is hard to reconcile with the "check-off." The humanity of a completely unionized coal trade was shown at Herrin. What the courts would say to a demonstrated monopoly of any sort of labor, with such a record as that of the United Mine Workers, remains to be seen.

The railway strike takes on its national quality in a different manner, not sufficiently well or widely known. It is the first great railway strike in which the American Federation of Labor has played a leading rôle. We have had great railway strikes, with events of national importance, but they lacked the present quality of confronting the national Government with a national union. Never before were so many railway workers on strike, but that is not what makes the present strike important. We have had greater disorders than we

are now experiencing in connection with other railway strikes, but they resulted from differences between the railways and their workers. This strike's disorders signify resistance to findings of a Government board more authoritative than the Roosevelt Anthracite Commission. The Labor Board was appointed, as the commission was, in order to compose strikes. The result has been to produce our worst strike, with the greatest capacity for revolutionizing the relations of Government to labor. Thereby hangs a tale worth telling, because otherwise it is not possible to have an informed opinion on the merits of the strike, or on the underlying causes, of which there are more than meets the eye of the careless observer.

Before the war individual unions made work agreements with individual railways. There was no union of either railways or unions. The American Railway Union had a brief, tempestuous career, and expired. The nearest previous approach to a railway strike on a national scale followed the attempt of the four train service brotherhoods to compel the administration of the Adamson law in a manner agreeable to them. They united their forces and invited the railways to unite theirs. The subsequent negotiations were not amicable, and a strike was averted narrowly, in manner resembling the enactment of the act under the stopwatches of the unions. It will be remarked that the train services are now working, and the dozen or more unions affiliated with the Federation of Labor are leading the present hostilities.

The breach between the two combinations of unions resulted from the failure of the attempt to compel the railways as a whole to deal with their workers as a whole. In a letter addressed to Mr. Jewell, the shop strikers' leader, the four brotherhoods requested "release from further co-operation regarding national boards of adjustment that we may endeavor to obtain regional boards of adjustment for the organizations we represent." The release was asked and given as an alternative to the other unions uniting with the four train unions to obtain regional boards of adjustment. The alternative was not agreeable to the striking unions, the train service unions were released from further co-operation with the striking unions, which declined to co-operate in forming regional boards of adjustment, according to the proposal of the Transportation act. The strikers, therefore, are antagonizing the principle of the organization of the railways in the manner of Congress, as well as antagonizing the Labor Board.

It is in evidence before the Senate Committee that the national agreement regarding wages and working conditions was "negotiated" between the Director General of Railways under Government operation and five of the federation unions "long after the armistice had been signed, and at a time when, in the

judgment of the railroads, no emergency existed of such a nature as to impel such concessions." The dates of these agreements ranged from four months before the return of the roads to private operation down to one month before the end of Federal operation. Several of them were executed after it was positively known that Government operation was approaching its end. The "negotiators" were men of union affiliations. McManamy had negotiated schedules for the Pere Marquette firemen. Franklin was President of the Boilermakers' Union. Deguire had been Chairman of the firemen's organization on the Chicago and Northwestern. Daugherty had been an employee of the Southern Pacific. Naturally such negotiators protected the interests to which they were most sympathetic. That they did not protect the interests of the Government or the railways appears from the testimony regarding the working of the agreements before the Labor Board. The number of workers was increased, their efficiency was reduced, and the strike is designed to obstruct the Labor Board in the correction of "featherbed" rules regarding working conditions.

The burden of the unwelcome task of bringing union workers to see that their wages should be proportioned to their work might logically and easily have been transferred to the railways. It was only necessary to allow the national agreements to die with Federal operation to restore prewar conditions. The railways argued that the national agreements ended, and should end, with the Federal operation to which they were an incident. Mr. Taft, now Chief Justice, over his signature supported that position that the national agreements ceased to be effective with the end of Federal operation, and thereafter had no legally binding control over either party. The railways of course were not even a party to the agreements. They had opposed them, and did not sign them, and only worked under them from patriotic motives. At the first opportunity they moved the Labor Board to abolish them and restore the prewar status.

The board decided that working rules had economic value, and that wage questions could not be adjusted without the establishment of a substitute for the national agreements. The board assumed the quasi-legislative function of providing that substitute. Just as the railways protested against the national agreements, the striking unions now protest against the board's awards regarding wages and working conditions, the substitute for the national agreements.

Before the war little more than one-third of railway workers were organized, and they were the workers most skilled in strict railway work, like the train services. They are the aristocracy of railway workers, and gained nothing by the national agreements. The strikers are the least skilled, the most easily replaced and, most important of all, they are com-

petitive with other workers in countless private industries. To give such railway workers privileges over competitive workers is to prejudice private industry in the manner that shipworkers' war wages demoralized wage standards. The train brotherhoods had fixed the industrial status of their members by negotiation and agreement over many years, and are ready to resume that procedure. They are obstructed by the tactics of the striking unions, desirous of perpetuating advantages which they do not deserve, and which they gained in a manner contrary to public interest and contrary to the principle of the Transportation act, which will be nullified if the strikers win. It will be well to make one or two points under this head plain.

The act provides that Boards of Adjustment "may be established by agreement between any carrier, group of carriers, or the carriers as a whole, and any employee or subordinate officials of carriers, or organization or group of organizations thereof." The railroads want boards local to each road or system under single management, practically the old method. The unions, other than the train services, want national boards of adjustment, with no representation of the public. The sixteen national organizations affiliated with the federation constitute the "Standard Recognized Railroad Labor Organizations," as they are termed in the board's decision 119. No others recognized, or need apply. There is no corresponding organization of railway managers. The one which existed abolished itself under the following conditions.

WHEN the Transportation act was pending the unions sought to provide legislative sanction for national adjustment boards, but Congress saw fit to leave the matter for negotiation and agreement. The manner in which the train service brotherhoods dropped that method of establishing one big railway union was set out above. The manner in which the other railway unions defeated the negotiations Congress intended was this. When the Labor Board annulled the "national agreements," which the railways never agreed to, they remanded the arrangement of a substitute to negotiations between the unions and the railways. The substitute was to be in accord with sixteen principles announced by the board, and the unions sought to set up eleven "fundamentals" of their bill of rights as the basis of the new national agreement. Subsequently, in decision 222, the board announced seven working rules, particularly affecting the shop strikers. These seven rules elicited the first dissenting minority opinion of the Labor Board. It was written by A. O. Wharton, representing labor. The Railway Employees' Department of the federation formally resolved: "By no conceivable line of reasoning can decision 222 be justified, and this body declines to accept it." In all there were 182 rules. They are not concerned with the basic rates of wages, but only with the method of calculating the wages due under the scale. One ex-

ample among the seven of decision 222 is the rule establishing week-time pay instead of punitive overtime for employees regularly assigned for work on Sundays and holidays, with the provision that such work shall be required "only when absolutely essential to the continuous operation of the railroad."

Opinions may differ regarding the propriety of the punitive pay rules. The rules are not discussed now and here. The point is the manner in which the board was compelled to act in default of the negotiation of new rules by agreement between railways and workers. In counseling agreement the board said: "Naked presentations as irreducible demands of voluminous forms of contract regulating working conditions, with instructions to sign on the dotted line, is not a performance of the obligation to decide disputes in conference if possible." It would be difficult better to describe the manner in which the unions negotiated. The union leaders demanded practically the continuance of the national agreements and, in case after case, certified the failure to agree to the board as a dispute for its settlement. The effect and apparent intention was to overwhelm the board with business beyond its capacity to perform it. It was not possible for individual railways to accept rules nationally effective. If they had done so they would have endorsed the rules the board had itself condemned, with the waste and excess cost of operation proved to be the result of the rules. To have done that would have been to prevent the adaptation of wages and rules regarding working conditions to local or regional conditions. In one word, the contest is over the nationalization of railways by the nationalization of their costs, in addition to the nationalization of their earnings. The public pays both rates and wages. The public is none too well pleased with the regulation of rates. It will be no better pleased, and not as well served, by the success of the unions' attempt to nationalize wages and working conditions. The success of the strike would in effect substitute the unions for the Labor Board as the regulator of railway costs, with undesirable reactions upon the regulation of rates to provide the wages deemed just and reasonable by those who receive them, regardless of the opinions of those who collect them from shippers for payment to the workers. The railways have abandoned the unequal contest against both the board and the unions. In an effort to denationalize the regulation of working conditions the National Association of Railway Executives disbanded, and notified the members to abide by the Labor Board's reference of these subjects to agreement between individual railways and their workers.

There is a precedent for success in such procedure. The Pennsylvania Railroad, neither before the war nor since, has been managed by the unions. The company had agreements with train service workers' unions and telegraphers.


But its rule was to deal directly with its own men, not with national unions. In this way the world's premier railway came into collision with the Labor Board's well meant attempt to legislate where there was no dispute, and was sustained by the courts. Nevertheless, last week the Pennsylvania Railroad was able to report better conditions than any

other railway. The official statement reads:

The Pennsylvania Railroad management announces "that during the first fortnight of the shopmen's strike 100 per cent. of all the train schedules, both passenger and freight, have been maintained on every portion of the system."

"Since the calling of the strike the Pennsylvania system has operated 42,436 passenger trains, of which 40,816 ran on scheduled time, constituting the unusually high proportion of 95.5 per cent. making schedule. This record is one of the best ever attained for the movement of an equal number of trains in any period on this or any railroad system."

This birdseye view enables a judgment whether the railways and the mines are operated by their owners or for the benefit of those whom they serve. The suggestion is strong that there is danger of their being operated in the manner of the unions, in defiance of the attempt to regulate them politically. The substitution of industrial for political rule, or owners' rule under political protection of public interests, has a Russian rather than American savor. There is a temptation to say that the unions are better served from a union standpoint than the Government from the standpoint of those who appoint our Government, that is to say, from the standpoint of users of railways and consumers of coal. Union rule of those basic industries is not likely to stop with them. Assertions of power which are not checked tend to further assertions. The nature of union control needs no description. It manifests itself by resistance to law, by preference of class to general interests, and by such inhumanity to fellow-workers, and exploitation of labor, as capital has never manifested in this country. Acceptance of rule by unions instead of by Congress or State enactments is difficult because unions divide more easily and numerous than Legislatures. We have many parties, but our Legislatures do not split as unions do. One of the greatest dilemmas of employers is to decide which union to obey. Readiness to obey any union is not sufficient. The right union must be selected. But the selection may be made with entire good-will toward labor in general, and unionism in particular, with no assurance that the chosen union will or can protect the employer against punishment by the other union. The near success of the mine workers in overcoming the principles of the anthracite award, and the difficulty in enforcing the decisions of the Labor Board, may well cause reconsideration of the rightful position of unionism in our political and



CHARLES RANSOM MILLER

Editor of The New York Times, 1883-1922, Who Died on July 18, in His Seventy-fourth Year, After More Than Forty-seven Years' Service With The Times, Nearly Forty Years As Editor-in-Chief.

From a Portrait by Haskell Coffin, Which Was Painted Recently From Life

The Legislative Week in Washington

Special Correspondence of The Annalist.
WASHINGTON, July 22, 1922.

ADMINISTRATION officials expressed confidence that the coal strike deadlock would be solved in time to avert a serious coal famine, which would result in suffering and stagnation of industry next Winter. The President's plan for a Federal commission and forced arbitration would, it was felt, bring about an orderly resumption of mining.

Insurgents in the Senate continued their attack upon high rates in the tariff bill submitted by the Finance Committee—an amendment by Senator Lenroot limiting duties to 75 per cent. ad valorem was adopted. Committee rates in some instances had been as high as 119 per cent. Senator Robinson indicated that a vote might be taken earlier than had been expected.

Responsibility for non-recognition of Mexico was placed squarely up to Obregon by a high Administration official. Recognition awaits definite action by the Mexican Government assuring security of American vested rights in Mexico.

A. H. G. Fokker, Dutch airplane builder, conferred with Secretary of War Weeks preliminary to transferring his airplane building plant from Europe to America. He expressed the belief that America was the field for manufacture.

Senator Underwood introduced a bill directing the President to appoint an American commission to adjudicate Lusitania claims and claims of other Americans against Germany. He charged in a speech that while bills were being introduced to give money back to Germany, Americans who had claims were being neglected.

Thomas L. Chadbourne, who negotiated the proposed Midvale-Republic-Inland steel merger, conferred with the Federal Trade Commission. He stated that the project never had been discussed with officials of the United States Steel Corporation and denied an intention to combine with the Bethlehem, Youngstown, Brier Hill or Steel Tube Company of America.

The war fraud grand jury indicted ten defendants in the surplus lumber cases. These were the first indictments of the so-called war contract cases. The charge was made of conspiracy to defraud the Government of \$1,800,000 in sales of surplus lumber.

Secretary of State Hughes will head the special commission to attend the Brazilian centennial celebration in September.

The Department of Justice recommended returning all the anti-profiteering fines collected under the Lever law.

Judge Lovett of the department, who wrote the opinion, took the ground that, as the Supreme Court had declared the Lever law unconstitutional, the fines should be returned.

Henry Ford's Muscle Shoals proposal

was voted down by the Senate Committee on Agriculture. The committee also voted down Senator Norris's Government operation plan. Both proposals are to

Continued on Page 78



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Bonds

Short Term Notes

Acceptances

The Economic Basis of a Solvent State

By Dr. R. Estcourt

PEOPLE who still cling to ideas of gold reserves in proportion to paper issues as the sine qua non of State solvency will have been astonished by recent remarks of Hugo Stinnes, the

man whose name has recently become so prominent as the economic giant of Germany. Mr. Stinnes opposes a short-term loan which, he says, would provide nothing but a brief breathing pause. The German advocates of such a loan, consciously or unconsciously, are actuated by political rather than ultimate economic motives. They can see clearly that it would immediately improve matters, but they shut their eyes to what would follow. Things are so desperate in Central Europe that anywhere a majority would probably favor any course that would make things better for a little while, hoping that during that while the next step would become clearer. This view accords with the interests of politicians. We must not attribute to them bad faith. What they lack is capacity to look far ahead.

At this juncture the sound advice of a man like Stinnes should be given the most serious consideration. He utters a timely warning against a temporary expedient that would prove to be a step backward, making the next step even more difficult that it is at present. He points out that a short-term loan would only increase the value of German exchange artificially and for a short time, making impossible far-seeing plans for economic reconstruction through uncertainty of what would happen at the expiration of the term of the loan. It requires no great acumen to perceive that the strength of the advocates of such a loan lies in the immense support they would instinctively receive from holders of German paper marks who, during the currency of the loan, would have an opportunity of getting out of part of their expected loss, some probably even making a profit. These holders are so depressed by the position to which their speculation in exchange has brought them that they would welcome any action that would afford an opportunity of escape. Many of them genuinely believe that if by any means the exchange could be given a filip good must inevitably result; others desire to see the filip regardless of subsequent consequences. These latter are not unpatriotic people. They are merely short-sighted and indifferent, inclined to believe that what they cannot see does not exist. The two groups together constitute a very powerful following and therein lies the danger. Only men of the far vision and intense patriotism of Stinnes can compass the whole prospect. Such see that a short-term loan would only increase the misery of the people. For that reason Stinnes urges the study of a comprehensive permanent solution. He believes that if the German people want to survive and grow again to their former economic stature, they must work more intensely until they produce at least two billions more value than at present.

The actual amount of what should be produced is in some degree unimportant. What is important is the principle involved. In the enunciation of that principle Stinnes has pointed to what is the true economic basis of a solvent State. In the elucidation of this basis we shall find that although a gold standard is not eternally essential, yet it is very desirable at present and, so far as the world has yet proceeded, gold has been demonstrated to be the most convenient measure of value. Yet gold is only a means to an end. To believe in gold reserve ratios as the be-all and end-all of economic reconstruction is to follow a will-o'-the-wisp. The absolutely es-

sential condition is the production of exchangeable wealth in excess of current needs of those engaged in its production. In so far as improvement in exchanges increases the international valuation of the wealth produced, such improvement is an important consideration, but it is an improvement that can scarcely go hand in hand with increased production; it may follow very closely, but it cannot lead. What Mr. Stinnes sees is that a loan to any Government is of no permanent use in the present juncture unless the money is employed wholly in developing the potential wealth of the nation into exchangeable wealth, and he rightly fears that the bulk of the money provided by any of the proposed short-term loans would merely be used to meet current expenses with the ultimate indirect result of paying off those speculators in marks at a higher price than the present position warrants. At the end of the period it would be found that the exchange value of the mark had been temporarily raised and that on the whole outstanding issue of State paper in the aggregate, the mean difference between that price and its price when the loan was effected would be almost exactly balanced by the expenditure of the loan.

The more astute speculators would obtain more than the average rise in valuation; the others less, but the mean difference would be obtained out of the proceeds of the loan. The net result would be the same as if the German Government were to distribute the proceeds of the loan among the holders of paper marks by buying their paper at an improved price. In the end the value of the paper would fall back to its existing level and the German people would be burdened with paying off the money gratuitously distributed by their Government. The only mitigation would be such slight temporary gain as might occur through the artificial stimulation of business during the process, while there would be a probability of a reaction more than outweighing the advance.

The return to normal conditions will be greatly facilitated by general realization of what is implied in a modern solvent State. It has become essential to recognize that the progress of the last half century has caused to pass away the days when a State could function politically simultaneously with a failure to function economically. Such a State today could only be the equivalent of a band of brigands or a band of paupers. The alternative is federation. Undoubtedly the world at large gains by the individuality fostered through the independence of small groups, but their status must be entirely economic. Such a group must not attempt the adoption of the official and military trappings which a great country is able to maintain by virtue of ample surplus wealth.

WE can best comprehend the position at which the world has arrived by looking back along the road traversed. It is questionable whether any other economic course could have been traced, or any other economic result attained, when regard is had to the aggregate psychology of human nature and its effect on the development of material resources. We can see which way we have come, but we can only look a very little way ahead in the direction we are going, wherever that may be. What we should be most concerned with is assurance of where we are. Most of our trouble arises from misapprehension on that point. Our position must be checked not alone by observation but by dead reckoning. In that way we can better determine the course a little way ahead.

The old-fashioned political or military

State consisted of so many workers, so many soldiers, so many nobles and military officers with a king at their head, and a number of priests who, in addition to exercising religious functions and conducting all ceremonials, carried on the civil functions of sanitation and education which today devolve upon local governments. The maintenance of highways, provision of water supply and other engineering matters were the business of the army, assisted by unskilled labor by prisoners of war. In periods of peace and great prosperity, periods that were far longer than generally imagined, owing to the undue emphasis given by historians to the more dramatic incidents of war, the priests suggested the erection of temples, palaces and other symbols of national greatness, which were then undertaken by joint enterprise, the unskilled labor being performed by captives. What corresponds to modern State extraordinary finance for military purposes was accomplished by raiding neighboring States and carrying off their treasure. The preliminary expenses usually were provided by contributions from the more wealthy citizens, who were rewarded in the event of a successful enterprise, a spoils system wherein the victors took all.

CERTAIN military-minded individuals of too great influence at the present fail to realize that this condition of affairs has passed away. It passed away when the army ceased to be a privileged body into which it was difficult to gain entrance. Modern war is not an affair of soldiers only, but an affair of the whole people. Conscription and the conditions of modern war had their inception in the medieval walled city, not in the empires of the past. Conscription is essentially a democratic institution; the privileged army is the aristocratic affair. These days are democratic and we must find our precedents in the practices of the burghers' walled cities, not in the imperialistic conditions of ancient empires whose military equipment consisted only of side-arms and a baggage train. Those armies lived upon the country through which they passed. The provision of the plant necessary for modern military operations will occupy all the people who are not actively engaged in fighting, which was much the case in the medieval cities, whose entire wealth was in the city and liable to complete destruction if the defense failed. With the failure of that defense disappeared the means of creating the wealth which the victor foolishly hoped would recoup him for the expenses of victory, a consequence closely paralleled by present experience.

In old times when an army went forth to war there was an end of the matter until it returned. It lived upon the countries raided and relied upon those countries to supply additional equipment of all sorts, even engines of war. Its own people pursued their ordinary avocations, but their minds were occupied by the important question of whether the army would return victorious, bringing hordes of captives to lighten the labors of the coming years, and spoils for the enjoyment of all, or whether it would be driven home before another conqueror, and its civil population be obliged to take their turn in serving some other State. The change was political only, not economic. It was a question of which party should serve and which enjoy, not a destruction of civilization, for civilization in those days depended but little on its plant and commercial equipment. The only things then destroyed were cheaply constructed fortifications. Agriculture survived; the hoarded grain and the cattle merely passed to the control of the victors. The

normal energies of the people had not been diverted in any way; the country was still a going concern. The change for either party was social, from masters to servants. The palaces had new occupants; the temples possibly a fresh ritual, possibly only a change of celebrants. So little was the civil population perturbed that they frequently assisted in destroying their unsuccessful generals and kings and making terms with the victors who came to take possession. With advance information of defeat they even went out to greet the victors. There was no elaborate machinery to be converted to fresh uses or reconstructed, no complicated commercial organization to be put out of gear. Such ships as were destroyed were not merchantmen, but only galleys built of wood in a few weeks, mere floating stations for fighting men. There was no wholesale destruction of the work of thousands of mechanics and finely constructed machinery.

Alexander set out on his raid into Asia with 10,000 men, annexing mercenaries and camp followers on the way. His successes were largely due to the desertions of those who were discontented with their rulers and played for safety by welcoming him instead of resisting. His own country had practically no concern with his affairs. He disappeared from the life of Europe as completely as a Polar explorer would today. The narrow swathe that he cut through Mesopotamia was easily closed over by the next harvest. The wanton destruction of the art of Persepolis and a few blurs in other places represented the whole material loss caused.

Even so late as the battle of Waterloo less than 100,000 men were engaged on either side, and the countries represented had no need to disorganize their civil life to provide equipment for the armies. Most of Napoleon's campaigns were settled in a single battle. Up to that time and later, an army was but a multiple champion that went out to do single combat to decide the issue. The memorable 400,000 who marched to Moscow beat but a narrow path across Europe and caused a relatively small amount of damage to the city of their goal. Their terrible sufferings stand out dramatically as a memorial of military madness, but compared with what has occurred in these last years, they are statistically negligible. If there is one lesson to be drawn from the late war and still more terrible peace, it is that military operations can no longer be undertaken as a thing apart from national life. They are like the military operations of the walled city of old when existence was the stake. Today every man, woman and child is involved; every factory, every elevator, every merchant vessel and every distributive organization. The whole fabric goes to pieces as a

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consequence, and the disastrous political peace attempted has demonstrated that we have passed into a new era where the diplomatist and politician are no longer competent to deal with the consequences of war. What has been destroyed is an economic fabric, not a political fabric. Its reconstruction must be economic, a work for industrial engineers and bankers. These were called in to furnish the means for conducting the war when the politicians found themselves defunct. The same groups must be called in to reconstruct the edifice.

Our ideas of war and peacemaking have been taken from the days of Napoleon and earlier. The episodes that have since occurred have been too brief to accentuate the effects of war under modern industrial conditions, which have only been developed with such alarming acceleration during the last few decades. Some inkling of what was to be expected, whenever military operations on a grand scale should once more come about, could have been gathered from the commercial dislocation that occurred in this country after our Civil War. Some idea of the stupendous efforts necessary might have been gathered from what had to be done in such a relatively trifling undertaking as the Boer war. The Russo-Japanese war gave further unheeded warning of what would happen in a general conflagration. But the old ruling class were too little enlightened to be able to perceive that their methods were already in the discard, that to conduct a war something more would be necessary than a mere declaration and ordering of troops to the scene. The whole commercial and industrial organization had to be called into action, and the leaders of that organization had to be appealed to to save the rulers from contempt; and when the making of peace came about it was still believed that the old parties could sit in secret about a table with a few maps before them and operate as in ancient days in total disregard of the functions of the men whose assistance had been so recently needed. Too slowly it is being discovered that commercial and industrial organizers are as necessary to the making of peace as in the making of war. Feathers may be artistic decorations, but a mother cannot safely be thinking of these when her children are starving, or when the starving children of neighbors are becoming a menace to the safety of her domicile.

What most European States require at the present time is the services of an industrial engineer. But if such service is to be of any avail, the politician will have to stand aside for the time being. It would be impossible successfully to reorganize a factory if the President of the corporation made rules that precluded the use of the most convenient doorways and insisted on processes being commenced on the ground floor that should properly start on the topmost story. Yet this is very like the difficulties that confront the business men who clearly recognize what should be done in Europe and attempt to do it.

The best way of doing anything usually in the long run is found to be the simplest and, because it is so simple, people pass that method by. Smaller minds always imagine that great accomplishments must be brought about by complicated processes. It is the old story of the Syrian General who was angry because the healer he consulted prescribed what appeared too simple a remedy. Naaman had immense power and would have preferred to employ the services of hundreds of servants in performing complicated offices or in bringing remedies from remote parts of the earth. He would have been pleased if the prescription had demanded something sensational. He was annoyed when he learned that the cure for his ills was close at hand and open to any one. That is exactly the case with the European States. The lesson lies within the domain of any well conducted corporation, but to say so gives offense. That is making the matter too simple, and such simplicity of prescription

touches the pride of those accustomed to give extensive orders involving the movements of armies and other sensational efforts.

The majority of people have not yet recognized that the solvency of a State of the present day depends upon precisely the same conditions as the solvency of a corporation. Except, perhaps, for very large self-supporting federations, the period has ended when isolation was possible. A State that does not recognize that will soon be unrecognizable economically. In every factory there is a place where the process can most efficiently be commenced and a most efficient order in which it can be completed. The railways and waterways of a State correspond to the trolleys that convey the product at each stage to where the next process takes place. The tendency will be to adapt them to the needs of the area served as a whole. In Europe eighty years had been spent in this process and now something has occurred by which everything that is wanted is in the wrong place. It is as if the process that should take place in the top story were commenced in the middle of the structure, the goods then being hauled to the top, then half way down and up again, and so on. Each floor of the European factory is under separate management of inexperienced foremen, supported in their ignorance by a super power that is interested only in the decorations of the building and little concerned as to efficiency so long as the result will provide the means to obtain decorative materials. Mr. Stinnes recognizes this and is roaring his demands that the disorder shall cease.

THE essentials of production are raw material and labor that is maintained in the most efficient condition. The success of this country is due to that last factor. The next need is to maintain the plant in perfect running order, the equipment up to date. The industrial engineer demands these conditions as an essential preliminary to his operations. Then he can arrange the processes in such order as to bring about the greatest result with the minimum of effort. When all these conditions are attended to there will be a large surplus of value. Without the production of surplus value there is no fund out of which taxation can legitimately be paid and no fund on which the owners of property can draw if they desire to avoid eventual bankruptcy. For a time the owners of the property can sell the products and spend the proceeds, while the fiscal administrator can absorb in taxes what should properly go to the maintenance of the workers and the plant, but this course will

sooner or later bring its own Nemesis. It is just what has been taking place in Europe. Taxes have been paid at the expense of the efficient support of the workers and gross receipts have been squandered as if they were profits, a process fostered by inflation of State currency. The results seen are due solely to this condition of affairs.

It is essential to get down to business. The State requires contributions and the owners of property wish for spending money. Neither can have these for long if the economic organization is defective. Borrowing to provide them defers the evil day but makes the crash greater when it comes. The production of the surplus value or economic rent necessary to supply these needs is the be-all and end-all of a modern progressive State. Obviously, then, the conditions are the same as for a single corporation. Art, science and all forms of magnificence are contingent upon the production of surplus value. If these be cultivated at the expense of the sustenance of the workers or the maintenance of the plant, the State will soon cease to function independently. Few people consider that nearly all plant is completely replaced every four years, some of it oftener. They get an insight into this necessity when they start keeping an automobile and find out how long a tire lasts, and how long the whole machine will endure if signs of wear in any part are neglected. It is a common error to imagine that when one has set up a factory and equipped it to turn out a certain quantity of goods at an estimated profit the apparent profit can be enjoyed indefinitely, and that the lower the pay of the workers the greater will be the profit. The necessary experience is soon gained, but its date usually corresponds with taking possession by the creditors' receiver.

Precisely the same elements enter into the composition of a modern State. There are the workers, the plant, the property owners and the tax collectors. Unless these are properly organized the results will be apparent about as quickly as they have become apparent between the Treaty of Versailles and the present time.

THE essential, from the lowest workman to the highest official. The industrial engineer cannot function until he has been fed. If the property owners do not recognize this and temporarily go on a short diet to permit of a proper start, they may presently find themselves on no diet at all, like some of the European nobility. It makes no difference whatever to the efficiency of a State whether there be few or many property owners (taking property not as the

equivalent of mere possessions, but as the capitalized value of the right to enjoy economic rent or surplus value), whether they are well fed or otherwise. That is their own affair and depends entirely on their sense in recognizing the conditions under which alone their income can be continued. When we consider the frequent need for replacement of plant the result should be very encouraging, for if it has always been customary and necessary to replace most plant every four years or oftener, it is obvious that the destruction of war and diversion to other uses should not take more than four years to remedy at the outside. The remedy is one that has been automatically applied in ordinary times before the war. Just as with a corporation, so in the case of a State, the organization must today be directed by business men, among whom must operate the most experienced and highly trained industrial engineers. There must be no outside power to frustrate the operations of the business men, and this, translated into terms of European requirements, means the razing of the obstructions caused by frontiers and custom houses, and the adoption of monetary and other standards common to large federated areas. Goods must move freely across the whole of Europe, and railways and waterways must be operated so as to bring the goods with the least delay to the spot where they are required to be delivered. Incidentally, Rumania might be required to repair and deliver back to Hungary the locomotives and rolling stock which were employed in conveying away the loot of that country after it was disarmed, the cars being reloaded with the loot or its equivalent. This would solve some of the export troubles that Rumania is considering at the moment. At present the Hungarian cars and locomotives are rotting and rusting in Rumania.

The meaning of Mr. Stinnes's words is now apparent. To lend money to any Government as at present conducted would simply result in temporarily increasing the incomes of officials and holders of existing paper currency. The immediate result would be an increased demand for goods that would be imported because internal production would not respond to the needs with sufficient rapidity. The distribution of the money would afford a certain amount of employment in the nature of service to the rich, to such as waiters in restaurants and providers of luxuries. This would indirectly affect all other workers, giving the impression of good times and an opportunity to the boosters to assert that the corner had been turned. Yet it would be like a rock hurled into a drying pond, causing wavelets to be mistaken for the replenishment of a stream. Instead of increasing the amount of water the effect would be to further evaporation by splashing the water onto the hot banks of the pond.

If it be essential to uphold the existing political Governments of these non-functioning States, the desirability of which is questionable, one must clearly understand that a loan to such Governments is in the nature of a dole and must be regarded quite apart from any effort to set the people on their feet. The latter result can be secured only by supplying commercial corporations with up-to-date plant, the agriculturalists with modern implements, and financing the productive wage bill in the interval between the establishment of the plant and its efficient operation. Foreign bankers from America or elsewhere must be enabled to establish themselves in the several countries to facilitate the provision of these things on hire-purchase terms, or after the manner of financing buildings where advances are made on duly accredited certificates of growth in construction. The end to be secured is that any advances from this country should take the form of industrial and agricultural plant and such other assistance as an ordinary commercial banker is accustomed to supply in developing possessions into property and making the income available for the issue of banker's currency.

The Legislative Week in Washington

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come before the Senate as minority reports.

Money loaned to farmers on mortgages would be exempt from income taxes under a bill introduced by Senator McCumber, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.

Chairman Jones of the Senate Commerce Committee announced in the Senate plans to press the River and Harbor Development bill in whatever spare time there might be during consideration of the tariff bill.

The House bill designed to relieve 7,500 subscribers for Liberty loans through banks which have failed, was passed and now goes to conference. The claims involve a total of \$254,000, which it is authorized to determine and pay.

President Harding recommended legislation enabling the United States to transfer its diplomatic representation at Luxemburg from the American Minister at The Hague to the Ambassador at Brussels.

The Administration Ship Subsidy bill was attacked in a speech by Senator Fletcher, Democrat, of Florida, ranking minority member of the Senate Commerce Committee.

Announcement was made by the State Department that President Harding had proclaimed ratification of the Yap treaty negotiated between the United States and Japan during the arms conference.

A bill to prevent evasions of the anti-trust laws, as recommended by the Federal Trade Commission in the Standard Oil cases, was introduced by Senator Walsh, Democrat, of Montana.

Senator Townsend, Republican, of Michigan, proposed a constitutional amendment giving the Federal Government jurisdiction over the hours and character of employment of all minors under eighteen years of age.

The lease provision requiring oil companies operating on Indian lands in the mid-continent field to settle for royalty oils at a specified price was annulled by Secretary Fall after many companies had protested that the price was far above that being received for their product. As a substitute basis for settlement, Secretary Fall instructed superintendents of Indian agencies to accept "the price at which not less than a majority of the oil of similar gravity sold for" during the period in question in that field.

The Economic Position of Finland

By C. C. Latour

F

INLAND is one of the few European nations that have made substantial progress toward rehabilitating their economic structure. With the possible exception of Czechoslovakia, she is today the soundest European State born out of the turmoil of the recent war. Little has been written or thought about Finland, due probably to her small area, her proximity to Russia and to general lack of knowledge about conditions in that country. Her prodigious efforts toward the improvement of her economic position, however, are worthy of attention.

Before the war Finland was united to the Russian Empire as an autonomous Grand Duchy, but she possessed her own currency system, postal service, railways and customs tariff. On Dec. 6, 1917, after the downfall of the Russian Empire, Finland declared her independence and she has since been recognized by most of the European nations (including Soviet Russia), by the United States and other countries.

The land area of the country at present is 129,549 square miles, slightly larger than the State of New Mexico and over two and one-half times the area of the State of New York. The population at the end of 1920 was 3,367,542, of which 85 per cent. resided in the country districts. The country is not densely populated, for the population per square mile amounts to only 26, as compared with 30 in the United States, 34 in Sweden, 195 in Denmark, and 250 in Czechoslovakia.

Racially the country is a unit, about 90 per cent. of the population being Finns and the remainder largely Swedes. Finnish is the sole tongue of the peasants and most of the lower and middle classes in the towns, but Swedish is understood in all the towns and in many is the predominant language. Russian is little understood and less used.

The educational standards of Finland have always been very high and certainly 96 per cent. of the population is literate. Education is free, sectarian and compulsory.

The Finn is industrious and steady and the country has experienced no serious labor troubles. A recent dispute in the metal industry was settled by concessions on both sides, and the friendly character of the negotiations between employers and employees gave great satisfaction. The number of unemployed has been rather small as compared with that of other countries. On Jan. 31, 1922, only 3,571 men and women were registered as unemployed out of a population of 3,368,000. In general, the workers live at least as well, if not better, than before the war. Co-operation has a strong foothold in the country and the number of co-operative societies has grown from 51 in 1902 to 1,996 in 1913 and to 2,988 in 1918.

The national wealth of Finland in 1920 was officially estimated at 30,238,000,000 Finnish marks (\$1,511,900,000 at the average exchange rate in 1920), of which State-owned property amounted to 9,387,000,000 Finnish marks (\$469,350,000).

Agriculture is the chief occupation of the people, although the cultivated area covers only 8.5 per cent. of the land. In 1910 the land was divided into 284,188 farms, only 14,108 of which were over 62 acres. Owing to the high latitude, to the short Summer season, and to the limited cultivable area, Finland's domestic supply of agricultural products is less than her requirements. The wheat crop is small, and the wheat flour consumed is almost all imported. The barley and rye crops, moreover, suffice for only about one-half the consumption. In 1921, however, the harvest was above

the average and the importation of foodstuffs was reduced by about one-half as compared with 1920.

Finland's greatest source of wealth lies in its timber lands. The State-owned forests cover 30,900,000 acres out of a total of 49,400,000 acres of forest land in the country. In other respects the natural resources of the country are limited.

The most important Finnish industries

mark made it possible for the ships to operate at a profit.

Before, during and since the war Finland has possessed an annual excess of merchandise imports. Since 1919, however, the percentage of her exports to her imports has been growing rapidly. In 1921 it equaled 94.5 per cent. as against 80.7 in 1920, 35.1 in 1919 and 81.7 in 1913. The 1921 ratio, in fact, has not been equaled since 1895. Im-

Foreign Trade of Finland

(in millions of Finnish marks)

Monthly Average	Imports	Exports	Excess Imports	Per Cent. Exports to Imports
Year 1913	41.3	33.7	7.6	81.7
Year 1919	209.2	73.4	135.8	35.1
Year 1920	302.2	243.9	58.3	80.7
Year 1921	298.6	282.2	16.4	94.5
January, 1921	194.7	95.4	99.3	49.0
February, 1921	271.1	64.2	206.9	23.7
March, 1921	170.4	58.4	112.0	34.3
April, 1921	297.0	111.2	185.8	37.4
May, 1921	340.3	138.9	201.4	40.8
June, 1921	332.4	247.5	84.9	74.5
July, 1921	293.8	338.3	44.5*	115.2
August, 1921	349.6	393.7	44.1*	112.6
September, 1921	377.5	546.1	168.6*	144.7
October, 1921	366.5	562.3	195.8*	153.4
November, 1921	285.6	515.4	229.8*	180.5
December, 1921	305.0	314.0	9.0*	103.0
January, 1922	146.1	146.5	0.4*	100.3
February, 1922	116.6	116.3	0.3	99.7
March, 1922	225.7	200.1	25.6	88.7
April, 1922	322.0	256.0	66.0	79.5

*Excess exports.

are, of course, the lumber, paper and pulp industries. The dairy industry is also important and butter ranks second only to forest products among the exports. The textile, iron and mechanical goods, leather and tobacco industries are the other important industries of the country. In 1913 Finland had 4,709 large manufacturing establishments, employing an aggregate of 109,238 workers and yielding an aggregate product of 749,996,900 Finnish marks (\$144,749,000 at par).

Practically all of the railways of Finland were built and are operated by the State. On Dec. 31, 1920, the railways had a total length of 2,685 miles, 93.1 per cent. of which was owned by the State. The capital invested in the railways has been largely raised at home, in Paris and in London. Construction has been at a comparatively low cost and capitalization per mile is very low. The position of the Finnish railways in 1913 as compared with the railways of other countries is shown in the following table:

COMPARATIVE RAILWAY STATISTICS, 1913

Country	Capital Invested Per Mile of Line	Operating Ratio	State-Owned Line Miles
Finland	\$36,711	68.8%	91.1%
Argentina	53,073	62.8%	18.0%
United States	82,950	65.8%	0.0%
Great Britain	284,600	61.8%	0.0%

The Finnish railway system has been undisturbed by the war and it is more distinctly fitted to the requirements of the new republic than in many of the other new States of Europe.

Finland's merchant marine amounted to 461,883 gross tons in 1920, as compared with 432,717 gross tons in 1913. Her merchant marine tonnage per capita in 1920 was 0.14 gross tons, equal to the per capita merchant tonnage of the United States.

Although Finnish shipping, in common with that of other countries, has been dull part of the time since the war, on the whole it has been prosperous. Finland did not suffer from the sharp decline in freight rates as much as other countries, partly because most Finnish vessels can operate at a very low cost. Although freight rates in 1921 were very low, the depreciation of the Finnish

port values, however, are reckoned c. i. f. and export values f. o. b., so it is not surprising that the tendency has been for import values to exceed export values.

THE excess of merchandise imports is probably covered by insurance and freights received. In 1919 Finland's excess of merchandise imports totaled 1,629,515,000 Finnish marks and her gross shipping revenue amounted to 277,809,000 Finnish marks, leaving an adverse balance of 1,351,706,000 Finnish marks. In 1920 her excess of merchandise imports amounted to 700,100,000 Finnish marks and her gross shipping revenue to 447,314,000 Finnish marks, so her adverse balance was reduced to 252,786,000 Finnish marks. Finland's excess of merchandise imports in 1921 amounted to only 197,400,000 Finnish marks, which was probably more than covered by her gross shipping revenue.

The remarkable recovery of Finland's trade position is reflected, moreover, in the fact that in July, 1921, her former excess of merchandise imports was turned into an excess of exports. This excess of exports was maintained until February, 1922, when the balance swung back again to an excess of imports. Finland's trade is highly seasonal and it is probable that during the latter half of this year she will re-establish her excess of merchandise exports. The movement of Finland's merchandise trade is shown.

Russia was Finland's principal export market in 1913, taking 28.0 per cent. of her total exports; while Great Britain took 26.8 per cent. and Germany 12.9 per cent. In 1921 Great Britain purchased 33.8 per cent. of her exports, Sweden 12.0 per cent., and Germany 10.9 per cent., while Russia bought an insignificant proportion. The establishment of stable conditions in Russia, therefore, should open up a fertile field for Finnish products.

In 1913 Finland took 40.9 per cent. of her imports from Germany, 28.2 per cent. from Russia, and 12.2 per cent. from Great Britain; but in 1921 she bought 33.7 per cent. of her imports from Germany, 19.8 per cent. from Great Britain, and 17.0 per cent. from the United States. Finland, therefore, sold her export goods in 1921 largely to high

exchange countries and bought her import goods chiefly from low exchange countries.

The principal exports of Finland are lumber, wood-pulp, paper and butter. In 1921 timber and wood products constituted 45.2 per cent. of Finland's exports, paper products 33.3 per cent. and animal foodstuffs (chiefly butter) 12.9 per cent. These three items made up 91.4 per cent. of Finland's total exports. Her forest and cattle-farming industry are, therefore, of the greatest importance in regulating her balance of international payments.

Foodstuffs are the principal imports and formed 42.4 per cent. of Finland's total imports in 1921. Metals and machinery constituted 16.4 per cent. and textiles 12.7 per cent. Cereals are prominent among the imports because the country does not produce grain in sufficient quantities for the needs of the population. Imports of metals, machinery and textiles reflect the country's paucity of metals and industrial need of raw materials.

Finland has not only improved her trade position, but she has also made substantial progress toward improving her financial position. In the thirty-three years prior to the war (1882-1914) the total revenues of Finland exceeded her expenditures in every year, with the exception of the years 1902, 1904, 1905, 1908, 1910, 1911, 1913 and 1914. From 1915 to 1919 revenues again exceeded expenditures. In 1920 a deficit of 178,000,000 Finnish marks was recorded, and in 1921 the deficit rose to 186,954,000 Finnish marks. The budget estimate for 1922, however, shows that the deficit has been reduced markedly to only 7,891,000,000 Finnish marks, which will be covered by funds now at the disposal of the Treasury. A comparison of the budgets for 1921 and 1922 is given in the following table, in thousands of Finnish marks:

Revenue	1921	1922
Ordinary	2,154,856	2,127,493
Extraordinary and supplementary ..	329,295	41,275
Total	2,484,151	2,168,768
Expenditure	1921	1922
Ordinary	1,808,631	1,931,296
Extraordinary and supplementary ..	862,474	245,363
Total	2,671,105	2,176,659
Deficit	186,954	7,891

The ratio of ordinary revenue to ordinary expenditure in the budget for 1922 is 110.2 per cent., as compared with 119.1 per cent. in 1921, 82.7 per cent. in 1919, and 114.2 per cent. in 1913. Of the total ordinary revenue in the budget for 1922, indirect taxes are estimated to yield 32.3 per cent., State property 28.7 per cent., and direct taxes 21.8 per cent.

The growth of direct taxation in Finland has been remarkable. In 1913 direct taxes accounted for only 3.6 per cent. of the ordinary revenue, while in 1922 they amount to 21.8 per cent. of the ordinary revenue. The most important direct tax is that on income and capital, introduced in 1920.

Expenditures on communications and public works form 50.1 per cent. of the total expenditure in the budget for 1922. The expenditure for the War Ministry has been reduced 26,000,000 Finnish marks as compared with 1921 and, in proportion to the total amount of Government expenditure, the outlay for the defense of the country amounts to only 14.1 per cent. The establishment of stability in Russia, moreover, will permit a further reduction of military expenditures.

Service on the national debt in the budget for 1922 is estimated at 10.9 per cent. of the total expenditures, a percentage which in many other countries is considerably exceeded.

The public debt of Finland on Dec.

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The British Public and the War Debts

By Alzada Comstock



SINCE the Bankers' Committee decided in June that no international loan could be offered to Germany as long as her creditors failed to agree on the limit of reparation payments, the discussion of the remission of interallied debts has started up afresh. People have begun to speak freely on a subject which formerly has been treated, in British-American relations at least, as one of some delicacy. Before any unanimity of opinion was reached in Great Britain the French financial mission left for the United States to discuss the question, and Great Britain was left in a rather uncomfortable state of inactivity.

The path of logic from the French attitude on reparations to Great Britain's debt to the United States now is a short one. France cannot give up her early hopes of reparation payments while her external obligations remain unchanged. The Prime Minister has announced that Great Britain's financial plans do not permit the remission of France's debt without receiving a corresponding benefit from the United States. Hence, debt cancellation by the United States emerges again as a live issue.

The question of the remission of interallied debts first was put before the general public in 1919 by John Maynard Keynes in his volume "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." This book was read widely and discussed, and for the first time the ordinary citizen began to understand the size of England's debt to the United States and the sacrifice which the huge annual interest payments would mean, to say nothing of the payment of the principal. Just before the book was published Great Britain made an arrangement with the United States for the postponement of the interest due on the debt, although it was felt in some circles that a great nation like Great Britain should not have been put in the position of petitioning for time in which to meet her financial obligations. At any rate the difficulty of getting together the money for interest payments, which became obvious for the first time, gave an unexpected point to Mr. Keynes's observations. The issue was taken up in influential quarters, and even Mr. Asquith, in public speeches made shortly afterward, followed very closely Mr. Keynes's line of argument. As the case for the remission of debts by the United States took form in popular discussions, it rested mainly on the moral obligation of the United States to bear the brunt of money payments in the same spirit in which Great Britain had undergone her great losses of life. Nothing was done, and although a tradition grew up that the great and rich country across the Atlantic was a hard creditor, the actual agitation died down within a few months.

In the early part of 1922 and up to the events of the early Summer, public opinion has been passing through another phase. Great Britain has laid an iron hand upon the Exchequer, and although the methods used in improving the country's financial position fail to satisfy everybody, or it might be said almost any two groups of people at the same point, it is undeniable that a real economy has been brought about, and underneath the conventional British grumbling at Government methods there is a general satisfaction and pride in the honest systematic efforts of the Government to cut down expenses and to reduce taxation. In proof of the sincerity of this attempt it only need be noted that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has asked for the advice of a business men's committee on national economy and has followed that advice, that he has cut down the national expenditure by more

than £150,000,000, and that he has reduced the income tax and import duties.

The attitude of the public toward the country's external debt could not fail to be affected by such an effort as this. In order to understand why this is so, it must be remembered that the interest of the country at large in political affairs is more acute than in the United States, probably on account of the small area of the kingdom and the fact that the political capital and the great commercial and financial metropolis are one and the same centre, and that political news is featured in the press of all parties and types in a fashion which is unusual in the United States. Great Britain's return to more nearly normal budget figures meant that "the man in the street" understood quite clearly what was happening and that he began to forget that his country ever had been other than an independent financial power. The idea of asking a favor of any country whatsoever again became repugnant to him. He viewed with a distinct pride the budget provision of £25,000,000 for the first interest payment to the United States after the three years' postponement, and he began to tell his business associates that of course the debt must be met, principal as well as interest; that the English nation must be beholden to nobody.

INTO the midst of returning confidence came the reverberations of the reparations discussions with France and the work of the Bankers' Committee. The people who make up England's every-day working world at last came to understand a thing which the men in positions of responsibility had had facilities for grasping long before—the fact that France could not find a way to meet her own external debts unless the reparation figures were kept high and unless Germany was forced to meet them. The critical attitude toward the leaders of the French Government, which can be found in a number of quarters, does not extend to the French people, and the ordinary Englishman's temperamental leanings toward abstract justice give him an honest desire to understand the basis of the continued international discussions. On the other hand, public sentiment on reparations has traveled a long road since the general election of 1918, and there is almost no section of the people which, for one reason or another, does not want to see reparation figures scaled down. But if they are lowered, how can France pay England what she owes and how can England pay the United States? Confused as the subject of international payments is in the mind of the small-scale business man and the professional (as it is in every country), there seems to be a partial understanding at least of the French point of view and of the financial difficulties which underlie it. However that may be, it can be said with certainty that almost every one in England understands that France is not going to pay her debts to Great Britain in the near future and that there is grave doubt whether she can pay them ever.

This puts Great Britain's debt to the United States in a new light. That lurking sense of injustice which showed itself in the debt discussions late in 1919 and early in 1920 is appearing again. The Englishman is no longer asking whether the British debt to the United States can be paid, for he knows that it can and he is proud of that fact, but he is asking whether it is fair that it should be insisted upon. Once again, after a long period when debt arguments were taboo, he wants to talk about the attitude of the United States. The better-informed men argue that the sums

loaned by the United States in fact were not used by Great Britain, but were passed on, through Great Britain as an intermediary, to continental countries. Why then, they say, should Great Britain be held technically responsible for that which was in fact loaned by the United States to the more impoverished countries of Europe? If great risk was involved, as subsequent events have proved, they believe that the United States should share it. The less well-informed part of the public is not equipped with enough information to argue along this line, but they welcome a chance to express a feeling of "soreness" about the debt. Only a part of the people understand the preoccupation of the American public with domestic affairs. It seems inconceivable on the eastern shores of the Atlantic that the United States should fail to understand the financial difficulties of Europe, and the only explanation that the ordinary citizen has to offer is that the world's money-getters are cold of heart.

And so the various possibilities of readjustment, and in particular the matter of cancellation by the allied and associated powers, are out in the open again. Two distinct parts of the question are being talked over at the present time. The first is England's remission of the debts due her, without reference to the possible action of the United States, and the second is the duty of the United States on the matter and the question whether Great Britain ought to take definite action toward wiping out any part of her obligations in that quarter.

The Labor Party, which is informed diligently of national issues by its large Parliamentary representation and which has a flair for finance, for a long time has wanted to see England's remission of the debts due her without reference to the action of the United States. It stands officially, however, for the complete remission of debt by all parties concerned. Last December the party asked the Prime Minister "to promote an arrangement among all the nations associated in the war for the cancellation of their mutual indebtedness created by and during the state of war." Other sections of public opinion are less organized, but it is clear that there is a general unwillingness to press England's continental debtors for payment.

To be sure, no one seems to know exactly how much England will lose in case she does remit her own debt abroad or in case she does not. Possibly she would lose almost nothing, and by a grand gesture of cancellation she might earn an international goodwill with little sacrifice. The ordinary citizen can be counted upon to punctuate his opinions on the debt question with the statement that England never can collect a penny of her own, but when it comes down to a consideration of the actual possibilities of the French debt to England he is not so willing to repeat it.

THIS popular confusion is natural, especially in view of the fact that it also runs through the highest circles, politically and financially speaking. So unimpeachable an authority as Hartley Withers, writing in the Financial Supplement of the Saturday Review for June 17 last, says that England would lose little by forgiving her debtors. Canceling bonds representing the foreign debt "would cost us little," he says, "for recovery of our allies' debt to us is generally regarded as impracticable." On that account he recommends that England should not wait for action by the United States, but should proceed at once in the direction of cancellation.

However, Lloyd George, speaking in the House of Commons on the 31st of

May, gave a wholly different twist to the whole debt argument by assuming that the total amount of England's loans to foreign countries plus reparation payments were collectible immediately. Interrupted by frequent cheers, he announced that "we cannot possibly contemplate entering into a transaction by which we should forgive all the debts due to us while we are liable for every penny which is owing to us." [Cheers.] "We want fair play and justice, and I am surprised to find that in all the proposals which have been made up to the present that aspect of the matter has not been stated."

If Great Britain's loans abroad, in fact are partly collectible, and if possibly, as John Maynard Keynes assumed, she stands neither to gain nor lose by all-round cancellation, the question arises as to the harm which the ebb and flow of interest payments will do. Why all this agitation? Why should she wish to undergo the almost endless international negotiations which remission of debt would involve? Many people in England do not carry their reasoning as far as this, but the more well informed have an answer ready. They believe that the huge burden of debt, always on the books, and the continuing uncertainty in all the details of payment, both out of and into the Exchequer, hinder the revival of commercial confidence not only in England but on the Continent. They want to know just where they stand, and to clear away the fog of the artificial billions of pounds which pad out the Treasury figures.

THE facts of the debt situation are:

Great Britain owes a little less than \$5,000,000,000 (par), almost all of which has been loaned by the United States. Other countries owe Great Britain almost twice that amount, but Russia was the largest borrower, and France and Italy owe a great part of the rest. The French debt is about \$7,000,000,000, of which one-half was loaned by the United States and nearly all of the remainder by Great Britain. Although the capital amount which France owes is more than that owed by Great Britain, her own loans to other countries are less, and one-third stands in the name of Russia. The United States has \$10,000,000,000 outstanding in foreign loans. Great Britain, France and Italy together owe \$9,000,000,000 of this.

The entire remission of war debts would mean to Great Britain a net paper loss of a capital amount of \$5,000,000,000. But if French and Italian as well as Russian debts are uncollectible, this loss is transformed into an actual gain which runs into the billions. Of course France would gain in any case, as her debt is so large relatively. The United States would lose a capital amount of \$10,000,000,000, almost half of which is owed by Great Britain and therefore is collectible.

The preoccupation of the American public with domestic affairs and its desire to restore its own commercial arrangements to a normal position, at last is coming to be understood by some sections of the British public. It is for that reason, as well as for others, that the departure of the French financial mission to the United States has been viewed with some misgiving. There is a fear that Great Britain, the necessary link in the chain of payments, will be forgotten or misunderstood in the general desire to find an immediate solution. It is feared that Great Britain's ability to meet her obligations will be mistaken for a general acceptance of the debt situation as it stands. The ordinary Englishman, like the ordinary American, is unable to work out his arguments in terms of international payments and commercial currents, but he does ask more and more insistently for a consideration of his claims on the grounds of justice.

A New Conception of an Old Science

By A. W. Russel

This Is the Sixth of a Series of Articles by Mr. Russel, the First of Which Appeared in THE ANNALIST of June 19 Last.



WE have seen the processes by which the banking system has developed; the theory of reserves under which it operates, and have outlined the elements which compose it and its general status on June 30, 1920.

The purpose of the banking system is to provide facilities for settlements of indebtedness of traders. The needs of industry, then, determine its evolution and growth in the long run. However, the machinery at times has not been adequate to perform the exchange work which the growth of industry developed. In other words, it has failed at times to meet traders' demands. Let us investigate the banking system from the trader's point of view and consider what he requires of it and whether or not his demands are reasonable and proper. He needs a medium to settle his accounts for exchange of goods or services. This medium the banking system provides in the form of bank credits, or the demand deposit liabilities of banks to their depositors, which the trader calls money. It does his work more conveniently and more efficiently than gold coin or what is technically called primary money.

We have noted that what the trader calls money is not money to his bank, and what his bank terms as money in its cash reserves is not money to his banker's reserve bank, and so on. In our use of the term "bank credit" now we refer only to commercial bank credits, the deposit balances of depositors. Distinction should be made between such bank credits and bankers' bank credits, the reserve deposit balances in reserve banks to the credit of commercial banks. The latter are merely a device within the banking system to facilitate clearings of commercial bank credits.

An earlier article cited many generally accepted notions with reference to money and banking operations and misuse of terms which obscured a true and fundamental understanding of this subject. In order to establish a proper conception of bank credit and its operation in the settlement of exchanges, one should expel from his mind every trace of the following notions: That credit money is a commodity that is loaned, deposited and withdrawn; that it is tied up in loans, foreign credits, crops or merchandise; that credits are frozen when loans are frozen; or that accumulation of wealth, or the withholding of wealth from the market, has any effect on money demands; or that price movements are dependent on the relation of the quantity of money issued and available for circulation to the amount of goods on the market.

Attempt now will be made to present a true conception of credit money and banking functions which, if conclusively proved, refutes each of the ideas above cited.

A bank credit is initiated by a borrower to obtain funds by which he can settle with his creditors. All individuals and corporations who are parts of our industrial system are creditors or debtors in the net, and the total amount of the net debts of those in the debtor class is equal to the total amount of net credits due those in the creditor class. By the process of a bank loan a commercial debtor becomes a debtor to the bank (a borrower) and when he assigns the proceeds of his loan to his creditors they become bank creditors to the extent that their commercial credits have been reduced. (These latter bank creditors hold liabilities of banks under which the bank agrees to pay them reserve money or gold on demand, but it is obvious the bank cannot do what it agrees to do. Our banking system is built on the theory that these depositors

will not demand payment in primary money, because they have not done so in the past and there is no reason for their doing so in the future, except to the slight extent that they need hand to hand circulation, and unless they lose confidence in the bank's ability to convert its investment assets into primary money.)

Bank credits, therefore, are the conversion of the liabilities of commercial debtors into the liabilities of banks to commercial creditors. These bank credits, or depositors, settle indebtedness to their creditors in turn by assignments of portions of their bank credits to their creditors. So the bank credits created by a loan become diffused among many depositors, but it must be recognized that all these bank credits, to whatever extent and in whatever amounts they are split up, are all representative of the conversion of a commercial debt into a bank debt of a commercial debtor, evidenced by a bank loan.

So, as the banking system provides means for transferring bank credits between depositors on the order checks of commercial debtors to creditors, it performs a clearing house function. A bank clearing house for exchange of inter-bank debits and credits in one of our large cities operates in this way: Each bank in a clearing house group turns into the clearing house daily the checks or credits of other banks which have been assigned to it, and this bank receives in exchange the debits against its credits assigned to the other banks of the group. Obviously all the debits offset the credits and the totals of the debit balances of the banks debtor to the clearing house equal the total credit balances of the banks which obtain net credits from the clearing house.

The inter-bank clearing house is an agency which performs in a concentrated way at set times what the banks do in a more diffused way, and with time intervening between deposits and withdrawals. The bank clearing house does not require its member banks to maintain funds on deposit with it, although it is known that some of the banks of the group will have debit balances. This debit balance is in the nature of an overdraft. The clearing house and the banks which compose it have confidence that the overdrafts of its members will be promptly made good.

IT is obvious that the banking system, clearing accounts of millions of debtor and creditor traders, cannot work on an overdraft basis, and so it is necessary that a bank credit be established by traders which, in essence, is a positive established reserve for traders against which inter-trader settlements are debited.

The nature of bank credits, as well as many other banking operations, can be most clearly seen by analogy to a game of poker. If the group of players have mutual confidence in each other they get their chips without putting up any money. If they do not have mutual confidence in each other, they pay cash for their chips. In the first instance they work on an overdraft or negative basis, in the latter on an established credit or positive basis.

"Money" or bank credit is obtained by traders either by liquidating their goods or investments to others who are depositors, or by borrowing the funds needed. A borrower's action in making a loan is prompted by his desire to retain his marketable wealth which, if he liquidated it, would obviate the necessity for the loan. Borrowers consequently possess wealth at least to the extent of their loans. In order to redeem their bank loans they must necessarily liquidate equivalent wealth or services to those who are depositors.

Therefore, of the total amount of sales or liquidation of goods, 95 per cent. is settled from existing deposit balances, all of which have originated from loans made to provide funds for an original exchange, the purpose of which was known to the banker. This relation of twenty to one shows that the banker controls only 5 per cent. of the investments of his depositors.

The total amount of bank credits outstanding is increased when the amount of new loans made exceeds the amount of loans paid, and vice versa. In the above argument we have not taken into account the actual withdrawals of bank credits in cash or reserve money. Depositors of course withdraw parts of their balances for pocket money for hand-to-hand circulation, but the amount of such reserves withdrawn is normally offset by the amount of such funds deposited, and altogether such withdrawals and deposits are negligible to the amounts of direct transfers of bank credits.

IN the case of the isolated community, we noted earlier, that 4,000 depositors of bank credits, demand deposits, possessed such funds originating entirely from the loans of 100 borrowers, and it was clear to see the effects of transfers of such credits when there was only one bank through which these credits were transferred. It is extremely difficult to comprehend the circulation of bank credits through our banking system of more than thirty thousand banks, for the assumption of a normal, concrete banking operation requires most involved abstract reasoning. One's imaginative faculties are put to a severe test to follow through a bank credit from its creation to the total ultimate retirement of it. A simple and, therefore, unusual case is as follows:

A owes B \$1,000. B owes his bank \$1,000. A purchases from B \$1,000 of goods and settles for the purchase by borrowing \$1,000 from his bank. When B receives A's check he retires his bank loan. In such a case A's loan has resulted in the retirement of B's loan, and the thousand dollars of credit which A's bank created for him has made in this instance but one exchange, and then it was canceled.

A normal case is as follows: A corporation borrows \$100,000 from its bank to settle its accounts payable to twenty creditors totaling \$100,000. Let us presume each of these accounts amounted to \$5,000. One of these creditors uses his \$5,000 to retire an equal amount of loans owed to his bank. The other nineteen creditors each uses the \$5,000 to settle accounts with their commercial creditors, and they in turn pay their creditors, and so on.

This hundred thousand dollars, after several steps of exchanges, may, after a short time, be found in thousands of different accounts if it could be traced. But as it, in circulation, is transferred from one depositor to another, parts of it cannot fail to get into the hands of some depositors who have bank indebtedness, in the retirement of which such remittances are used, and parts of it get into the hands of some who deposit it in savings accounts, where it may stay for years, long after the loan which created it has been retired.

It is obvious, therefore, that every dollar of bank credit created on the average does more exchange work than the actual transfer for which it was created. There is no data available from which to determine accurately the relation between the number of exchanges settled by new credits created especially for that purpose and the amount of exchanges settled by transfers of existing outstanding credits, but the writer hazards the guess that the average amount of exchange work done by each dollar from the time it is created until it is retired is \$20. Or, in other words, each dollar on the average passes through twenty different accounts. This also means that of the total amount of checks issued each day against deposit balances, or what are called debits to individual accounts, 5 per cent. of the exchanges are used to retire loans by the receivers of the checks, and by the same token the 5 per cent. of the exchanges have been created by the loans of the drawers of the checks.

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The persistent notion that money is "tied up" in bank loans is absurd on the face of it, either from the standpoint of the banks in the aggregate or from the standpoint of the individual bank. A frozen loan does not mean that money is tied up. The fact that the borrower cannot pay his loan shows that he does not hold the money or the proceeds of the loan. No borrower makes a loan at the bank and pays interest thereon with the idea of retaining the credit. It has been estimated that borrowers hold bank credits or deposit balances to the extent of approximately 15 per cent. of the amount of their borrowings. The balance, or 85 per cent. of the loans, therefore, is disbursed to others, and is in the possession of depositors who have no loans. These depositors, therefore, who are not borrowers of the bank, possess funds which were originally created by commercial debtors who have assumed liabilities to banks in order to liquidate their liabilities to commercial creditors. The number of depositors who are not borrowers is greatly in excess of the number of borrowers.

The deposit balances of an individual bank do not represent, except possibly to a slight extent, the credits which that bank has itself created. As the borrowers have withdrawn the credits which the bank has given them in exchange for their loans, the bank has received from its depositors checks on other banks which in effect are simply the assignments of the credits of other banks to the bank in question.

A bank, when it receives or deposits a check on another bank, trades its credit for the credit of the other bank. A bank's desire or eagerness to increase its demand liabilities is actuated by its wish to increase its reserve funds, and every check on another bank deposited gives the receiving bank the right to demand the full amount of the check in reserve funds. The bank which receives the check on another bank does not demand such payment of reserve funds, for by the clearing house transactions the amounts of the checks received by a bank are offset by the amounts of the checks drawn on the bank in question.

Under active or tight money conditions, individual bankers attempt to improve their condition by forcing payment of loans and increasing their deposits, but to the extent they benefit their condition, they injure the condition of other banks, for the very payment of loans withdraws balances in other banks and, of course, its increase in deposits necessarily is derived through withdrawals from or the extension of loans by other banks. It should be recognized that the interests of an individual banker oppose the conditions which improve the general money conditions.

In forcing the payment of frozen loans, the banker compels the liquidation

on the part of the borrower of his goods. Liquidation implies sale of goods for money, and the more liquidation the more need for money. At the same time that they compel liquidation they discourage speculation, but liquidation cannot take place unless there is speculation. Every sale implies a purchase. For every seller there is a buyer. If the amount of outstanding bank credits is about the limit which can be issued and, consequently, a restriction is placed on further credit extension, then the existing depositors practically hold a monopoly of our available money supply. If, for any reason, such as expectancy of lower prices, they withhold these funds from exchange or purchase of goods, the borrowers who have the goods, being unable to liquidate them to those who have the money, or to other possible borrowers who cannot obtain bank credit, are unable to pay their loans, and therefore these loans become frozen.

When commodities decline in value, money rises in value in relation to other commodities, and so when depositors withhold their funds from purchase, awaiting a favorable time to buy, they speculate in money, and this restricts the rate of circulation. The rate of circulation is the ratio between the total amount of money exchanged and the total amount of money outstanding. On the other hand, in times of rising prices money circulation is more rapid. Traders do not hesitate to buy, and hold money funds if the general price movement is upward.

The effect of price movement on the circulation of money is pertinent here, for if every dollar did twice as much exchange work within a given period of time, there would be half as many dollars needed. It seems to be generally believed that value and price movements are, to a great extent, dependent on the quantity of money issued in relation to the amount of goods on the market. Just why this notion does prevail is difficult to account for. If values are dependent on the relation of money to goods, is it not clear that the amount of money that changes hands and is actually doing exchange work should be reckoned with in relation to price movements?

Money is tied up by depositors rather than by borrowers, for the borrowers have disbursed or used the proceeds of their loans among depositors. Depositors in a time of tightening money are inclined to carry larger balances than necessary in the fear that they will not be able to obtain funds when they need them, so the very feeling that money is scarce and tight acts further to accentuate the tightness by slowing up circulation. So, at a time when a declining price movement is in motion and money is tight, the rate of circulation is extremely low.

The Ford Motor Company, it is said, carries today balances in banks totaling more than fifty million dollars, which is largely in excess of the bank funds needed as reserve for their current liabilities. They either hold these balances awaiting a favorable time to invest them, or as protection against some future emergency. This fifty million dollars withheld from purchase of goods or from investment has no effect whatever on the demand for goods, and consequently does not affect values.

In a time of money stringency when traders cannot obtain funds to which they are legitimately entitled, such idle bank balances deprive others of an equivalent amount of medium of exchange. It is the almost universal belief among bankers that idle bank balances are doing money work because such balances are used by bankers to loan to others. This is an utter fallacy. No bank which has any of the Ford Motor Company's fifty million dollars can loan one cent of these funds to others. Only the Ford Motor Company can dispose of or invest its own funds.

Two years ago we were very familiar with the expression that money was "tied up" in surplus crops or stocks which the farmer would not or could not

liquidate to retire his loans, and this fact was ascribed as the cause of tight money, notwithstanding the inconsistency of this idea with the established fact that demands for funds are usually severe when the banks are called upon to finance crop movement or liquidation. Another expression which implied the same idea was that unusual demands for funds were caused by borrowers seeking loans for the express purpose of keeping goods off the market.

Figures were published a year or so ago giving the total value of crops, live stock, &c., at \$20,000,000,000, and it was estimated at that time that the loans of crop producers amounted to \$7,000,000,000. Presume that this amount of crops is liquidated by the farmers to the produce merchants on one certain day when the produce merchants paid to the farmers \$20,000,000,000. The farmers then pay off their \$7,000,000,000 of loans and hold \$13,000,000,000 of money. By this liquidation they have reversed their condition and have now become depositors in the net aggregate of \$13,000,000,000 of money.

It is reasonable to suppose that the produce merchant had to borrow the greater part of the \$20,000,000,000, let us say \$17,000,000,000, and it is the produce merchant's borrowings that have originated the \$13,000,000,000 of money or bank credits which the farmers now hold. If the produce merchants had to borrow \$17,000,000,000 to purchase these crops, there has therefore been a net increase of credit money issued of \$10,000,000,000. The same situation obtains among manufacturing and commercial corporations. Some hold large stocks, their loans are large and their bank balances are small. Others show no loans and carry large balances.

With reference to the \$4,000,000,000 of foreign credits so often referred to a year or so ago, these credits represented the liabilities of foreign buyers to our exporters. As open commercial credits they had no effect whatever on our banking condition. To be sure, our exporters who extended these credits no doubt had frozen loans which they could have liquidated if the foreign buyers had paid their accounts.

Presume our exporters had financed this production by bank loans to the extent of \$3,000,000,000. Their unpaid loans to this amount were supporting an equal amount of bank credits. The bank credits created by the exporters' loans may have been used to a great extent to retire other loans, or may have gone into savings deposits. It is likely that these funds were disbursed to those who would not have received them if it had not been for the foreign purchasers.

Consider what would have taken place if the foreign importers liquidated the credits extended to them. We could not expect them to ship us \$4,000,000,000 of gold, or any part of it. The only way they could have settled these accounts was through the creation of bank credits by sale of their bonds or securities in this country, and the result of this would have been that some of our banks would have created bank credits of \$4,000,000,000, which would have been used to take up the \$4,000,000,000 of exporters' loans. Of course, if the foreign importers sold their bonds to existing depositors, or to the extent they might have done so, it would, to a like extent, have reduced loans at the bank.

Tight money conditions are not indicated directly by the amount of loans which our banks hold. They are indicated directly by the relation between the demand deposits and note liabilities of the banks to the amount of gold in the banking system. It is the demand and the use for the bank credits that determine the amount of loans, and not the amount of loans that determine the amount of credits issued. No borrower makes a loan and pays the bank interest just to have a loan. He makes the loan to obtain a bank credit.

If the labor and other costs of producing the \$4,000,000,000 of goods exported had been expended in the produc-

tion of goods for our domestic use, which were not liquidated, there would have been no difference in the effect on money conditions. At equal cost it does not take more money to finance the production of consumable or marketable wealth than it does unconsumable and unmarketable wealth, such as the building of railroads, public improvements and buildings.

The Government, municipalities, railroads, manufacturers or farmers who obtain funds to meet costs of production do not require or use funds on account of the production after it is completed. When production is liquidated, then funds are needed by the buyers. In other words, there is no direct relation between the accumulation of wealth and need for money. Money is only required to effect exchanges of wealth.

Money demands in this country are exceedingly high relative to the money work to be done. The reason for this is that traders are accustomed to make settlements by checks against deposit balances or by transfers of credits set up. We have previously pictured the banking system as functioning in the nature of a clearing house. All commercial debits equal commercial credits, but debtors settle with their creditors by transferring a positive, tangible amount of bank liability to them.

In European countries a large part of commercial indebtedness is settled by the over-draft method, such as letters of credit, which are in effect an authorization on the part of the bank to the owner of the letter of credit to overdraw on the bank to the amount of the letter of credit. Bankers' acceptances in essence are really instruments guaranteeing a debtor's overdraft. A debtor's debts are therefore canceled against the credits due him, thereby necessitating a comparatively small amount of money funds to settle accounts. International bankers operate as clearing houses in settlements of balances due between countries by offsetting bills due to and from the countries involved. A traveler abroad can get a letter of credit from an American bank by hypothecating security to cover the amount of credit, and yet in traveling in this country this method is not recognized and it is not the usual custom. Bankers' acceptances are a comparatively new device in this country, and their use is becoming more and more general, but, relatively speaking, so far their use is almost negligible in comparison with customary settlements of positive established credits.

In a previous article on the Theory of Reserves a commercial depositor's balance was pictured as his reserve for his liabilities. If, under our customary practices, our traders carry excessive bank credits as reserves for their liabilities, the bankers are required to carry a proportionate banking reserve which we have seen ultimately, through one, two or three additional steps of reserves, tie up a proportionate amount of gold.

Bankers are to a considerable extent responsible for the maintenance of idle balances on the part of their individual depositors, as well as bank depositors. It has become customary for bankers to require borrowers to hold minimum or average balances in proportion to their loans. In justifying this practice bankers, with more or less sincerity, say that a banker should hold, say, 15 per cent. or 20 per cent. of his bank indebtedness as reserve. However, it is a distinct advantage to the banker that the borrower leaves this balance with the bank rather than draw out the banker's reserves, and the statement is ventured that most bankers, in demanding average or minimum balances, look at this matter only from the standpoint of their own benefit. Why should the banker require a depositor to carry a reserve proportionate only to his indebtedness to the bank and not to other creditors?

The fundamental principle of reserves with banks is that they shall carry funds to meet only demand liabilities. Bankers are not required to carry any reserve funds to meet their time liabilities,

and so it is not consistent for them to require their depositors to do what they are not required to do. The statements of banks in interior cities show balances in banks of other reserve cities which seem to be disproportionately large for their need for exchange. While the establishment of the Federal Reserve system reduced to a considerable extent these balances, they are still carried, particularly with New York banks, as remuneration for the bank's accommodations to them in various ways. Some large interior banks carry balances with their New York correspondents almost equal to their required reserves in the Federal Reserve banks, and bankers freely admit that a great portion of these balances is maintained as compensation to the New York banks for accommodations.

Just how far this sort of thing goes it is difficult to say, but without question the old banking customs in the maintenance of these balances and in collections of checks, through correspondent banks rather than through the Federal Reserve system is going on to a marked extent.

The sole function of money, the purpose for which it is issued, is the settlement of indebtedness for exchanges or services. Its retention or disuse as a "store of value" (or the time occupied between its receipt by a creditor and its disbursement by the creditor), is withholding money from its prime purpose.

Money is held speculatively when its disbursement is delayed until a favorable time to buy. It is conceivable that our exchanges could be effected with a relatively small portion of the credit money which we have outstanding today if methods of settlement in use were more efficient. In fact, we have become accustomed to an extravagant use of positive bank credits to settle exchanges rather than negative overdrafts.

If the supply of money through depletion of our gold reserves is inadequate to take care of the demands in the future, there are the possibilities of effecting exchanges with very much less money than we are accustomed to use if traders used methods of settlement in line with letters of credit, acceptances, or evidences of indebtedness, which are just as effective as settlements by evidences of credits. The banker's function would not be changed, nor would his remuneration be lessened thereby. If bankers' services are compensated for by interest determined by the law of supply and demand, the same law would control their compensation on guaranteeing deficits or overdrafts.

ALL

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Boston National Bank

statements were carried by

The Boston Transcript

On last Comptroller's call for statement of condition as of June 30.

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The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

AFFAIRS of the last week were not of a character to increase confidence in the industrial outlook. There is no doubt that a high demand for goods exists in all branches in industry, and there is no indication that this demand will abate. On the other hand, the condition which has been brought about by the coal strike and the railroad strike is one which from now on may be expected to find sharp reflection in business conditions. There seems to be an impression on the part of some that a settlement of the two strikes will do much to alleviate the untoward situation. Of course, this is true looking at the case from one angle, but it is also true that the effects of the strikes are such as to be felt for a considerable period. No miracle can bring about a supply of coal, and it seems certain, with industry already facing a shortage in many quarters, that low fuel supplies will be an increasing menace to a high plane of activity as the demands of winter begin to become more pronounced with relation to coal supplies. Even were it possible to begin mining coal on a substantial scale, there is grave doubt whether the carriers could move the fuel to alleviate the shortages which exist. To a certain extent, therefore, the coal strike and the railroad strike are linked together. As a matter of fact, many of the railroads will before long begin to feel the pinch of a coal shortage unless a sudden change comes into the situation.

At the close of last week it seemed that in both strikes labor and the companies were widely apart, although, of course, a quick settlement of both difficulties could be brought about by compromise. There is this to be said, however, that the railroad executives are in no mood to make concessions, and feel that the strike must be fought out to a finish. At all events, the Railroad Labor Board last week, through its Chairman, Mr. Hooper, announced that it had abandoned its endeavor to bring about further conferences. Of course, if the view of the railroad executives is to be taken as the final verdict in the matter, it means that they are prepared to carry the issue to definite victory or defeat, and if that is the case the strike will undoubtedly be a prolonged affair, even though the differences on Friday of last week seemed to have resolved themselves into one definite issue, namely, that of seniority rights which the railroads took from the men when the strike had progressed beyond a certain point which they had set. A long strike would mean the tying up of transportation, the backing up of freight at terminal points, a slackening in industry generally, and altogether the result would be a severe blow at the business recovery which has already taken place in the process of readjustment to a time of peace. Probably the steel industry has been hardest hit so far, and reports last week showed that a decided curtailment of operations was being put into effect at some of the steel-producing centers. This lack of fuel, of course, relates directly to the coal strike, and if there is to be a tying up of transportation by a rail strike it matters not whether the coal strike is settled, so far as new supplies of fuel are concerned, for the output of coal could not be brought to the points of greatest need.

All along Wall Street has held the view that both strikes were due to early termination, and this opinion held almost to the close of last week. In the later days of the week opinion began to undergo a change, as it was seen that negotiations were failing to accomplish any useful purpose, and the buoyancy which had been one of the outstanding features of the stock market in the early days was supplanted by irregularity and declining prices, mainly because of the weight of profit-taking sales. There had been a good speculative following in the market, and with the railroad continuing unfavorable it was the endeavor of these speculators to turn paper profits into real assets. It was a striking feature of the situation that there was no forced liquidation, which was taken as further evidence that stocks for the most part were in strong hands. It is probable, too, that the degree of firmness which existed in the stock market was in part a reflection of the old Wall Street age, when sell stocks on strike news was one of the anomalies of the situation that while adverse reports as to the two big strikes continued to develop, reports of trade activity and a heavy demand for many products accompanied the unfavorable news. It must be remembered, however, that trade reports are a somewhat belated recognition of demand which has already asserted itself, and that the effect on industry of any untoward situation which may arise is usually postponed for some weeks, until the effect of the adverse circumstance has had time to infiltrate its way through the various trade channels. Hence what appears to be the optimism of industry is really not a forecast but a review, so that optimism in such a case does not carry all that the word implies.

For instance, the steel industry is talking of good times, mainly as a result of the excellent showing in the second quarter of the year in which earnings showed a sharp about-face, as compared with the same quarter of last year, and even with the first quarter of this year. But unless conditions change materially from what they are now, and what they promise to be, another story may be told of the third quarter. On the whole, however, it does not seem that either of the two major strikes can be allowed to run their course, with the Government taking even more active measures than have already been instituted. A tying up of both coal supplies and transportation strikes at the very foundation of national existence, and while the outlook is decidedly clouded, the Government has been putting forth every endeavor to terminate the difficulties.

The news of the week was not without its favorable features. There was word, for instance, that the textile strike in New England was waning, and that only a little time would elapse before this difficulty was a thing of the past. Likewise, there was some comfort to be found in the fact that the Calumet and Hecla Mining Company restored dividends after a lapse of more than two years. This was indicative of a decidedly better position in the copper industry, and was taken to be an indication of what might be expected in the case of other prominent copper companies which lowered or passed their dividends. The slowing down in the production of copper has had just the effect that was anticipated. The big surplus stocks have been reduced, and the companies are now in a position to take up mining operations on a scale which will be in accord with

demand, and there is every reason to expect that the low price for the metal will not long prevail.

The foreign situation presents many complexities, and while some interesting proposals have been put forth, actual developments looking to the alleviation of the financial crisis in Central Europe have not progressed to any great extent, so far as surface indications are concerned. One unofficial proposal was that the British Government remit the French debt, in return for which France was to agree on a reduction in the German reparations total from 132,000,000,000 gold marks to 50,000,000,000 gold marks. Whether France would concede this may be open to some question, although there would be an advantage to that country in accepting a proposal which would bring actual cash payments on reparations account without causing the bankruptcy of Germany. France could gain little, of course, by forcing Germany into a position where there might not be a basis for debt collection. However, in any consideration of Germany's inability to pay, from a Governmental standpoint, it must be remembered that thus far there seems to have been no very high measure of good faith in regard to paying. However, even if France were willing to accept a reduction in reparations, there are the other allied countries to be considered, so that the remission of France's debt might make necessary the remission of all interrelated debts except that between England and America, which will be paid. Already gold to the extent of \$1,315,000,000 has been shipped here by England, to take care of interest payments on her debt, and some refunding plan to care for the whole debt will probably be announced before any great length of time.

It was reported also last week that the Guarantees Committee has secured the consent of Germany to supervision of her finances along lines that were established before the Guarantees Committee went to Berlin. This naturally would be a step in the right direction, since Germany seems totally incapable of managing her own finances on a plane of reason. The steady increase in note circulation and the failure to balance the budget are two factors which count very much against Germany's operation of her own finances.

It is probable that the committee of international bankers, which some weeks ago considered a loan to Germany and which at that time found no hope for making such a loan, will be called together to consider this question anew, particularly if there is to be a reduction in German reparations. It may be, if allied control of German finances is instituted, that a loan bearing the endorsement of the Allies can be arranged. At least the security which is offered must have sufficient guarantees to assure solvability at a reasonable interest rate, and it is somewhat difficult to see how Germany alone, as the responsible party, could offer such guarantees.

The steady buying of investment bonds was one of the outstanding developments of last week. Investors were apparently overlooking the unfavorable events of the moment in the realization that the high money rates of the war are a thing of the past, and that henceforth a normal yield commensurate with that which obtained in the pre-war years may be expected. Reasoning of this sort has been responsible for the buying of investment bonds, and that the power of absorption is by no means diminished was indicated by the heavy demand for the New York Telephone Company's \$25,000,000 4% per cent. preferred stock, which was oversubscribed more than three times. This was accomplished without any underwriting by bankers so that the cost of the loan to the company was probably only a little more than 1 per cent.

Liberty bonds were in further process of accumulation, and new high levels for the year were established in nearly all of them, with many of them making new high records since the date of issue.

Stocks

IT was noticeable that trading in stocks last week was carried on without any particular attention being paid to the two unfavorable developments, the rail strike and the coal strike. The market all along has been of the opinion that no serious trouble could result from either strike since both were destined, according to Wall Street opinion, to early termination. Consequently, during the early days of last week prices in the stock market were bid up sharply, the advance encompassing a wide range of issues.

It was a move apparently designed to follow out Wall Street custom of bidding up stocks in the expectation of favorable news, but in this case the favorable news did not materialize. All that came forth regarding the rail strike, up to the middle of the week, was of discouraging character, and ultimately this tended to shake Wall Street's optimism. Wall Street fed itself on discussion of high earnings and a heavy demand for goods in all lines and disregarded the fact that a prolongation of the coal strike and the rail strike would lead to industrial inactivity, and consequently to a curtailment of earnings.

Sentiment underwent a change on Thursday and Friday and stocks were reactionary. It was apparently considered wise to take profits, and the weight of this selling, without supporting orders in the market, caused recessions all along the line. Wall Street by no means was turned from its belief of a settlement of the two strikes, but at least it was inclined to be more cautious.

It must be remembered that the present rise in the stock market has carried prices in many instances to levels which have not before been attained this year. This has been largely the case in many of the specialties and seasoned investment issues have been carried along on a wave of good buying. Thus the long interest in the market may be considered as somewhat topheavy, still it is doubtful whether stocks have been going from strong into weak hands.

The movement in the specialties has been largely a product of pool manipulation, and the pools, with easy time money prevailing, are in no way timid. The move in the investment securities, however, has firmer foundations, the lowering of interest rates, and the relatively high yields to be obtained on some of the gilt-edged securities having attracted buying of the type which takes stock out of the Street, so that in such issues as General Electric, American Car and Foundry, Atchafson and others of like character there has been a steady depletion of floating supply, and there seems to be li-

tle possibility of pressure developing from profit-taking sales, but such degree as will cause a serious reaction. Undoubtedly there has been a speculative following in the investment issues of best proven worth, but it is small by comparison.

The railroad stocks held firm for the most part and some of them, as for instance Pennsylvania, touched new high levels for the year. There was no reason for selling the rails even though the rail strike was a disturbing factor in the situation. The rail stocks have been so thoroughly liquidated that there is room for a real rise on values alone and not one based upon what values may be in the future. The upturn recently in the industrials has been of a character that was discounting the future. The advance in the rails has been discounting the past.

Cuts in crude oil prices last week caused some unsettlement in the oil shares. And the cuts were to have been expected in view of the heavy overproduction of oil. For the first five months of this year the production of petroleum has totaled 221,697,000 barrels, an output which has never before been paralleled. Stocks of petroleum on hand at the end of May had reached 245,030,000 barrels, in comparison with 156,200,000 barrels at the close of May, 1921, and 129,745,000 barrels at the close of May, 1919. It is true that the consumption of petroleum has been in excess of that for the first five months of any year since 1917, but the gain over 1921 has been only about 5,500,000 barrels, whereas production has increased by more than 26,000,000 barrels.

It is plain, therefore, that even discussion of salt water encroaching on the Mexican wells could hardly stimulate domestic oil stocks under the circumstances. There is no doubt that the Mexican supply of oil is steadily dwindling, but it will not be cut off this year or next. Ultimately new fields must be discovered if the supply is to keep up, and it is the realization that extensive exploration work must be undertaken which has counted against the Mexican oil stocks, since the cost of this exploration work is decidedly heavy.

Mexican Petroleum is quite apart by itself, the action of this stock being caused to a pronounced extent by the technical position which prevails. The floating supply is not large and a running-in of the shorts can be easily brought about.

Bonds

THE bond market during the week just passed registered encouraging advances for securities of all classes. The large supply of funds seeking investment and the 4 to 4½ per cent. current rate for time money have turned large sums into the bond market, where more attractive rates are obtainable on bonds of unquestioned stability. Securities maturing in from six to twenty-four months are naturally affected to the greatest extent by this condition. Strong credits of early maturities are selling on a 4.25 to 4.75 per cent. basis. Such gains as were made, particularly by railroad obligations, in the face of the strike situation in that industry and the growing shortage of coal, indicate a strong undertone and growing confidence in fundamental conditions on the part of the investing public.

Offerings of new issues were small in volume, a fact which was also responsible to a great extent for the demand for older obligations. The rapid oversubscription of several flotations, particularly the Northern Pacific refunding and improvement 5s, was more typical of the market conditions of the recent past. Some of the more important offerings of the week were: \$375,000 Santa Rosa (Cal.) high school district 5s, due 1928 to 1932, at prices yielding 4.50 to 4.40 per cent.; \$368,000 town of Hempstead (N. Y.) 4½ per cent. registered school bonds, due 1927 to 1931, to yield 4.25 to 4.20 per cent.; \$385,000 Panther Creek Drainage District (Kentucky) 6s, due 1927 to 1933, on a 5.50 per cent. basis; \$730,000 City of Utica (N. Y.) 4½ per cent. due 1923 to 1942, at prices to yield 4 to 4½ per cent.; \$5,702,000 Northern Pacific Railroad refunding and improvement 5s, due 2047, at 96, to yield 5.20 per cent.; \$7,500,000 Central Indiana Power Company first mortgage collateral and refunding 6s, series A, due 1947, at 95½ to yield 6.35 per cent.; \$6,750,000 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 5 per cent. equipment trust notes, due 1923 to 1937, at prices averaging 5.25 per cent.; \$2,500,000 Republic of Peru ten-year external 8s, at par and interest; \$1,801,000 City of Yonkers (N. Y.) 4½s, maturing 1925 to 1962, at prices to yield 4.20 to 4.15 per cent.; \$175,000 Charleston County (S. C.) 6 per cent. road bonds, due 1937, on a 4.70 per cent. basis; \$3,500,000 Durant Motor Company one to twelve year first mortgage 6½ per cent. bonds, at par and interest.

The sustained advance of the various 4½ per cent. Liberty issues has been a noteworthy feature of the market for the last two months. These bonds, with the exception of the second 4½s, which went over 102 immediately after issuance, all closed this week at the highest prices they have attained thus far.

Municipal bonds enjoyed a good demand in a market that was unusually active for this time of year. The 4½ per cent. bonds of the City of Yonkers were disposed of in twenty-four hours. Obligations of Southern cities and counties, which do not command as ready a market as similar obligations of Eastern States, have been making good gains lately, and are at present selling on a 4.50 to 5 per cent. basis, compared with 6 to 6.50 per cent. a year ago.

Steady increases in car loadings and net earnings of railroads since the first of the year have resulted in substantial gains for their obligations. General opinion on the subject seems to be that if the carriers can do so well without carrying coal, their profits after the coal strike is settled should be still more encouraging. There is also a report, which seems to be justified, that heavy purchase orders for bonds of the more conservative class are coming from Europe, but advances were not limited to such issues, Chicago & Eastern Illinois general 5s jumped 1½ to 83. Seaboard Air Line 6s gained 1½ to 63, and the refunding 5s rose almost two points, to 45½. Washington Railway first 5s came up a point, to par. Decided strength was shown late in the week by bonds of the Baltimore & Ohio and Southern Railway. Neither of these roads threatened striking shophen with loss of their seniority rights at the time of the walkout, and it was believed in well-informed quarters that they would soon be in a position to open negotiations for

the return of their workers. Southern Railway 6½s gained 1½ to 102½, the Consolidated 5s jumped 2½ to 95½, and the general 4s advanced a like amount, to 69½. B. & O. convertible 4½s rose ½ to 84½, the refunding 5s gained 2 to 89, and the prior lien 3½s advanced a fraction, to 94½. The new Northern Pacific 5s closed at 97½ up 1½ from the offering price. New York Central 6s gained about a point to 106½. Atchafson, Topeka & Santa Fe general 4s lost a fraction, to 93½. Pennsylvania 6½s rose a fraction, to 109½, and the general 5s gained 1½ to 102. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy refunding 5s advanced ½ to 101½.

Public utility issues followed the general trend, but, although the entire list was firm,

Continued on Page 90

Stocks—Transactions—Bonds

STOCKS, SHARES

Week Ended July 22, 1922

	1922	1921	1920
Monday	480,410	328,300	312,483
Tuesday	631,950	309,125	316,333
Wednesday	797,768	333,233	304,577
Thursday	677,955	279,213	317,741
Friday	688,806	292,681	488,533
Saturday	279,500	195,163	172,453

Total, week	3,576,391	1,737,715	1,912,120
Year to date	147,495,819	99,590,769	131,938,094

BONDS (PAR VALUE)

	1922	1921	1920
Monday	\$11,334,200	\$9,017,700	\$8,452,800
Tuesday	12,652,100	8,577,950	8,448,000
Wednesday	15,580,550	9,589,000	9,054,000
Thursday	14,196,900	12,168,200	7,915,000
Friday	15,251,600	11,363,350	10,047,850
Saturday	6,757,350	4,906,100	2,960,900

Total, week	\$76,172,700	\$54,625,900	\$46,879,150
Year to date	2,559,912,955	1,808,334,985	2,482,551,750

In detail the bond dealings compare as follows with the corresponding week last year:

	July 22, '22	July 23, '21	Changes
Corporations	\$38,680,000	\$17,203,500	+\$21,476,500
Liberty	26,541,250	31,706,000	- 5,165,750
Foreign	10,916,500	5,658,500	+ 5,258,000
City	35,000	57,000	- 22,000

Total, all

Stocks—Averages—Bonds

TWENTY-FIVE RAILROADS

	High	Low	Last	Net Same Day	Ch's Last Yr.
July 17	64.35	63.78	64.03	..	52.01
July 18	64.27	63.70	64.07	..	52.74
July 19	64.58	63.97	64.21	..	52.94
July 20	64.40	63.79	63.99	..	53.05
July 21	64.16	63.48	63.83	..	53.53
July 22	63.92	63.70	63.82	..	53.97

TWENTY-FIVE INDUSTRIALS

	High	Low	Last	Net Same Day	Ch's Last Yr.
July 17	99.53	98.47	98.88	..	71.96
July 18	101.13	99.48	100.76	..	72.83
July 19	101.95	100.43	101.24	..	72.86
July 20	102.00	100.83	101.26	..	72.58
July 21	101.62	100.16	100.39	..	72.63
July 22	100.71	99.97	100.11	..	73.89

COMBINED AVERAGE—50 STOCKS

	High	Low	Last	Net Same Day	Ch's Last Yr.
July 17	81.94	81.12	81.45	..	61.99
July 18	82.70	81.59	82.41	..	62.78
July 19	83.26	82.20	82.72	..	63.90
July 20	83.20	82.31	82.62	..	62.81
July 21	82.89	81.81	82.11	..	63.08
July 22	82.33	81.83	81.96	..	63.93

BONDS—FORTY ISSUES

	Close	Net	Same Day
July 17	80.96	..	69.28
July 18	81.03	..	69.40
July 19	81.13	..	69.36
July 20	81.16	..	69.55
July 21	81.22	..	69.67
July 22	81.16	..	69.88

Stocks—Yearly Highs and Lows—Bonds

	High	Low	High	Low
*1922..	82.17 July	66.21 Jan.	81.22 July	75.01 Jan.
1921..	73.13 May	58.35 June	76.31 Nov.	67.56 June
1920..	94.07 Apr.	62.70 Dec.	73.14 Oct.	65.57 May
1919..	99.50 Nov.	69.73 Jan.	79.05 June	71.05 Dec.
1918..	80.16 Nov.	64.12 Jan.	82.36 Nov.	75.95 Sep.
1917..	90.46 Jan.	57.43 Dec.	89.48 Jan.	74.24 Dec.
1916..	101.51 Nov.	80.91 Apr.	86.48 Nov.	86.19 Apr.
1915..	94.13 Oct.	58.99 Feb.	87.62 Nov.	81.51 Jan.
1914..	73.30 Jan.	57.41 July	89.42 Feb.	81.42 Dec.
1913..	79.10 Jan.	63.09 June	92.31 Jan.	85.45 Dec.
1912..	85.83 Sep.	75.24 Feb.
*1911..	84.41 June	69.57 Sep.

*To date.

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
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An index number is a means of showing fluctuations in the average price of a group of commodities. The Annalist Index Number shows the fluctuations in the average wholesale price of twenty-five food commodities selected and arranged to represent a theoretical family's food budget.

Financial Transactions

	Last Week.	Same Week.	Year to Date.	Same Period.
Sales of stock, shares.....	3,576,391	1,737,715	147,485,819	96,590,760
Sales of bonds par value.....	\$76,172,700	\$54,625,900	\$2,559,912,955	\$1,698,334,985
Average price of 50 stocks.....	High 83.36	High 64.00	High 82.26	High 72.13
	Low 81.12	Low 61.60	Low 82.21	Low 58.35
Average price of 40 bonds.....	High 81.22	High 69.80	High 81.22	High 71.60
	Low 80.96	Low 69.28	Low 75.01	Low 67.56
Average net yield of ten high-priced bonds.....	4.430%	5.390%	4.642%	5.343%
New security issues.....	\$42,052,300	\$20,972,000	\$1,321,830,060	\$1,091,748,000

BAROMETRICS

The State of Credit

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SECURITIES

	Last Week.	Previous Week.	Year to Date.	Same Week.
British Con. 2 1/2%.....	99 1/2@100 1/2	99 1/2@100 1/2	99 1/2@100 1/2	99 1/2@100 1/2
British 5%.....	100 1/2@100 1/2	100 1/2@100 1/2	100 1/2@100 1/2	100 1/2@100 1/2
British 4 1/2%.....	95 1/2@95 1/2	95 1/2@95 1/2	95 1/2@95 1/2	95 1/2@95 1/2
French rentes (in Paris).....	58.20@57.70	58 1/2@57.65	59.05@54.20	56.60@56.30
French War Loan (in Paris).....	76.95@74.20	75.45	80.20@74.20	82.70

Potentials of Productivity and Measure of Business Activity

THE METAL BAROMETER

	End of June.	End of May.
United States Steel orders, tons.....	5,635,531	5,117,068
Daily pig iron production, tons.....	78,701	35,494
Pig iron production, tons.....	\$2,361,028	\$1,064,383
		\$2,306,670
		\$1,221,221

ALIEN MIGRATION

	May, 1922	Apr., 1922	Mar., 1922	Feb., 1922	Jan., 1922	Dec., 1921	Nov., 1921	Oct., 1921
Inbound.....	31,000	29,176	14,903	10,702	23,000	44,000	38,000	45,975
Outbound.....	25,000	24,983	8,369	7,063	10,287	36,000	38,000	38,596
Gain or loss.....	+6,000	+4,214	+6,534	+3,739	+12,713	+8,000	+7,019

GROSS RAILROAD EARNINGS.

	Second Week in July.	First Week in July.	Fourth Week in June.	Month of May.	From Jan. 1 to May 31.
1922.....	\$12,880,106	\$13,154,413	\$17,624,246	\$448,947,898	\$2,137,339,741
1921.....	\$12,060,802	\$13,066,097	\$16,810,702	\$448,859,511	\$2,214,596,980
Gain or loss.....	+\$819,304	+\$108,316	+\$813,544	+\$4,088,387	-\$77,256,239
	+6.61%	+0.75%	+4.84%	+0.91%	-3.45%

SUMMARY OF IDLE CARS AND CAR LOADINGS

AMERICAN RAILWAY ASSOCIATION

	June 15.	June 8.	May 31.	May 24.	May 15.	May 8.
Idle cars.....	442,253	457,579	486,846	511,282	518,758	528,308
Car loadings.....	718,519	876,806	877,856	880,722	846,062	750,645

COMPARISON OF WEEK'S COMMERCIAL FAILURES (DUN'S)

	Week Ended July 20, 1922.	Week Ended July 21, 1921.	Week Ended July 22, 1920.	Week Ended July 24, 1919.	Week Ended July 25, 1918.
Total Over \$5,000.....	103	77	60	35	13
East.....	122	103	77	60	13
South.....	125	62	106	50	31
West.....	113	59	83	45	30
Pacific.....	44	22	51	29	13
U. S.	444	246	371	201	160
Canada.....	67	28	41	18	10

FAILURES BY MONTHS

	June, 1922.	June, 1921.	June, 1920.	June, 1919.	June, 1918.
Number.....	1,740	1,330	1,334	9,635	3,352
Liabilities.....	\$38,348,450	\$34,639,375	\$373,716,538	\$310,671,004	\$86,743,876

BUILDING PERMITS (BRADSTREET'S)

	June, 1922.	June, 1921.	June, 1920.	June, 1919.	June, 1918.
141 Cities.....	\$258,674,440	\$127,671,270	\$258,575,188	\$133,063,676	\$192,194,353
					\$112,373,483

The Week in the Money and Exchange Market

COST OF MONEY—NEW YORK

	Call.	Time Loans.	Six Mos.	Com. Dis.
Last week.....	5 @ 3	4 @ 3 1/2	4 1/2 @ 4	4 1/2 @ 4
Previous week.....	4 @ 2 1/2	4 @ 4	4 1/2 @ 4	4 1/2 @ 4
Year to date.....	6 @ 3 1/2	5 @ 3 1/2	5 @ 3 1/2	5 @ 4
Same week, 1921.....	6 @ 6	6 @ 6	6 @ 6	6 @ 6
Same week, 1920.....	9 @ 8	9 @ 8 1/2	9 @ 8 1/2	9 @ 8

BANK CLEARINGS

Entire country, estimated from complete returns from cities representing 92.3 per cent. of the total. Percentages show changes from preceding years.

	1922	P.C.	1921	P.C.
Last week.....	\$7,847,000,000	+24.08	\$6,324,000,000	-22.7
Week before.....	\$7,872,000,000	+19.02	\$6,586,000,000	-26.8
Year to date.....	\$216,782,000,000	+8.2	\$200,229,000,000	-20.9

BAR GOLD AND SILVER

	Bar Gold	Bar Silver	Bar Silver
	In London	In London	In N. Y.
Last week.....	\$24 9/16 @ \$24 5/8	35 1/2 @ 35 1/4	70 c @ 69 c
Previous week.....	9 3/4 @ \$24 7/8	35 1/2 @ 35 1/4	70 c @ 70 c
Year to date.....	\$24 4 1/2 @ \$24 5/8	37 1/2 @ 37 1/4	73 c @ 69 c
Same week, 1921.....	\$24 1 1/2 @ \$24 5/8	38 1/2 @ 37 1/2	69 c @ 69 c
Same week, 1920.....	\$24 1 1/2 @ \$24 5/8	42 1/2 @ 37 1/2	69 c @ 69 c


FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC EXCHANGE RATES

New York funds in Montreal were quoted at \$10.00@9.96 premium. The discount on Montreal funds in New York was from \$9.90@9.80.

The week's range of exchange on the principal foreign centres last week compared as follows:

	1922.	1921.	1922.	1921.	1922.	1921.
Exports.....	\$334,000,000	\$338,958,412	\$307,688,622	\$329,700,579	\$1,819,672,706	\$2,534,532,956
Imports.....	260,000,000	185,679,893	252,817,254	204,911,186	1,418,948,806	1,320,466,314
Excess of exports.....	\$74,000,000	\$151,278,519	\$54,871,368	\$124,789,393	\$400,723,910	\$1,214,066,642

Federal Reserve Gold Holdings and Total Stock of Gold



The space between the base line and the broken line represents the cash reserves required, that between the broken line and the light line the excess reserves, or free gold, and the whole space between the base line and the heavy line represents the total stock of gold. The supply is computed monthly, so that the record can never be brought to the date of publication. The chart records the last figures published.

Week Ended
Saturday, July 22

Bank Clearings

By Telegraph to
The Annalist

	Last Week		Year to Date	
	1922	1921	1922	1921
Central Reserve Cities				
New York	\$4,387,161,725	\$3,345,548,090	\$123,453,149,533	\$111,649,713,879
Chicago	536,608,510	479,720,143	15,302,648,974	14,572,542,318
Total, 2 C. R. cities	\$4,923,770,235	\$3,825,268,242	\$138,755,798,507	\$126,222,256,197
Increase	28.7%		9.9%	
Other Federal Reserve Cities				
Atlanta	\$39,009,400	\$37,585,007	\$1,110,497,521	\$1,161,470,899
Boston	320,000,000	276,843,370	8,810,000,000	7,973,280,135
Cleveland	99,021,189	83,066,517	2,441,182,308	2,833,630,444
Kansas City, Mo.	127,762,911	154,236,309	3,655,311,581	4,284,167,919
Minneapolis	69,385,000	58,452,148	1,709,780,409	1,806,977,058
Philadelphia	454,000,000	377,000,000	11,917,000,000	10,887,356,739
Richmond	41,557,000	35,044,000	1,165,724,694	1,146,520,060
San Francisco	140,100,000	124,300,000	3,879,700,000	3,669,700,000
Total, 8 cities	\$1,282,415,506	\$1,146,727,351	\$34,679,176,601	\$33,702,103,263
Increase	11.8%		2.7%	
Total, 10 cities	\$6,206,185,741	\$4,971,995,593	\$173,434,975,108	\$159,924,359,460
Increase	24.8%		8.4%	

	Last Week		Year to Date	
	1922	1921	1922	1921
Other Cities				
Buffalo	\$41,259,376	\$33,938,550	\$1,070,791,846	\$1,035,745,414
Cincinnati	63,358,000	56,368,000	1,628,242,685	1,601,973,633
Columbus, Ohio	14,046,000	13,564,800	405,360,200	385,673,300
Denver	18,903,430	15,065,372	539,118,159	514,997,106
Indianapolis	19,058,000	15,500,000	492,688,000	421,517,000
Los Angeles	100,485,000	70,253,000	2,752,567,000	2,423,328,000
Louisville	25,387,240	22,134,430	727,352,440	592,924,130
Milwaukee	28,720,973	27,813,198	851,634,000	789,351,226
New Orleans	44,872,213	40,000,427	1,250,915,949	1,216,021,006
Omaha	38,329,120	38,454,855	1,070,310,429	1,094,253,838
St. Paul	33,502,104	32,711,318	851,875,779	941,095,075
Seattle	31,652,261	27,000,036	898,166,604	823,618,967
Washington	18,567,041	15,752,904	541,416,786	491,090,697
Total, 13 cities	\$478,641,358	\$414,557,088	\$13,080,450,877	\$12,332,408,392
Increase	15.3%		6.0%	
Total, 23 cities	\$6,684,827,000	\$5,386,553,281	\$186,515,425,985	\$172,316,857,852
Increase	24.0%		8.2%	

Actual Condition

Statements of the Federal Reserve Banks

July 19

	Dist. 1. Boston	Dist. 2. New York	Dist. 3. Philadelphia	Dist. 4. Cleveland	Dist. 5. Richmond	Dist. 6. Atlanta	Dist. 7. Chicago	Dist. 8. St. Louis	Dist. 9. Minneapolis	Dist. 10. Kansas City	Dist. 11. Dallas	Dist. 12. San Fran'co.
Gold reserve	\$202,664,000	\$1,101,119,000	\$216,462,000	\$233,684,000	\$99,203,000	\$127,560,000	\$545,307,000	\$72,494,000	\$68,141,000	\$90,236,000	\$35,891,000	\$252,674,000
Rediscouts	6,523,000	69,495,000	30,021,000	22,400,000	11,700,000	2,488,000	14,198,000	5,898,000	1,066,000	1,513,000	1,183,000	9,118,000
Bills on hand	38,508,000	134,125,000	59,162,000	51,289,000	38,440,000	31,732,000	71,777,000	31,516,000	24,834,000	18,376,000	36,102,000	56,597,000
Due members	123,553,000	759,212,000	108,555,000	148,117,000	57,708,000	48,514,000	267,886,000	60,008,000	43,139,000	77,509,000	44,649,000	125,286,000
Notes in circula'n	161,816,000	616,468,000	178,135,000	195,387,000	79,791,000	112,686,000	369,039,000	66,907,000	49,482,000	58,975,000	26,283,000	217,870,000
Ratio reserve	73.4%	80.9%	77.0%	70.1%	76.1%	81.7%	88.1%	66.4%	73.0%	66.2%	67.5%	71.5%

Federal Reserve Bank Statement

Consolidated statement of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks compares as follows:

	July 19, 1922	July 12, 1922	July 20, 1921
RESOURCES—			
Gold and gold certificates	\$317,860,000	\$317,832,000	\$368,448,000
Gold settlement fund—Federal Reserve Board	490,620,000	514,590,000	404,006,000
Total gold held by banks	\$808,600,000	\$832,422,000	\$772,453,000
Gold with Federal Reserve agents	2,195,062,000	2,161,560,000	1,624,332,000
Gold redemption fund	41,673,000	41,851,000	111,513,000
Total gold reserves	\$3,045,335,000	\$3,035,833,000	\$2,508,298,000
Legal tender notes, silver, &c.	123,987,000	121,207,000	151,088,000
Total reserves	\$3,169,322,000	\$3,157,040,000	\$2,659,386,000
Bills discounted: Secured by U. S. Government obligations	176,263,000	157,555,000	609,779,000
All other	267,205,000	272,387,000	1,076,370,000
Bills bought in open market	148,970,000	157,675,000	23,907,000
Total bills on hand	\$592,438,000	\$587,617,000	\$1,710,056,000
United States bonds and notes	201,901,000	208,424,000	35,407,000
United States certificates of indebtedness	74,000,000	74,000,000	215,875,000
One-year certificates (Pittman act)	265,948,000	274,340,000	2,892,000
All other	9,000	4,000	
Municipal warrants			
Total earning assets	\$1,134,296,000	\$1,144,394,000	\$1,964,230,000
Bank premises	42,417,000	41,985,000	25,762,000
Five per cent. redemption fund against Federal Reserve Bank notes	7,496,000	7,551,000	9,954,000
Uncollected items	592,345,000	611,733,000	544,655,000
All other resources	16,186,000	16,069,000	12,712,000
Total resources	\$4,962,062,000	\$4,978,772,000	\$5,216,679,000
LIABILITIES—			
Capital paid in	\$105,239,000	\$105,224,000	\$102,222,000
Surplus	2,132,848,000	2,158,122,000	2,564,512,000
Deposits: Government	49,376,000	20,837,000	34,967,000
Member banks—Reserve account	1,884,145,000	1,875,229,000	1,630,196,000
All other	29,010,000	28,871,000	27,856,000
Total deposits	\$1,942,531,000	\$1,924,937,000	\$1,693,019,000
Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation	2,132,848,000	2,158,122,000	2,564,512,000
F. R. Bank notes in circulation—Net liability	66,053,000	67,380,000	127,875,000
Deferred availability items	479,274,000	486,360,000	453,543,000
All other liabilities	20,719,000	21,351,000	61,694,000
Total liabilities	\$4,962,062,000	\$4,978,772,000	\$5,216,679,000
Ratio of total reserves to deposit and Federal Reserve note liabilities combined	77.8%	77.3%	62.5%

Statement of Member Banks

Data for Federal Reserve Cities and in Federal Reserve Branch Cities

	New York		Chicago	
	July 12	July 5	July 12	July 5
Number of reporting banks	66	66	50	50
Loans sec. by U.S. Govt. obligations	\$75,941,000	\$79,691,000	\$36,032,000	\$34,179,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	1,508,067,000	1,540,776,000	399,877,000	352,280,000
All other loans and discounts	1,940,920,000	1,936,949,000	647,241,000	647,060,000
Total loans and discounts	3,522,928,000	3,557,416,000	1,053,150,000	1,035,541,000
U. S. bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	464,486,000	463,315,000	49,408,000	50,657,000
U. S. Victory notes	8,288,000	8,079,000	3,466,000	2,861,000
U. S. Treasury notes	336,821,000	331,726,000	50,898,000	41,204,000
U. S. cfs. of indebtedness	132,513,000	120,398,000	16,650,000	15,895,000
Other loans, stocks and securities	644,846,000	643,154,000	179,369,000	186,714,000
Loans, discounts, investm'ts, &c.	5,089,612,000	5,124,086,000	1,332,931,000	1,332,872,000
Reserve bal. with F. R. Bank	657,029,000	616,194,000	146,549,000	140,248,000
Cash in vault	82,531,000	79,866,000	30,050,000	31,287,000
Net demand deposits	4,539,501,000	4,502,739,000	988,484,000	970,643,000
Time deposits	565,821,000	547,052,000	321,025,000	322,481,000
Government deposits	34,818,000	35,695,000	5,862,000	9,746,000
Bills payable	43,330,000	50,110,000	1,426,000	4,240,000
Bills rediscounted	4,027,000	27,281,000	2,236,000	4,824,000
All Reserve Cities	723	273	210	210
Number of reporting banks	273	273	210	210
Loans sec. by U.S. Govt. obligations	\$176,539,000	\$183,635,000	\$50,340,000	\$58,018,000
Loans sec. by stocks and bonds	2,612,511,000	2,628,079,000	485,972,000	485,972,000
All other loans and discounts	4,398,048,000	4,382,253,000	1,370,099,000	1,359,308,000
Total loans and discounts	7,186,098,000	7,193,968,000	1,906,420,000	1,903,298,000
U. S. bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	733,991,000	731,541,000	277,625,000	276,137,000
U. S. Victory notes	27,281,000	24,988,000	6,047,000	6,554,000
U. S. Treasury notes	421,273,000	413,069,000	59,729,000	65,523,000
U. S. cfs. of indebtedness	134,205,000	120,398,000	16,650,000	15,895,000
Other loans, stocks and securities	1,273,913,000	1,263,152,000	613,356,000	617,331,000
Loans, discounts, investm'ts, &c.	9,827,761,000	9,814,344,000	2,913,562,000	2,912,293,000
Reserve bal. with F. R. Bank	1,062,715,000	1,026,120,000	216,927,000	216,541,000
Cash in vault	161,913,000	162,110,000	58,644,000	59,805,000
Net demand deposits	7,838,402,000	7,763,400,000	1,772,531,000	1,753,532,000
Time deposits	1,727,635,000	1,715,130,000	1,008,533,000	1,008,556,000
Government deposits	79,213,000	87,687,000	21,738,000	23,458,000
Bills payable	43,330,000	50,110,000	1,426,000	4,240,000
Bills rediscounted	33,964,000	75,605,000	15,679,000	16,810,000
All Other Reporting Banks	313	313	313	313
Number of reporting banks	313	313	313	313
Loans secured by United States Government obligations	\$44,114,000	\$44,888,000	\$44,114,000	\$44,888,000
Loans secured by stocks and bonds	435,262,000	437,027,000	435,262,000	437,027,000
All other loans and discounts	1,263,267,000	1,259,185,000	1,263,267,000	1,259,185,000
Total loans and discounts	1,742,643,000	1,741,100,000	1,742,643,000	1,741,100,000
United States bonds owned (exclusive of bonds borrowed)	264,425,000	262,205,000	264,425,000	262,205,000
United States Victory notes	5,788,000	5,834,000	5,788,000	5,834,000
United States Treasury notes	34,645,000	35,764,000	34,645,000	35,764,000
United States certificates of indebtedness	18,596,000	18,852,000	18,596,000	18,852,000
Other loans, stocks and securities	403,642,000	409,947,000	403,642,000	409,947,000
Loans, discounts, investments, &c.	2,489,722,000	2,474,342,000	2,489,722,000	2,474,342,000
Reserve balance with Federal Reserve Bank	158,504,000	157,256,000	158,504,000	157,256,000
Cash in vault	85,612,000	74,032,000	85,612,000	74,032,000
Net demand deposits	1,584,182,000	1,576,522,000	1,584,182,000	1,576,522,000
Time deposits	740,182,000	746,863,000	740,182,000	746,863,000
Government deposits	9,119,000	10,063,000	9,119,000	10,063,000
Bills payable	11,401,000	8,824,000	11,401,000	8,824,000
Bills rediscounted	18,062,000	19,132,000	18,062,000	19,132,000

New York Stock Exchange Transactions

Week Ended July 22

Total Sales 3,576,391 Shares

—1922—				—1922—				—1922—				
High.	Low.	Sales.	Stock and Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Stock and Dividend Rate.	High.	Low.	Sales.	Stock and Dividend Rate.	
20 1/2	19 1/2	800	ADAMS EXPRESS	64 1/2	62 1/2	48 1/2	1 1/2	2 1/2	85 1/2	82 1/2	110,700	Crucible Steel
50 1/2	49 1/2	1,000	Do pf (3)	49 1/2	48 1/2	49	1/2	1/2	27 1/2	24 1/2	18,100	Cuban Amer Sugar
57 1/2	45 1/2	9,400	Air Reduction (4)	56 1/2	53 1/2	50 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	94 1/2	78 1/2	1,700	Do pf (7)
18 1/2	13 1/2	8,500	Alax Rubber	15 1/2	14 1/2	14 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	19 1/2	18 1/2	7,500	Cuba Cane Sugar
1/2	1/2	700	Alaska Gold Mines	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	40 1/2	10 1/2	7,900	Do pf
2 1/2	2 1/2	1,200	Allied Chem & Dye (4)	60 1/2	57 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	65 1/2	43	6,500	DAVISON CHEM
110	101	500	Do pf (7)	107 1/2	107 1/2	1/2	1/2	1/2	126	106 1/2	800	De Beers Mines
56	37 1/2	34,500	Allis-Chalmers Mfg (4)	56	53 1/2	54	1 1/2	1 1/2	130 1/2	109 1/2	300	Delaware & Hud (8)
100	86 1/2	300	Do pf (7)	98 1/2	98 1/2	98 1/2	1/2	1/2	130 1/2	110 1/2	900	Del. Lack & W (18 1/2)
42 1/2	29 1/2	2,100	Am Agricultural Chem	39 1/2	38 1/2	39 1/2	1/2	1/2	108 1/2	100 1/2	150	Detroit Edison (8)
70 1/2	55 1/2	500	Do pf	63 1/2	63	63 1/2	1/2	1/2	60 1/2	57 1/2	100	Det United Ry (*10)
49	31 1/2	1,100	Am Beet Sugar	46 1/2	44 1/2	46	1 1/2	1 1/2	30 1/2	18 1/2	800	Dome Mines (2)
40	31 1/2	400	Am Bosch Magneto	38 1/2	38 1/2	38 1/2	1/2	1/2	150	11 1/2	3,300	P de Nemours (8)
83 1/2	51	1,800	Am Brake S & F (4)	63 1/2	61	63 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	83	80	200	Do deb (6)
58	32 1/2	40,000	Am Can	58	55 1/2	55 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	77 1/2	70	3,800	EASTMAN KOD (5)
108 1/2	141	3,100	Am Car & Fdy (12)	108 1/2	106	106 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	48	40 1/2	25,200	Elec Stor Bat (3)
121 1/2	115 1/2	100	Do pf (7)	121	121	121	1/2	1/2	23 1/2	14 1/2	900	Elk Horn Coal
14	7	400	Am Chiclé	10 1/2	10 1/2	10 1/2	1/2	1/2	11 1/2	2 1/2	100	Emerson Brantingham
30 1/2	19 1/2	400	Am Cotton Oil	27 1/2	26 1/2	26 1/2	1/2	1/2	44 1/2	22	100	Do pf
61	41 1/2	2,800	Am Drug Syndicate	57 1/2	54 1/2	54 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	87 1/2	76 1/2	5,900	Endicott-Johnson (5)
143 1/2	126	200	Am Express (8)	132	132	132	1/2	1/2	18 1/2	17 1/2	100	Do pf (7)
17 1/2	12	200	Am Hide & Leather	14 1/2	14	14 1/2	1/2	1/2	27 1/2	11 1/2	6,200	Do 1st pf
73	58	2,200	Do pf	71 1/2	70	70 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	20 1/2	17 1/2	1,000	Do 2d pf
114 1/2	78	6,000	Am Ice (7)	112 1/2	109 1/2	110 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	87 1/2	75 1/2	9,300	FAM PLAY-LASKY (8)
92 1/2	72	800	Do pf (6)	90 1/2	90	90	1/2	1/2	99	91 1/2	300	Do pf (8)
50 1/2	38 1/2	6,400	Am International	44 1/2	42 1/2	43 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	127 1/2	97 1/2	1,100	Fed Min & S pf (5)
13 1/2	9 1/2	1,800	Am La F Fire Eng (1)	13 1/2	12 1/2	13 1/2	1/2	1/2	103 1/2	79 1/2	300	Greene-Cannan Corp
40 1/2	29 1/2	800	Am Lined	34 1/2	34	34 1/2	1/2	1/2	103 1/2	79 1/2	1,700	Do Ohio pf (8)
118 1/2	102	32,200	Am Locomotive (6)	118 1/2	114 1/2	115	1 1/2	1 1/2	19 1/2	11 1/2	3,300	Flak Rubber
118	112	800	Am Radiator (4)	118 1/2	117 1/2	117 1/2	1/2	1/2	26 1/2	12 1/2	9,800	Freeport-Texas
103 1/2	82	200	Am Mail & Grain	2	2	2	1/2	1/2	67 1/2	45 1/2	1,300	GEN AM T CAR (3)
13	8 1/2	7,300	Am Safety Razor	7	6 1/2	6 1/2	1/2	1/2	73 1/2	50 1/2	1,200	Do pf (7)
20 1/2	15 1/2	7,500	Am Ship & Commerce	21	19 1/2	20 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	111	90	3,400	Do pf (5)
67 1/2	43 1/2	7,200	Am Smelt & Refining	62 1/2	60 1/2	61 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	102	94	200	Do deb pf (7)
99 1/2	86 1/2	800	Do pf (7)	98 1/2	98	98 1/2	1/2	1/2	178 1/2	136	5,000	General Electric (112)
138	106 1/2	200	Am Snuff (12)	138 1/2	135	136 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	154 1/2	84	45,900	General Motors
40 1/2	30 1/2	10,000	Am Steel Foundries (3)	38 1/2	38 1/2	38 1/2	1/2	1/2	83 1/2	69	300	Do pf (6)
100	91	400	Do pf (7)	90 1/2	90 1/2	90 1/2	1/2	1/2	94	87 1/2	275	Do deb (7)
81 1/2	54 1/2	7,500	Am Sugar Refining	80 1/2	78 1/2	79 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	18 1/2	13 1/2	1,500	Gilchrist Co
107	84	600	Do pf (7)	106	106	106 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	44 1/2	34 1/2	2,500	Goodrich (B F) Co
47	23 1/2	1,300	Am Sumatra Tobacco	39 1/2	37 1/2	38 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	91	80 1/2	300	Do pf (7)
71	53 1/2	100	Do pf	61 1/2	61 1/2	61 1/2	1/2	1/2	35	25	3,500	Granby Consol
124 1/2	114 1/2	10,300	Am Tel & Cable (5)	124 1/2	121 1/2	121 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	45 1/2	31 1/2	13,800	Great Northern pf (7)
145 1/2	129 1/2	2,600	Am Tobacco (12)	143 1/2	142	143 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	45 1/2	31 1/2	300	Do pf (7)
142 1/2	126	3,200	Do Class B (12)	143 1/2	143	143 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	14 1/2	10 1/2	1,000	Do pf (7)
105	98 1/2	400	Do pf (6)	104 1/2	103 1/2	104	1 1/2	1 1/2	32	25	3,500	Granby Consol
17 1/2	6	1,000	Am Water W & Elec	16 1/2	15	15 1/2	1/2	1/2	45 1/2	31 1/2	13,800	Great Northern pf (7)
48	37	600	Do 1st pf (7)	47 1/2	46 1/2	47 1/2	1/2	1/2	14 1/2	10 1/2	1,000	Do pf (7)
43	17 1/2	3,300	Do participating pf	43	40 1/2	41	1 1/2	1 1/2	19	5	200	Gulf, Mobile & North
100	75 1/2	9,150	Am Woolen	92 1/2	90 1/2	90 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	14 1/2	10 1/2	1,000	Do pf
100	100 1/2	100	Do pf (7)	100 1/2	100 1/2	100 1/2	1/2	1/2	90 1/2	44 1/2	19,200	Gulf States Steel
37 1/2	22 1/2	800	Am Writing Paper pf	32	31	31	1/2	1/2	103	80 1/2	200	HARTMAN CORP (7)
20 1/2	12 1/2	1,200	Am Zinc, L & S	18 1/2	17 1/2	17 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	28 1/2	15	1,800	Headless Manufacturing
48 1/2	36	1,500	Do pf	45 1/2	43 1/2	45 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	85	70	2,300	Houston Oil
57	47	18,500	Anaconda Copper	54 1/2	52 1/2	53 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	24	20 1/2	6,500	Hudson Motor Car (2)
20 1/2	10	100	Ann Arbor	15	15	15	1/2	1/2	21 1/2	10 1/2	4,000	Hupp Motor Car (1)
51 1/2	29	1,200	Do pf	42 1/2	40 1/2	42 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	14 1/2	3	10,300	Hydraulic Steel
57 1/2	43	900	Associated Dry G (4)	53 1/2	52 1/2	53 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	109 1/2	97 1/2	1,700	ILLINOIS CENT (7)
83 1/2	75	610	Do 1st pf (6)	82	81	82	1/2	1/2	110 1/2	103 1/2	3,300	Do pf (6)
135 1/2	99	100	Associated Oil (6)	115	115	115 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	4 1/2	3 1/2	3,600	Indianapolis Refining
102 1/2	91 1/2	7,800	At & T Santa Fe (6)	102 1/2	100 1/2	101 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	11 1/2	5 1/2	1,000	Indian Refining
91 1/2	85	1,800	Do pf (5)	91 1/2	90 1/2	91 1/2	1/2	1/2	5 1/2	3 1/2	4,100	Inspiration Copper
5 1/2	3 1/2	2,000	Atlanta, Birm & At	5 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2	1/2	1/2	5	1	3,300	Interboro Consol
111 1/2	83	2,200	Atlantic Coast L (7)	108 1/2	108	108 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	12 1/2	3 1/2	4,500	Do pf
5 1/2	2 1/2	2,200	Atlantic Fruit	5 1/2	5 1/2	5 1/2	1/2	1/2	43 1/2	34 1/2	1,500	Do pf
43 1/2	23 1/2	5,600	Atlantic, Gulf & W I	38	36 1/2	37 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	38 1/2	26	1,000	Internat Cement (2 1/2)
31 1/2	16 1/2	100	Do pf	29 1/2	29 1/2	29 1/2	1/2	1/2	28 1/2	20 1/2	2,900	Int Comb Eng (2)
118 1/2	114	100	Atlantic Ref pf (7)	117	117	117 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	27 1/2	13 1/2	2,200	Int Harv new (5)
140	120	100	Atlas Powder (12)	130	130	130	1/2	1/2	27 1/2	13 1/2	1,200	Int Mer Marine
33 1/2	9 1/2	2,400	Austin-Nichols	27 1/2	26	26 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2	87 1/2	62 1/2	14,800	Do pf
121 1/2	9											

NEW TOTAL: \$2,000.00 JULY 4, 1999

Total sales	\$38,680,000
Grand total	\$76,172,700

—Continued

and rates as given in the above table are the annual payments based on the latest quarterly or half yearly

*Last quarterly payment in stock. †Partly extra. ‡Including 4 per cent. extra in stock. §Including 3 per cent. extra in stock. ¶Last quarterly payment in scrip. †Payable in preferred stock. x Ex dividend.

ADVERTISEMENTS.

Security

		FIRMS			
Dean,	Onativia & Co.,	52	Broadway.	Broad	1560
Dean,	Onativia & Co.,	52	Broadway.	Broad	1560
Dean,	Onativia & Co.,	52	Broadway.	Broad	1540
Dean,	Onativia & Co.,	52	Broadway.	Broad	1560
Dean,	Onativia & Co.,	52	Broadway.	Broad	1560
Dean,	Onativia & Co.,	52	Broadway.	Broad	1540

*Legal for Savings Banks and Trust Cos., in New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut.

Transactions in the New York Curb

WEEK ENDED JULY 22, 1922

Trading by Days

	Industrials	Oils	Mining	Bonds	Foreign
Monday	38,800	197,978	330,950	\$658,000	89,000
Tuesday	39,525	211,730	331,400	631,000	183,000
Wednesday	74,448	196,265	360,780	916,000	189,000
Thursday	62,573	139,233	238,900	807,000	177,000
Friday	95,627	183,710	353,930	537,000	200,000
Saturday	40,805	70,560	126,700	321,000	200,000
Total	360,778	1,008,476	1,746,680	\$3,670,000	1,046,000

INDUSTRIALS

Range, 1922	High	Low	Last	Ch'ge	Net
1% .90	16,013	Acme Coal	1.90	.93	..
1% .20	9,000	Acme Packing	.40	.43	-.04
25 15	400	Aluminum Co.	22	21 1/2	+ 1 1/2
12 4 1/2	400	Allied Packers	11	11	- 1
15 10	900	Allied Packers, new	10	10	- 1
7 3	100	Allied Packers, cfs.	3	3	- 3 1/2
14 1/2 7 1/2	1,100	Amal Leather	10 1/2	9 1/2	- 1 1/2
43 33	100	Amal Leather pf.	35 1/2	35 1/2	- 1
108 104	800	Am Metals Co 7% pf.	107 1/2	107 1/2	- 1/2
2 1/2 1	800	Am Drug Stores, Cl A	1 1/2	1 1/2	..
30 1/2 4 1/2	3,800	Am Metals Co, Ltd.	47 1/2	45	+ 4 1/2
5 1/2 3	500	Am Writing Paper	3 1/2	3 1/2	..
3 2	1,900	Atlantic Fruit, w l	2 1/2	2 1/2	- 1/2
15 10 1	485	Beth Motors	15	15	+ 1 1/2
110 94	25	Borden Co	106 1/2	106 1/2	+ 1/2
10 12 1/2	1,200	Brit-Am Tob. reg.	10	17 1/2	- 6
10 1/2 1/2	16,400	Brit-Am Tob. coupon	19 1/2	17 1/2	+ 1 1/2
9 1/2 4 1/2	1,500	Brook City R.R.	9 1/2	8 1/2	- 1 1/2
2 1/2 4 1/2	4,200	Buddy Buds, Inc.	1 1/2	1 1/2	- 1/2
1 1/2 5 1/2	2,000	Car Light & Power	70	55	+ 12
106 90	25	Celluloid Co	94 1/2	94 1/2	+ 1
16 6 1/2	200	Cent St Elec.	6 1/2	6 1/2	- 2
3 1/2 1 1/2	200	Cent Tereza Sugar	3	3	+ 1 1/2
4 2 1/2	200	Cent Tereza Sugar pf.	2 1/2	2 1/2	- 1/2
6 1/2 1 1/2	5,700	Chicago Nipple	5 1/2	5 1/2	- 1/2
5 1/2 1 1/2	9,800	Chicago Nipple B.	5 1/2	4 1/2	+ 1/2
45 1/2 4 1/2	2,300	Commercial Solv. A	44 1/2	44 1/2	+ 1/2
40 1/2 3 1/2	100	Commercial Solv. B	40 1/2	40 1/2	+ 3
35 29	300	Cleveland Motors	30 1/2	28 1/2	+ 1
5 4	500	Columbia Motor	4	4	..
15 1/2 10 1/2	600	Conley Tin Foli.	14 1/2	13 1/2	- 1/2
9 1/2 7 1/2	1,000	Continental Motors	7 1/2	7 1/2	- 1/2
12 1/2 8	1,800	Cuban Dom Sugar	9 1/2	8 1/2	- 1 1/2
14 1/2 10 1/2	4,000	Daniels Motor	13 1/2	12 1/2	..
75 38	1,300	Denver & Rio Gr pf.	.00	.55	..
9 1/2 7	4,900	Dublier Cond & L, w l	9	8 1/2	..
40 1/2 20 1/2	4,500	Durant Motor	40	30	+ 10
16 1/2 8 1/2	1,000	Durant Motor of Ind.	14 1/2	13 1/2	+ 1/2
3 1/2 3	100	Eari Motor cfs.	3 1/2	3 1/2	+ 1/2
7 5 1/2	300	Fed Tel	5 1/2	5 1/2	+ 1/2
68 58	100	Flintstone T & R 7% pf.	88	88	..
10 1/2 5 1/2	2,300	Gibson Howell Co.	19 1/2	18 1/2	+ 1/2
22 1/2 16 1/2	1,000	Gillette Safety Razor	22 1/2	22 1/2	+ 1
56 1/2 42	1,300	Glen Alden Coal	56 1/2	54 1/2	+ 2 1/2
9 1/2 4	14,100	Goldwyn Pictures	8	7 1/2	+ 1/2
14 9 1/2	500	Goodyear T & R	11 1/2	11	..
40 24	300	Goodyear pf	33	32 1/2	- 1/2
4 1/2 4 1/2	600	D W Griffith, Cl A	4 1/2	4 1/2	+ 1/2
1 1/2 50	1,300	Grant Motor	1	.80	- 1
32 28	5,500	Hays Wheel Co.	32	30 1/2	+ 1
1 1/2 80	6,000	Heyden Chemical	1 1/2	1	..
15 1/2 5 1/2	2,000	Hudson & Man R R	15 1/2	12 1/2	+ 1/2
21 1/2 5 1/2	1,000	Hudson pf	19	16 1/2	+ 2 1/2
58 40	120	Inland Steel	51 1/2	50 1/2	+ 1/2
14 1/2 10 1/2	400	Imp Tob. Co. Brit & Ir.	14 1/2	14 1/2	+ 1/2
11 1/2 6	4,400	Intercont Rubber	6 1/2	6 1/2	- 2 1/2
13 1/2 10 1/2	700	Inter Carbon	11 1/2	10 1/2	..
18 1/2 14 1/2	800	Lehigh Power Sec.	16 1/2	16 1/2	+ 1/2
82 66	10	Lehigh Val Coal Sales	77 1/2	77 1/2	+ 1/2
4 1/2 2	1,700	LoLaW new, w l	4 1/2	4 1/2	+ 1/2
54 5 1/2	4,700	Luna Loco, new	54	52 1/2	+ 1 1/2
8 1/2 7 1/2	2,200	Lincoln Motors	3	2 1/2	+ 1/2
2 1/2 40	6,800	Locomobile	2 1/2	1 1/2	+ 1 1/2
5 1/2 1 1/2	1,600	Mercer Motors	3 1/2	3 1/2	+ 1/2
5 1/2 3	1,400	Mercer Mot. v cfs.	3 1/2	2 1/2	+ 1/2
12 1/2 10	3,800	Mocon Motor Car	12 1/2	11 1/2	..
11 1/2 7 1/2	600	National Leather	8 1/2	7 1/2	..
8 1/2 4	700	National Leather, new	8 1/2	8	..
10 1/2 10 1/2	2,500	N. Y. Tel. 6 1/2 pf.	10 1/2	10 1/2	..
10 1/2 5 1/2	2,300	Packard Motor	15 1/2	14 1/2	..
4 1/2 2 1/2	100	Perfect Tire	3	3	..
50 1/2 23 1/2	800	Peelless T & M	50 1/2	50	+ 1/2
22 1/2 5 1/2	8,300	Phillip Morris	21 1/2	18 1/2	+ 1 1/2
10 1/2 8 1/2	600	Pub Ser of N J 8% pf.	10 1/2	10 1/2	..
14 1/2 8 1/2	800	Pyrene Mfg	9 1/2	9 1/2	+ 1/2
6 1/2 2 1/2	22,100	Radio Co.	6 1/2	4 1/2	+ 1 1/2
3 1/2 2	11,000	Radio Co. pf.	3 1/2	3 1/2	+ 1/2
1 1/2 50	300	Repetit Candy	.65	.65	- 20
29 18 1/2	2,000	Rep Motors	27 1/2	26 1/2	- 1 1/2
3 1/2 1 1/2	700	Republic Rubber	3 1/2	3 1/2	+ 10
3 1/2 1 1/2	100	Saveway F & P	1 1/2	1 1/2	..
2 30	94,100	Southern Coal & Iron	44	30	..
23 1/2 18 1/2	300	Swift International	19 1/2	19 1/2	- 1/2
14 1/2 9 1/2	1,600	Tenn El Power w l	14 1/2	13 1/2	+ 1/2
40 1/2 30	700	Tenn El Pr 22 pf w l	38	38	..
90 1/2 67	1,200	Todd Shipyard	71	68	+ 1/2
10 1/2 5	900	Tobacco Products Exp.	7 1/2	7 1/2	- 1/2
2 1/2 96	800	U S Lt & Heat pf.	1 1/2	1 1/2	+ 1/2
2 1/2 7 1/2	7,800	U S Lt & Heat	1 1/2	1 1/2	- 1/2
9 1/2 5 1/2	3,100	U S Prof. Steel	3 1/2	3 1/2	+ 1/2
3 1/2 1 1/2	3,300	United Retail Candy	6 1/2	6 1/2	- 1/2
14 1/2 4 1/2	3,100	U S Ship Corp.	97	95	+ 1 1/2
15 1/2 4 1/2	3,000	U S Steamship Co.	97	97	- 1/2
24 1/2 16	17,000	Wayne Coal	2	1 1/2	+ 1/2
3 1/2 5 1/2	600	West End Chemical	3 1/2	3 1/2	- 1/2
31 1/2 1 1/2	1,000	Willis 1st pf	20 1/2	20	..
72 64 1/2	200	Youngstown S & T	64 1/2	64 1/2	- 1/2

STANDARD OIL SUBSIDIARIES

25 10 1/2	2,000	Anglo-Amer Oil	19 1/2	18 1/2	- 1/2
12 1/2 8	800	Atlantic Lobos	9 1/2	9 1/2	..
100 84 1/2	10	Buckeye Pipe Line	83	83	- 1
103 1/2 79 1/2	10	Eureka Pipe Line	89	89	- 1
62 40	1,470	Galena Signal Oil	55	52	- 4
198 161	9	Illinois Pipe Line	165	162	- 4
12 1/2 9 1/2	715	Imp Oil (Can) coupon	11 1/2	10 1/2	+ 1
106 84	350	Indiana Pipe Line	81	80	+ 1 1/2
27 1/2 14	30,100	International Pet	23 1/2	21 1/2	+ 1 1/2
110 90	10	Northern Pipe Line	98	98	- 2
33 1/2 23 1/2	10	Ohio Oil	28 1/2	27 1/2	- 1
44 1/2 17	500	Pena Mex Fuel	37	35	- 1
27 1/2 22 1/2	40	Pratt Pipe Line	24 1/2	24 1/2	- 3
104 77	170	So Pipe Line	93	93	+ 1
24 1/2 16 1/2	350	South Penn Oil	23 1/2	21 1/2	+ 10
12 1/2 8 1/2	71,100	Stand Oil of Ind.	10 1/2	10 1/2	..
108 76 1/2	2,400	Stand Oil Ky, new	94 1/2	93 1/2	- 1/2
44 1/2 31	310	Stand Oil of N Y	44 1/2	41 1/2	- 1/2
450 290	10	Vacuum Oil	415	415	- 1/2

MISCELLANEOUS OILS

1 1/2 1	700	Aetna C Oil	1 1/2	1 1/2	+ 1/2
15 1/2 2	23,200	Alcon Oil Corp.	15 1/2	13 1/2	+ 1 1/2
5 1/2 2	1,200	Allied Oil	.04	.03	..
13 1/2 8	2,000	Amal Royal	.05	.05	- 1/2
25 1/2 13	1,200	Ark Natural Gas	10 1/2	9 1/2	..
92 1/2 50	9,800	Bonne Oil	12 1/2	12 1/2	- 11
57 1/2 39	17,600	Boston & Wyoming Oil	55	55	- 11
3 1/2 29	200	Brit-Am	31	30 1/2	- 1/2
9 1/2 3 1/2	9,573	Carib Syndicate	7 1/2	7 1/2	- 1/2
24 1/2 15 1/2	2,225	Cities Service	20 1/2	20 1/2	- 2
24 1/2 17	3,410	Cities Service	20 1/2	20 1/2	- 2
2 1/2 1 1/2	3,500	Cities Service bks	20 1/2	20 1/2	- 1/2
2 1/2 1 1/2	200	Cities Service pf.	6 1/2	6 1/2	- 1/2
3 1/2 1 1/2	1,300	Columbia Petroleum	1 1/2	1 1/2	- 1/2
4 1/2 1 1/2	11,000	Columbia Petroleum	1 1/2	1 1/2	- 1/2
4 1/2 1 1/2	100	Cent Refining Co.	1 1/2	1 1/2	- 1/2
4 1/2 1 1/2	300	Cosden pf, old	1 1/2	1 1/2	- 1/2

Range, 1922

High	Low	Sales	High	Low	Last	Ch'ge	Net
5 1/2	1 1/2	3,300	Croco Petroleum	5 1/2	5 1/2
12 1/2 3	6,000	Cushing Petroleum	.03	.03	.03
11 1/2 1 1/2	500	Darby Petroleum	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
11 1/2 8	300	Dome Texas	9 1/2	9	9	- 1 1/2	..
4 1/2 2 1/2	200	Duquesne Oil	4 1/2	4 1/2	4 1/2
14 1/2 12 1/2	1,000	Equity Petroleum	14 1/2	14 1/2	14 1/2
7 1/2 20	73,000	Engineers Petroleum	.34	.23	.31	+ 1 1/2	..
2 1/2 1	24,000	Federal Oil	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
19 1/2 8 1/2	2,200	Fennell Oil	16 1/2	15 1/2	15 1/2	+ 1 1/2	..
9 1/2 3 1/2	1,000	Gilliland Oil	5 1/2	4 1/2	5 1/2	+ 1/2	..
1 1/2 7 1/2	25,500	Glen Rock Oil	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
400 400	10	Gulf Oil	400	400	400	- 30	..
3 1/2 2	1,300	Granada Oil	2	2	2
30 1/2 4	107,600	Hudson Oil	25	20	22	- 10	..
1 1/2 40	25,700	Keystone Ranger	.62	.45	.53	- 08	..
26 1/2 5	1,100	Kirby Petroleum	5 1/2	5	5 1/2	- 1/2	..
10 1/2 3	7,000	Lance C Roy	.03	.03	.03
1 1/2 1 1/2	6,310	Livingston Petroleum	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
1 1/2 7 1/2	10,700	Lyons Petroleum	7 1/2	7 1/2	7 1/2
27 1/2 18	2,800	Maracibo Oil	19	18 1/2	19	+ 1 1/2	..
1 1/2 50	1,300	Magma Oil	1	1	1
10 1/2 1	6,200	Marland Oil of Mexico	7 1/2	6 1/2	7 1/2	- 1/2	..
2 1/2 1	300	Marine Oil	1 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
20 1/2 2	20,400	Meridian Petroleum	.04	.03	.04
14 1/2 8 1/2	1,900	Merritt Oil Corp.	9 1/2	9 1/2	9 1/2
24 1/2 51	100	Mex Panuco	51	51	51	+ 1 1/2	..
4 1/2 1 1/2	25,200	Mexico Oil	2 1/2	1 1/2	1 1/2
18 1/2 9 1/2	21,800	Mountain Product	14 1/2	14 1/2	14 1/2
12 1/2 5 1/2	3,000	Mutual Oil	9 1/2	9	9	- 1/2	..
37 1/2 11 1/2	3,200	New York Oil	28	20	20 1/2	- 6 1/2	..
60 40	8,100	New England Fuel Oil	60	55	59 1/2	+ 4 1/2	..
35 1/2 13	1,600	Noble Oil & Gas	21	21	21	- 10	..

The Economic Position of Finland

Continued from Page 79

31, 1914, amounted to 171,186,000 Finnish marks, almost all of which was contracted for railway construction purposes. In 1917 the debt amounted to only 249,500,000 Finnish marks, but in 1918 it rose to 1,189,500,000 Finnish marks, due to the civil war in that year. The establishment of independence and the State participation in industrial enterprises, moreover, increased the public debt to 1,971,259,000 Finnish marks on Dec. 31, 1920. Since this date the debt has been contracted. On Nov. 30, 1921, it amounted to 1,936,000,000 Finnish marks and on April 30, 1922, to 1,891,000,000 Finnish marks. The national wealth of Finland is over fifteen times and the State-owned property over four and a half times the total public debt.

On April 30, 1922, Finland's domestic debt amounted to 1,199,000,000 Finnish marks, equal to about \$23,980,000 at current exchange. The foreign debt on this date amounted to 692,000,000 Finnish marks, equal to about \$138,400,000 at par of exchange. The total debt thus amounted to about \$162,380,000, or to \$48 per capita. Finland's per capita debt is, therefore, one of the smallest in the world.

In 1913 the service (interest and amortization) on the public debt amounted to 8,028,000 Finnish marks, or to 4.4 per cent. of the ordinary revenue. In the budget for 1922 the service on the debt amounts to 237,757,000 Finnish marks, or to 12.3 per cent. of the ordinary

revenue. Even though the service on the debt has increased, it still forms a small percentage of the ordinary revenue.

Since Finland has practically balanced her budget, she is now in a position to deflate her currency. During and after the war, the currency was grossly inflated to cover budget deficits and to provide for the expansion of trade. On May 30, 1914, there were only 123,941,000 Finnish marks in circulation, but by March 15, 1921, the amount had increased to the high level of 1,493,342,000 Finnish marks. Since March 15, 1921, however, the note circulation has not expanded, but has fallen to 1,387,806,000 Finnish marks on May 15, 1922, a decrease of 7.1 per cent.

Meanwhile the ratio of the Bank of Finland's gold reserve to its note and deposit liabilities has fallen from 24.2 per cent. on May 30, 1914, to 2.8 per cent. on May 15, 1922. The condition of the Bank of Finland on May 30, 1914; May 14, 1921, and May 15, 1922, is shown in the following table, in thousands of Finnish marks.

The movement of commodity prices in

Finland is further evidence of deflation. In October, 1921, the cost of living index number in Finland stood at its high point of 1279 per cent. of prewar (July, 1914), but since this date it has fallen steadily and in March, 1922, stood at 1107 per cent. of prewar, or a decrease of 13.4 per cent.

The exchange value of the Finnish mark, moreover, has reflected the ups and downs of Finland's trade and financial position. The normal or par value of the Finnish mark is 19.3 cents. During and after the war, however, it depreciated severely, due to (1) a heavy excess of merchandise imports; (2) excessive issues of notes; (3) extraordinary rise of prices; (4) uncertainty as to internal political stability; (5) fear of the influence of Soviet Russia. As a result, the Finnish mark depreciated steadily until it touched the low level of 1.30 cents, or 6.7 per cent. of par, on Sept. 15, 1921. The recent improvement in Finland's economic position has resulted in a marked recovery in Finnish exchange and it now stands at 2.13 cents, or at 11.0 per cent. of par. The course of Finnish exchange in New York

since 1919 is shown in the following table:

MOVEMENT OF FINNISH EXCHANGE AT NEW YORK				
(in percentages of par)				
Year	High	Date	Low	Date
1919	42.1	July 25	15.3	Dec. 17
1920	29.8	Apr. 12	10.4	Dec. 4
1921	18.9	Jan. 24	6.7	Sept. 15
1922	11.2	Mar. 18	9.6	Jan. 11

In recent years there has been considerable discussion regarding the "stabilization of exchange" in various countries, but no concrete plans have been promulgated, due largely to the fact that the economic condition of countries with highly depreciated exchanges made stabilization impracticable. Finland, however, appears to have attained a position where the stabilization of her exchange is a practical problem. The Government of Finland recognizes that the fluctuation of the Finnish mark is one of the most disturbing factors in Finland's economic life. Accordingly, the Government has decided to make stabilization "the first task of its financial policy."

In order to obtain a sufficient gold reserve to effect the stabilization of the Finnish mark, or at least to make some progress in that direction, the Government is now negotiating for a £4,000,000 loan in London. Should Finland succeed in obtaining this loan, the economic position of the country would be materially improved, especially if the proceeds were used to stabilize the exchange value of the Finnish mark.

CONDITION OF THE BANK OF FINLAND

Date	Gold	Notes in Circulation	Deposits	Ratio of Gold to Notes and Deposits
May 30, 1914.....	35,091	123,941	21,225	24.2
May 14, 1921.....	42,626	1,415,916	111,092	2.8
May 15, 1922.....	42,625	1,387,806	147,813	2.8

The Annalist Barometer of Business Conditions

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the rise was not as pronounced as in the railroad section. It seems probable that the issue of New York Telephone Company preferred stock took a good deal of money from the public utility bond market, and that the excess funds of disappointed subscribers should seek investment in bonds. New York City traction bonds were quiet. Interborough Rapid Transit 5s gained $\frac{1}{4}$, to 99 $\frac{1}{2}$, and Manhattan Railway 5s advancing $\frac{1}{4}$, to 98. Consolidated Gas 7s gained $\frac{1}{4}$, to 102 $\frac{1}{2}$. Columbia Gas & Electric Company published a very good report of earnings for the first half of this year, and the first 5s, stamped, gained $\frac{1}{4}$, to 96 $\frac{1}{2}$.

The understones of the industrial list was strong. Advances were general, but the important upward moves were confined to those industries, such as copper and sugar, which seem to have been completely deflated and prices for whose products seem to be definitely on the upward path again. American Smelting & Refining 5s rose $\frac{1}{4}$, to 92 $\frac{1}{2}$. Cerro de Pasco Copper 5s jumped $\frac{1}{4}$, to 119 $\frac{1}{2}$. Chile Copper 7s advanced $\frac{1}{4}$, to 105 $\frac{1}{2}$. Braden 5s gained $\frac{1}{4}$, to 100 $\frac{1}{2}$. American Sugar Refining 5s rose a point, to 103. South Porto Rico Sugar 7s gained $\frac{1}{4}$, to 99 $\frac{1}{2}$. Warner 7s advanced a point, to 102 $\frac{1}{2}$. United States Rubber 5s rose $\frac{1}{4}$, to 99 $\frac{1}{2}$. The new Goodrich Tire 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ s jumped $\frac{1}{4}$, to 101. Kelly-Springfield 5s lost $\frac{1}{4}$, to 108. Goodyear 5s of 1931 fell $\frac{1}{4}$, to 101.

The revision of France's policy as to the reparations question had a decidedly constructive effect on the entire European situation and a much firmer market for foreign government obligations resulted. French 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ s and 8s both made fractional advances to 100 $\frac{1}{2}$ and 102 $\frac{1}{2}$, respectively. United Kingdom 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ s, 1937, gained $\frac{1}{4}$, to 103 $\frac{1}{2}$, while the issue due 1929 climbed $\frac{1}{4}$, to 111. Belgian 5s advanced $\frac{1}{4}$, to 101 $\frac{1}{2}$. Japanese first 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ s rose a fraction, to 92 $\frac{1}{2}$. Mexican issues were softer pending publication and confirmation of the decisions reached at the recent conference between the Minister of Finance of that country and American bankers.

Money

EVIDENCE of easier money was to be had in the market of last week. While call money was fairly firm, advancing at one time to 5 per cent., as compared with a high of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in the previous week, there was a further easing in time money, although no great amount of business was done in this quarter.

The rise in call money was due to the calling of loans, but it is doubtful whether very much of the money went out of this district. In fact, there was a strong suspicion that some of the funds called at the 3 per cent. rate came back into the market when the rate advanced to 5 per cent. It is a trifle early for money to begin to move out of New York in anticipation of crop needs, and it may be that even this movement of funds will not raise rates materially since the demand for business is as yet not making heavy inroads into the money market.

So far as time money was concerned, many loans for ninety days were arranged on a 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. basis, which was a fractional drop as compared with the rate in the preceding week. There was plenty of money to loan with demand light, which probably explains to some extent why there has been such a heavy turning of funds into investment issues. If the business expansion which has been taking place continues, then a tightening up of money may ultimately be expected, but for the present at least, and for some time in the future, it appears that easy money rates will prevail.

Commercial paper is still ruling at 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., but some further shading in this quarter may be expected. Acceptances were moderately active and for the first time

in several years the bill rate dropped below 3 per cent., the selling rate being quoted at $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. with the bid quotations 3 per cent. Later in the week there was some firming up in this quarter of the market, the selling rate advancing to $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. and the buying rate to 3 per cent.

The Federal Reserve Bank gave no indication last week of a desire to reduce the rediscount rate. It was hardly expected, however, that any change in this particular would be made at this time. It seems that a spread of a full 1 per cent. between New York and London is not feasible and a lowering of the New York rate may be expected.

Foreign Exchange

THE foreign exchanges showed alternating periods of strength and weakness last week, as word, favorable or unfavorable, was received in relation to the German crisis. There was nothing official up to Friday in regard to the steps which might be taken to alleviate the condition of Germany, but such rumors as came to hand indicated that events were moving to bring about a betterment in Central Europe. For instance, it was reported early in the week that England was prepared to remit the French debt, if France would consent to a reduction in the German reparations from 132,000,000,000 gold marks to 50,000,000,000 gold marks. This, naturally, had a favorable effect on all of the exchanges, at least until it was discovered that some of the other allied nations might not be favorably disposed to the reduction.

The unusual feature in connection with this unofficial proposal was that German markets reacted instead of advancing, which was a movement in contravention of the news of the day. Germany would naturally benefit most by reduction in reparations, yet markets declined to as low as ninety-centredths of a cent. French francs, on the other hand, rose sharply, and strength was evidenced in lire.

Toward the close of the week it was reported that the Guarantees Committee had arranged with Germany for control of finances in that country, and this, too, would be a favorable development and one which would probably meet the desires of France. On the whole, however, no great degree of stability may be expected in any of the exchanges, with the exception of sterling, until there has been some concrete proposal put forth, with governmental authorization, regarding the steps which will be taken in the German matter.

Sterling moved within narrow limits, and the strength of exchange on London was largely due to the heavy gold shipments to this country in anticipation of interest payments on the British debt. These shipments have totaled about \$15,000,000, and more gold is on the way.

Iron and Steel

THE banking of blast furnaces was reported from several sections of the steel and iron district last week as a result of a shortage of fuel supplies. Apparently the question of fuel will become one of increasing importance as the days pass and unless there exists to be some alleviation of the present difficulties with relation to the coal strike and the railroad strike it will mean that the steel industry will have to greatly curtail operations over those which now obtain.

So far as demand is concerned, this continues to keep up and perhaps is being somewhat hurried by the situation which exists. At any rate, delivery of products is being urged, but the time has apparently passed when shipments can be made on a normal scale, and there is undoubtedly a

backing up now of finished products at manufacturing points. In other words, the steel industry is well fortified with orders, but is beginning to lack the means of fulfilling these orders.

How serious the situation has become is not quite clear. It is a fair assumption that the banking of furnaces has not been due entirely to lack of fuel, but rather to a cutting down to the danger point of surplus supplies; but from now on, if the arrivals of fuel are not large, the companies will be in a serious predicament and a partial shutting down as the result of an actual lack of fuel may be forced.

But apart from the immediate situation is the question of how the industry will be situated with relation to coal supplies during the balance of the year. The disaffection of the coal miners has brought about a critical condition and one that may create a fuel famine, so far as industrial activities are concerned. Even if both of the labor difficulties, the one in the railroads and the other in the coal mines, were to be settled immediately, the effect of the difficulties would be felt in iron and steel for a long time to come. Therefore, from this angle the outlook for the industry is by no means favorable as that which existed a month and a half to two months ago. On the other hand, there has been no basic change in conditions so far as the steel industry is related to consumers. There is a heavy latent demand for steel which must ultimately be filled, and it through untoward circumstances the fulfillment is postponed, it does not mean that the business is lost, but rather that it is sidetracked, and it can be called into active state in short order.

Shipping

WITH the coal situation becoming more serious, American interests have contracted for the shipment of more than 300,000 tons of coal in the United Kingdom. The Shipping Board has 104 vessels operated by managing agents in the United Kingdom and Continental trades and it is estimated that they will bring in nearly 500,000 tons monthly, if there were sufficient demand. With 1,100 steamers idle, the possibilities of the Government-owned fleet being used in the case of a real emergency are considerable, although it is not believed that the ocean-borne fuel would nearly meet the demands of the American industries.

The crisis has resulted in the chartering of a number of ships, chiefly foreign. The rates have been as low as 7 shillings and 6 pence, but the market has shown a more firm tendency. President Harding is understood to have given his consent to the employment of the State-owned steamers for the movement of coal, after his efforts to bring about a settlement failed.

While the ship subsidy has been displaced as a topic before Congress, there have been two developments. Senator Ransdell of Louisiana, a Democrat, came out in favor of the bill, while Senator Fletcher of Florida, the ranking member of the Committee on Commerce on the minority side, made a strong speech against the legislation and suggested direct operation by the Government. He suggested that the Government re-enter the marine insurance field and offer to cover both hulls and cargoes. The successive nomination of avowed opponents of the subsidy bill in Iowa, North Dakota, and Nebraska in the Senatorial primaries has served to solidify the opposition of the Senate leaders to acting on the subsidy before adjournment at this session. President Harding has not yet indicated whether or not he will acquiesce in the plea of the majority Senators for a postponement until the short session of Congress, which starts next December. The chances for the passage of the bill at this time seem to be more remote than ever.

Announcement has been made that the

Post Office Department has renewed the mail contract with the Oceanic Steamship Company of San Francisco for the transportation of mail from the Pacific Coast to Australia and American Samoa. The contract is for six months only, but \$200,000 annually has been added to the rate of compensation, due to the representations of the Navy Department. The Oceanic Line threatened to withdraw its two steamers, the Ventura and Sonoma, from the route and to sell them if the Post Office Department did not offer a larger subvention. The company lost its appeal for an increase in the basic rate of pay from \$2 to \$4 a mile, however. It claimed to have lost \$91,000 on operations during 1921.

Construction of steel sea-going tonnage in the United States dropped to 41,536 gross tons on July 1. According to the records of the American Bureau of Shipping, only 19 ships, ranging from 2,000 gross tons upward, were contracted for in this country. Twelve were 6,000 tons and more. Considerable speculation has been created by the statement, made by Homer L. Ferguson, President of the Newport News Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company, that responsible interests had discussed the construction of two 1,000-foot liners, which would be built if the proposed ship subsidy measure were passed. The 1,000-foot liner, according to the heads of the largest American companies, would not be a profit maker under the existing traffic conditions, as the 35,000-ton type is regarded as the ideal size at present. The identity of the interests who propose to build the superliners has not been revealed. Inasmuch as the various American lines have disclaimed this intention, it is rumored that the Pennsylvania Railroad is considering branching out upon the seas.

While there has been but slight improvement in traffic conditions, due to the failure of the steamship lines to re-establish the conference arrangements, the volume of cargoes offering for overseas movement is growing. Large gains in both imports and exports in June were reported by the Department of Commerce. Imports reached the highest figure since December, 1920, when they amounted to \$280,000,000, while exports were \$334,000,000, an increase of \$27,000,000 over May and the highest since last October. The recovery is expected to be more or less permanent. The significant part about the imports is that the total included little of gold.

The Shipping Board has announced a settlement of the claim lodged against it for the cancellation of ships on the building program of the J. F. Duthie Company of Seattle. It was stated that a claim amounting to \$6,000,000 had been disposed of for \$846,000. The shipbuilder claimed prospective profits and other items, which were disallowed. The Skinner & Eddy claim, which runs over \$10,000,000, has not been adjusted as yet. It is stated that the Downey Shipbuilding Corporation case is nearing a close and that the indications are the Staten Island yard, which issued bonds, will not get more than \$500,000, although its claims were much larger.

An effort is being made to reorganize the conference from New York to Italian and other Mediterranean ports. Thus far the move has been in vain because the freight lines are holding out for a differential against the passenger carriers. It is reported, however, that the steamship lines are working more in co-operation now than they have in several weeks, and it would not be surprising if the conferences on several routes were revived within the next two months.

Textiles

LEAVING out of the question such external things as developments in the railway and coal strikes and the tariff, the most important happening of last week for the textile trades was the pricing of several varieties of woolen and worsted

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Dividends Declared and Awaiting Payment

STEAM RAILROADS.

Company.	Rate.	Pay- able.	Books Close.
Balt. & Ohio pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Shipbuilding	1	Aug. 1	July 15
Buffalo & Susquehanna	1	Aug. 1	July 15
Canada Southern	1	Aug. 1	July 15
C. St. P. M. & O.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Central of N. J.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Conn. & P. R. R.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Great Northern	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Hunt. & B. T. M. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Louis. & Nash.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Louisiana & Northw.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Mahoning Coal R. R.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Mich. Central	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Minerhill & Schuy. H.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Nash. Chat. & St. L.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Norfolk & Western	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pennsylvania	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Perla & Bureau	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pere Marquette pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pitts. & Lake Erie	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pitts. & West Va. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pitts. & West Va. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Reading Co.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do 1st pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15

STREET RAILWAYS.

Bangor Ry. & L.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Bras. T. L. & P.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Bras. T. L. & P.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Carolina Ry. & L.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Conn. Ry. & L. com. & pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Duquesne Light St. Ry.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Eastern Mass St. Ry.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do sink. fund stock.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
El. Ry. & L. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Philadelph. Co.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Philadelph. Co.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Public Service Inv.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Montreal Tramways	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Phila. Co. pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Railway & Light Secur.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
com. & pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Tampa Electric	2	Aug. 1	July 15
West Penn Power pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
W. Penn. T. & W. P. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
West Penn. Ry. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15

BANK STOCKS.

Continental	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Corn Exchange	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pacific	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pacific	2	Aug. 1	July 15

TRUST COMPANY.

Farmers Loan & Tr.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
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INSURANCE.

Commercial Union	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pacific	2	Aug. 1	July 15

INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS.

Acme Tea 1st & 2d pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Allied Chemical & Dye	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Bank Note	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Cigar	2	Aug. 1	July 15
American Coal	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Dist. Tel. N. J.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Glue pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Ice	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Ice	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Light & Traction	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Light & Traction	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. La. F. Fire Eng.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Linen	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Radiator	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Tel. & Cable	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Shipbuilding	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Shipbuilding	2	Aug. 1	July 15

Company.	Rate.	Pay- able.	Books Close.
Am. Shipbuilding	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Shipbuilding	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Soda Fountain	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. Sugar Ref. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Am. W. W. & E. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Amoskeag Mfg.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Appalach. Pwr. 1st pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Art. Metal Construction	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Associated Dry Goods	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do 1st pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do 2d pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Associated Oil	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Atlantic Refining pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Atlas Powder pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Banc. Service Sta.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Barnard Mfg.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Bathelcher & Snyder pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Barnhart Bros. & Spind.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
1st & 2d pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Bold-Cordell	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Bigelow-Hartford	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Bourne Mills	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Borden Co.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Boston Cons. Gas pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Brill (J. G.) Co. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Brit. Emp. Steel pt. B.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Bras. T. L. & P.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Brown Shoe pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Buckeye Pipe Line	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Burns Bros.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Butler Bros.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Burroughs Adding Mach.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Canadian Converters	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cal.-Oregon Power pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
California Packing	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Calumet & Hecla	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Canadian Explosives	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Canada Tea pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Canada Comen. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Casey-Hedges	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cedar Rap. Mfg. & P.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cent. Aris. L. & P.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Charlton Mills	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Chicago Pneumatic Tool	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Chicago Yellow Cab	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cleve.-Cliffs Iron	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Chl. W. L. F. Coal pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cities Service	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cities Service	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf. & pt. B.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Christy (H. C.) Co.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cities Service	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cities Service	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf. & pt. B.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Clinchfield Coal pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Commonwealth Edison	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Columbia Petroleum	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cons. Ice (Pitts.) pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Consol. Utilities pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cosden & Co.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Cuba Co. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Damascus Bros.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Dallas Power & L. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Davis Mills	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Diamond Match	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Dominion Steel pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Dominion Bridge	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Dow Chemical	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Edison Enl. Boston	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Eisenlohr & Bros.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Elgin Watch	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Elce. Bond & Share pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Exchange Buffet	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Eureka Pipe Line	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Famous Players pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Fall River Gas	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Federal Sugar Refining	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15

Company.	Rate.	Pay- able.	Books Close.
Fisher Body	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Fl. Worth P. & L. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Gair (Robert) 1st pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
General Motors pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do 2d pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
General Development	2	Aug. 1	July 15
General Cigar	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do deb.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Gossard (H. W.) pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Gillette Safety Razor	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Gillette Safety Razor	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Halle Bros. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Harris Bros. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Hart. S. & M.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Hall Lamp	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Hodgman Rubber pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Hillman C. & C. 1st pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do 2d pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Homestead Mining	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Hood Rubber pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Illum. & Pwr. Sec. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Isapp Motor Car	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Isapp Motor Car	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Ill. Northern Util. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Inap. Tob. of G. B. & I.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Ingersoll-Rand	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Indiana Harvester Line	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Int. Harvester	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Int. Comb. Eng.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Int. Mer. Marine pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Int. Nickel pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Kaminitiqua Power	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Kaufmann Dep. Stores	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Kelsey Wheel pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Kellogg Switch & Sup.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Kress (S. H.) Co.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Kelly-Spr. Tire pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Lehigh Coal & Nav.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Lima Loco. Works pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Lincolnton Internat. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Lincolnton Mfg.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Loose-W. B. 2d pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Lowell Electric Light	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Lindsay Light pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Lyman Mills	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Maple Leaf Milling	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Marland Oil	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Martin-Perry	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Maxon Tire & R. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Marine Oil	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Mass. Gas Cos.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Mass. Lighting	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Midwest Refining	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Morris Canal & Bk. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do consol. stock.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Mullins Body pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Moon Motor	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Montreal L. H. & P.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Mutual Oil	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Naah Motors	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Nat. Biscuit	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
New Cornelia Copper	2	Aug. 1	July 15
New Niagara Sugar	2	Aug. 1	July 15
New Jersey Zinc	2	Aug. 1	July 15
N. Y. & H. R. M. 2d pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Northern States Power	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pacific G. & E. 1st pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pacific Power & L. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pack. Plym. Mills pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Phillips-Jones Corp. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pick (Albert) & Co.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Penn Traffic	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Penns. Co.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pittsburgh Coal	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Do pf.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pitts. Steel pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Pitts. Steel pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Portland Cement	2	Aug. 1	July 15
Prod. & Ref. pt.	2	Aug. 1	July 15

Company.	Rate.	Pay- able.	Books Close.
Postum Cereal	1.25	Q. Aug. 1	July 23
Do pf.	2	Q. Aug. 1	July 23
Procter & Gamble.	5	Q. Aug. 15	July 15
Procter & Gamble.	4	Stk Aug. 15	July 15
Pullman Car	2	Q. Aug. 15	July 15
Pure Oil	50c	Q. Aug. 15	July 15
Revillon, Inc.	2	Q. Aug. 1	Aug. 15
Reo Motor Car.	100	Stk Aug. 10	July 15
Royal Dutch	\$2.005	— Aug. 1	July 19
Rosenbaum Co.	2	Sp. Aug. 1	July 20
Russell Motor	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 20
Do pf.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 20
St. Law. Flour Mill.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 20
Do pf.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 20
Salt Creek Cons.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 20
Salt Creek Prod. Assn.	30c	Q. Aug. 1	July 15
Savannah Sug. Ref. pt.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 15
Shove Mills	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	*July 22
Sierra Pac. Elec. pt.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 15
Shell Trans. & Trad.	\$1.55	Q. Aug. 1	July 17
Simmons Co. pt.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 15
Sinclair Con. Oil pf.	2	Q. Aug. 31	Aug. 15
Southern W. Electric.	2	Q. July 25	*June 30
Stand. Oil (Ohio) pt.	1 1/4	Q. July 25	July 28
Stern Bros. pt.	2	Q. Sep. 1	*Aug. 15
South States Oil	1	— Aug. 20	Aug. 1
Steel Co. of Canada.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 8
Do pf.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 8
Sterling Products	2	Q. Aug. 1	July 8
Stewart Mfg.	75c	Q. Aug. 15	July 31
Do pf.	2	Q. Aug. 1	July 25
Stew.-W. Speedometer.	75c	Q. Aug. 15	July 31
Stover Mfg. & Eng. pt.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 22
Swift International	90c	Q. Aug. 15	July 8
Texas Power & L. pt.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 17
Tobacco Prod. Corp.	\$1.50	Q. Aug. 1	July 3
Trenton Pot. non-c. pf.	1	Q. July 25	*July 20
Do cum. pf.	2	Q. July 25	July 20
Troxel Mfg. pt.	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	July 20
Underwood Typewriter.	2 1/4	Q. Oct. 1	Sep. 2
Do pf.	2	Q. Oct. 1	Sep. 2
Un. Eastern Mining.	15c	Q. July 28	July 8
Union Oil of Cal.	2	Q. July 28	July 10
Union Oil of Cal.	2	Ex. July 28	July 10
Un. T. Car com. & pf.	1 1/4	Q. Sep. 1	Aug. 5
United Drug 1st pf.	87 1/2c	Q. Aug. 1	July 15
United Prof. Sharing.	10c	Q. Oct. 2	Sep. 1
Un. Rubb. 1st pf.	2	Q. July 31	*July 15
Un. S. Radiator.	\$1	Q. Sep. 30	Sep. 1
Un. S. Radiator.	\$1	Q. Sep. 30	Sep. 1
Un. Vented Extension.	25c	Q. Aug. 1	*July 15
Un. V. Glass.	50c	Q. July 29	July 22
Un. Ventura Cons. Oil.	50c	Q. Aug. 1	July 19
Un. Ventura Cons. Oil.	50c	Ex. Aug. 1	July 19
Un. Warner (Chas.) Co.	25c	Q. July 17	*June 30
Un. 1st pf.	1 1/4	Q. July 27	*June 30
Un. 1st pf.	1 1/4	Q. July 27	*June 30
Un. Waymont	1 1/4	Q. Aug. 1	*June 30
Un. Do pf.	1 1/4	Q. July 31	*July 24
Un. Vestinghouse A. Brake.	\$1	Q. Aug. 31	*June 30
Un. Vestinghouse E. & M.	\$1	Q. July 31	June 30
Un. Wilcox Oil & Gas.	10c	Ex. Aug. 1	July 15
Un. Wilcox Oil & Gas.	5c	Ex. Aug. 1	July 15
Un. Woolworth (F.W.) Co.	2	Q. Sep. 1	Aug. 10
Un. 1st pf.	50c	M. Aug. 1	July 25
Un. 1st pf.	50c	M. Sep. 1	Aug. 25
Un. 1st pf.	50c	M. Sep. 1	Aug. 25
Un. 1st pf.	50c	M. Nov. 1	Oct. 25
Un. 1st pf.	50c	M. Dec. 1	Nov. 25
Un. 1st pf.	50c	M. Jan. 1	Dec. 25
Un. 1st pf. (Rudolph) Co.	15c	M. Aug. 25
Un. 1st pf. (Rudolph) Co.	75c	M. Aug. 25
Un. 1st pf. (Rudolph) Co.	75c	M. Sep. 25
Un. 8% pf.	2	Q. Sep. 1	*Aug. 22
Un. 8% pf.	2	Q. Dec. 1	Nov. 22
Un. 8% pf.	2	Q. Dec. 1	Nov. 21
Un. 8% pf.	2	Q. Mar. 1	Feb. 9
Un. 8% pf.	2	Q. June 1	May 22
Un. 7% pf.	1 1/4	Q. July 1	June 21
Un. 7% pf.	1 1/4	Q. Oct. 1	Sep. 21
Un. 7% pf.	1 1/4	Q. Nov. 1	Oct. 21
Un. 7% pf.	1 1/4	Q. Apr. 1	Mar. 22
Un. Yellow Cab M. Class B.	50c	— Aug. 1	July 20
*Holders of record; books do not close.			
†Payable in scrip.			
‡Payable in stock.			
§Four months.			
¶Every 28 days.			

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and Original Preferred Capital Stock of the
Company will be paid on August 15, 1922, to
shareholders of record at close of business July
31, 1922. The transfer books will not be closed
and checks will be mailed from the office of the
company in time to reach stockholders on the
date they are payable.
A. F. HOCKENBEAUMER,
Vice President and Treasurer.
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UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES

	Bid	Offered		
Consol. 2s, April, 1930.....	101	103 1/4	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Conversion 3s, 30 days from date			C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
of issue.....	92 1/2	94 1/2	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Old 4s, 1925.....	104 1/2	105	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Liberty 2d 4s, 1927-42.....	100.00	100.78	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Liberty 1st 3 1/2s, 1932-47.....	100.90	101.03	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Liberty 1st 4s, 1932-47.....	101.05	101.20	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Liberty 1st-2d 4 1/2s, 1932-47.....	101.00	102.00	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Liberty 2d 4 1/2s, 1921-42.....	100.74	100.80	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Liberty 3d 4 1/2s, 1928.....	100.62	100.68	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Liberty 4th 4 1/2s, 1933-38.....	101.20	101.24	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Victory 4 1/2s.....	100.56	100.58	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Panama 2s.....	103	103 1/4	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Panama 3s, 1921.....	90	92	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Hawaiian 5 1/2s.....	Quot.	on Req.	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Philippine 4s.....	Quot.	on Req.	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Philippine 5 1/2s, 1941.....	107 1/2	108 1/2	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731
Porto Rico 5 1/2s.....	Quot.	on Req.	C. F. Childs & Co., 120 Broadway, N.Y.C.....	Rector 6731

FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES

GOVERNMENT ISSUES

AUSTRIA:			
Austrian 6s, Treasury.....	4 1/2	6 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Austrian 6s, Treasury.....	3	6	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Vienna 5s, 1921.....	6	10	C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
ARGENTINA:			
Argentine Ry. Recession 4s.....	64 1/2	65 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Argentine 4s, 1896-1900.....	62 1/2	63 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1896-1900.....	62	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Argentine 4s, 1896-1900.....	63	64	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Argentine 4s, 1897.....	64 1/2	66	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Argentine 4s, 1897.....	62 1/2	63 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Argentine 4s, 1897.....	64 1/2	65 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Argentine 4s, 1897.....	64	65	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Argentine 5s, 1909 (large).....	79 1/2	80 1/2	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Argentine 5s, 1909 (large).....	78 1/2	79 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Argentine 5s, 1909 (large).....	79	81	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Argentine 5s, 1909 (large).....	78	78 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Argentine 5s, 1909 (large).....	79	80	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Argentine 5s, 1909 (small).....	78	79	Jerome B. Sullivan, 44 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Broad 7230
Argentine 5s, 1909 (small).....	78	78 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Argentine 5s, 1909 (small).....	77 1/2	78 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Argentine 5s, 1909 (small).....	78	79	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Argentine 5s, 1909 (listed).....	82 1/2	83 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Argentine 5s, 1909 (listed).....	84	85 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
BELGIUM:			
Belgian Rost. 5s, 1919.....	69 1/2	71	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Belgian Rost. 5s, 1919.....	69 1/2	71	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Belgian Rost. 5s, 1919.....	70 1/2	71 1/2	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Belgian Rost. 5s, 1919.....	68	72	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	75	76 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	74	77	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	75	77	Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Belgian Premium 5s, 1920.....	71	75	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Belgian 6s, 1921.....	80	85	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Belgian External 6s, 1925.....	101 1/2	102	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Belgian 7 1/2s, 1945.....	107	107 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Belgian 8s, 1941.....	105	105 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Belgian 8s, 1941.....	106	107	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
BOLIVIA:			
Bolivian 6s, 1920.....	84 1/2	86 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Bolivian 6s, 1940.....	80	82	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
BRAZIL:			
Brazil 4s, 1889.....	44 1/2	46	Jerome B. Sullivan, 44 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Broad 7320
Brazil 4s, 1889.....	44	44 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4s, 1889.....	44	45	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Brazil 4s, 1889.....	43 1/2	44 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Brazil 4s, 1910.....	45 1/2	47	Jerome B. Sullivan, 44 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Broad 7320
Brazil 4s, 1910.....	45	45 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4s, 1910.....	44 1/2	45 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Brazil 4s, 1910.....	44 1/2	45 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Brazil 4s, 1911.....	24	28	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Brazil 4s, 1911.....	41	43	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4s, 1911.....	43 1/2	45	Jerome B. Sullivan, 44 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Broad 7320
Brazil Recession 4s.....	43 1/2	44	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Brazil Recession 4s.....	43 1/2	44 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1883.....	47 1/2	48 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1883.....	47 1/2	49	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1883.....	47 1/2	49	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1883.....	48	49 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1883.....	47	48 1/2	Jerome B. Sullivan, 44 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Broad 7320
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1888.....	46 1/2	47 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1888.....	46 1/2	47 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Brazil 4 1/2s, 1888.....	46 1/2	47 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Brazil 5s, 1895.....	54 1/2	55 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Brazil 5s, 1895.....	54 1/2	55 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Brazil 5s, 1895.....	53 1/2	54 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Brazil 5s, 1895.....	55	56 1/2	Jerome B. Sullivan, 44 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Broad 7320
Brazil 5s, 1903.....	61 1/2	62 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Brazil 5s, 1903.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Brazil 5s, 1903.....	27	31	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Brazil 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Brazil 5s, 1908.....	25	29	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Brazil 6s, 1913.....	53 1/2	54 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Brazil 6s, 1913.....	53 1/2	54 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Brazil 6s, 1913.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Brazil 6s, 1914.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Brazil 8s, 1941.....	103 1/2	104 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
CANADA:			
Canada 5s, 1925.....	96 1/2	97 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5s, 1926.....	96 1/2	97 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5s, 1931.....	98 1/2	99 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5s, 1931.....	98 1/2	99 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5s, 1937.....	98 1/2	99 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5s, M. & N., 1932.....	98	98 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5 1/2s, 1922.....	98 1/2	99 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5 1/2s, 1923.....	98 1/2	99 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5 1/2s, 1924.....	98 1/2	99 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5 1/2s, 1927.....	99	100	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5 1/2s, 1929.....	100 1/2	101	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5 1/2s, 1933.....	100 1/2	101 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5 1/2s, 1934.....	100 1/2	101 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Canada 5 1/2s, 1937.....	103 1/2	104 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
CHILE:			
Chile 5s, 1911.....	66	69	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Chile 8s, 1941.....	104	104 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Chile Cedula, 8s, J. & D.....	124	130	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Chile Cedula, 8s, M. & S.....	123	128	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
CHINA:			
China 4s, 1896.....	71	75	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
China 4s, 1896.....	71	76	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
China 5s, 1913.....	62 1/2	64 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
China 5s, 1911.....	53 1/2	55 1/2	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
China 5s, 1920.....	71	75	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
China 5s, 1913.....	62 1/2	63 1/2	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
China Govt. Hu-Kuang Ry. 5s.....	53 1/2	55	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
China Govt. Hu-Kuang Ry. 5s.....	53 1/2	54 1/2	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
China Govt. Hu-Kuang Ry. 5s.....	51	54	Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
CUBA:			
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Cuba 5s, 1906.....	60	63	

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Open Security Market—Bonds

FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES—Continued

GOVERNMENT ISSUES—Continued

COSTA RICA:		Bid	Offered	
Costa Rica 5s, 1911.....	57	59		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Costa Rica 5s, 1911.....	57	60		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
COLUMBIA:				
Colombian Govt. 6s, 1947.....	63	65		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
DENMARK:				
Denmark 3½s.....	14½	16½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Denmark 3½s.....	16	18		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Denmark 3½s.....	100	100½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Denmark 5s.....	100	110		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
FRANCE:				
French 4s, 1917.....	52½	53½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
French 4s, 1917.....	52½	53½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
French 4s, 1917.....	53	53½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
French 4s, 1917.....	52½	53½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
French 4s, 1917.....	52½	53½		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
French 4s, 1917.....	50	53		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
French 4s, 1918.....	52	54		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
French Victory 5s.....	64	65		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
French Victory 5s.....	63½	64½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
French Victory 5s.....	63½	64½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
French Victory 5s.....	64	64½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
French Victory 5s.....	63	64		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
French Victory 5s, 1920.....	75	77		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
French Premium 5s, 1920.....	73½	75		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
French Premium 5s, 1920.....	75	77		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
French Premium 5s, 1920.....	74	77		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
French Premium 5s, 1920.....	75	77		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
French 5½s, 1937.....	79½	80		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
French 5½s, 1937.....	78	77		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
French 5½s, 1937.....	75	77		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
French 5½s, 1937.....	73½	77		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
French 6s, 1920.....	73	75		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
French 6s, 1920.....	73	75		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
French 6s, 1920.....	73	75		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
French 7½s, 1941.....	100	100½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
French 8s, 1945.....	102	102½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
French 8s, 1945.....	101½	102		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
GERMANY:				
German Govt. 5s.....	1¼	1½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
German Govt. 5s.....	1¼	1½		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
GREECE:				
Greek 5s, 1914.....	67	75		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Greek 5s, 1914.....	65	73		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
GREAT BRITAIN:				
British Consol 2½s.....	260	270		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
British Funding 4s.....	390	400		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
British Funding 4s.....	77½	79½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
British Funding 4s.....	78	80		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
British Victory 4s.....	80	82		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
British Victory 4s.....	80½	82½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
British Victory 4s.....	400	410		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
British 5s, 1922.....	460	470		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
British 5s, 1922.....	91½	93½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
British 5s, 1922.....	91½	93½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
British 5s, 1927.....	95½	97½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
British 5s, 1927.....	95½	97½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
British 5s, 1927.....	477	487		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
British 5s, 1929.....	470	480		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
British 5s, 1929.....	93½	95½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
British 5s, 1929.....	96½	97½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
British 5s, 1929-47.....	88½	90½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
British 5s, 1929-47.....	84½	86½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
British Govt. Exchequer 5½s.....	464	474		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Great Britain & Ireland 5½s.....	103	104		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
ITALY:				
Italy 5s, 1920.....	35½	36½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1920.....	35½	36		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Italy 5s, 1920.....	35½	36½		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1920.....	35½	36½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1920.....	35½	36		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Italy 5s, 1925.....	40	41		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Italy 5s, 1925.....	40	41		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Italy 5s, 1925.....	46	47		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Italy 5s, 1925.....	46	47		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Italy 5s, 1925.....	46	46½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Italy 5½s, 1925.....	96	96½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Italy 5½s, 1925.....	97	98½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Italy 5½s, 1925 (small).....	94	96		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
JAPAN:				
Japan 4s, 1910, sterling.....	50	62		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Japan 4s, 1910.....	50	61		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Japan 4s, 1931.....	77	77½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Japanese 4s, 1931.....	77½	77½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Japan 4s, 1931 (small).....	75½	76		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Japan 4s, 1931 (small).....	75½	76		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Japan 1st series 4½s, 1925.....	92½	93		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Japan 1st series 4½s, 1925.....	92½	92½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Japan 2d series 4½s, 1925.....	92½	92½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Japan 2d series 4½s, 1925.....	92	92½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Japan 2d series, 1925 (small).....	90½	91½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Japan 2d series, 1925 (small).....	90	91		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Japanese 5s, 1907.....	73	74		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Japanese 5s, 1907.....	73½	74½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
MEXICO:				
Jalisco gold 6s, 1930.....	27	35		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Mexican 3s.....	12	12½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Mexican 3s.....	11½	12½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Mexican 3s.....	12	12½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Mexican 4s, 1904.....	38½	39½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Mexican 4s, 1904.....	47	48		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Mexican 4s (French).....	39½	40½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Mexican 4s, 1910.....	40	40½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Mexican 5s, 1890.....	55	58		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Mexican 5s, 1915.....	60	61		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Mexican 5s, 1915.....	17	17½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Mexican 5s, 1915.....	53	55		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Mexican silver 5s.....	17	17½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Mexican 5s, 1915.....	53½	54½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Mexican 6s, 1923.....	50	51½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Mexican Treas. 6s (large).....	50½	51½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Mexican Treas. 6s (small).....	49½	50½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Mexican 6s, 1923 (large).....	50½	51½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Mexican 6s, 1923 (small).....	50½	51½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Mexican 6s (large).....	50½	51½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Mexican 6s (small).....	49½	50½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
NORWAY:				
Norway 3½s, 1894.....	57	57		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Norway 3½s, 1902.....	52	54		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Norway 3½s, 1904.....	51½	53½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Norway 3½s, 1904.....	51½	53½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Norway 5½s, 1918.....	17½	18½		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Norway 6s, 1920.....	17	18½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Norway 6s, 1921.....	17	18½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Norway 6s, 1921.....	179	184		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Norway 6s, 1921.....	100½	101½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Norway, King, of 6s, skg. 1940.....	110½	111		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Norway 6s, 1920.....	110½	111½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
POLAND:				
Polish External 6s, 1940.....	7½	8½		Dean, Onativis & Co., 52 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Broad 1560
Polish Govt. 5s.....	20	25		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Polish Govt. 6s, 1940.....	47½	52½		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Polish Govt. Internal 5s.....	26	31		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Polish Govt. External 6s, 1940.....	45	50		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
RUSSIA:				
Russian 4s, rentes.....	4½	5½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Russian 5s, 1921, cert.....	14	16½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Russian 5s, 1921.....	14	16½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Russian 5s, 1921.....	14½	17		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Russian 4s, rentes, 1894.....	4½	5½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Russian 5s, 1926.....	2½	3½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Russian 5s, 1921, cert.....	14	16		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Russian 5s, 1921.....	15	18		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330

Open Security Market—Bonds

FOREIGN SECURITIES, INCLUDING NOTES—Continued

GOVERNMENT ISSUES—Continued

RUSSIA:		Bid	Offered	
Russian ruble 5½s.....	2½	3½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Russian ruble 5½s, T. & A.....	3	3½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Russian 5½s, 1926.....	3	4		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Russian external 5½s, 1919.....	15	18		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Russian 6s, 1919.....	14	16		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Russian 6s, 1919, cert.....	15	19		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Russian 6s, 1919.....	14½	17		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Russian 6s, 1921.....	15	17		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Russian 6s, 1919, bonds.....	15	17½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Russian 6s, 1919.....	14	16		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Russian external 5½s, 1926.....	15	18		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Russian ruble 5½s, 1926.....	2½	3½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Russian 6s, 1919.....	15	17		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
RUMANIA:				
Rumanian Reconstruct. 5s, 1920.....	Want offer			C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
SWEDEN:				
Sweden, King, of, 6s, gold, 1939.....	103½	104		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
SWITZERLAND:				
Swiss Confederation 5½s, gold.....	102½	103½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Swiss Confederation 5s, s. f.....	118	119		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
URUGUAY:				
Uruguay 5s, 1915.....	74	76		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Uruguay 5s, 1919.....	71	72½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Uruguay 5s, 1919.....	71	73½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Uruguay 8s, 1946.....	104½	105		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Uruguay 5s, 1919.....	71½	73½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Uruguay 5s, 1919.....	71½	73½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
MUNICIPAL ISSUES				
ARGENTINA:				
Buenos Aires 4½s, 1909.....	58	62		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Buenos Aires 5s, 1916.....	59	62		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Buenos Aires gold 5s, 1944.....	60	62		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Buenos Aires gold 5s, 44 (£20).....	59½	61½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Buenos Aires 5s, 1944.....	58	60		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Buenos Aires 6s, 1926.....	58	60		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Buenos Aires 6s, 1926.....	94½	95		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Cedula 6s.....	W. O.			C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
AUSTRIA:				
Vienna 6s.....	5	10		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
BRAZIL:				
Sao Paulo 5s, 1905.....	69½	67½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Sao Paulo 5s, 1911.....	69½	67½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Sao Paulo 5s, 1907.....	59	60		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Sao Paulo 5s, 1907.....	59½	60		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Sao Paulo 5s, 1919.....	85½	87½		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Sao Paulo 5s, 1936.....	100½	100½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Sao Paulo 6s, 1943.....	87½	89		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Sao Paulo 8s (guilder).....	371	376		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Sao Paulo 8s (guilder).....	371	376		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Sao Paulo 8s (guilder).....	371	376		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
CANADA:				
Calgary 6s, 1924.....	98	100		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Edmonton, 6s, 1924.....	101	104		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Calgary 7s, 1923.....	101½	104		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Edmonton, Alberta, 6s, 1924.....	96½	99½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Gt. Winnipeg Water Dist. 5s, 23	98½	99½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Gt. Winnipeg Water Dist. 6s, 23	99½	100½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
London, City of, 6s, 1923.....	90	100½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
London, City of, 6s, 1928.....	90	101		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Raisonnéville, Mont.-Que., 5s, 54	92½	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Montreal, City of, 6s, 1922.....	98½	99½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Montreal, City of, 6s, 1923.....	100	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Montreal, City of, 6s, 1926.....	100	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Ottawa 5s, 1944.....	94	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Outremont 6s, 1922.....	99½	100½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Point Grey 5s, 1913.....	86	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Point Grey 5s, 1913.....	84	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Point Grey 5s, 1962.....	84	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Quebec City 5s, 1927.....	96½	98		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Toronto 6s, 1927.....	99½	101½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Toronto 6s, 1950.....	104	106		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Toronto Harbor Com. 4½s, 1953	97	98		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Toronto, Ont., 4½s.....	98½	100		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Toronto, Ont., 5½s, 1923.....	96	98		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Toronto, Ont., 5½s, 1923.....	96½	98		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Vancouver 4½s, 1923.....	90½	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Vancouver 4½s, 1928.....	91	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Vancouver 4½s, 1933.....	87	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Victoria 4½s, 1925.....	93	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Victoria 6s, 1925.....	97	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Winnipeg 5s, 1925.....	98	98		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Winnipeg, Manitoba, 6s, 1930.....	99½	W. O.		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
CZECHOSLOVAKIA:				
Prague 4s.....	14	17		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Karlsbad 4s.....	14	17		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Royal Bank of Bohemia 4½s.....	16	18		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
DENMARK:				
Copenhagen 4s, 1949.....	70	75		A. A. Housman & Co., 20 Broad St., N.Y.C.....Rector 6330
Copenhagen 4s, 1949.....	71	75		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Copenhagen, City of, 5½s, 1944	89	91½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Danish Con. Municipal 8s, 1946.....	109½	109½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
FRANCE:				
Bordeaux 6s, 1934.....	83½	84½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Lyons 6s, 1934.....	84	84½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
Marseilles 6s, 1934.....	84	84½		Pynchon & Co., 111 Broadway, N.Y.C.....Rector 813
GERMANY:				
Berlin 4s.....	1½	2		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Berlin 4s.....	1½	1½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Berlin 4s.....	1½	2		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Bremen 4s.....	1½	2½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7320
Bremen 4s.....	1½	2½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7320
Bremen 4s.....	1½	2½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7320
Coblenz 4s.....	1½	2½		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Coblenz 4s.....	1½	2½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Coblenz 4s.....	1½	2½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Cologne 4s.....	1½	2½		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Cologne 4s.....	1½	2½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Cologne 4s.....	1½	2½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Cologne 4s.....	1½	2½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Cologne 4s.....	1½	2½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Cologne 4s.....	1½	2½		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Dresden 4s.....	1½	2½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Dresden 4s.....	1½	2½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Dresden 4s.....	1½	2½		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Dresden 4½s.....	1½	2½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Dresden 4½s.....	1½	2½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Düsseldorf 4s.....	1½	2½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Düsseldorf 4s.....	1½	2½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Düsseldorf 4s.....	1½	2½		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Essen 4s.....	1½	2½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Essen 4s.....	1½	2½		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Essen 4s.....	1½	2½		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 4s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 4s.....	2½	3		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Frankfurt 4s.....	2½	3		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Frankfurt 4s.....	2½	3		C. B. Richard & Co., 29 B'way, N.Y.C.....Whitehall 500
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Dunham & Co., 43 Exchange Pl., N.Y.C.....Hanover 8300
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan & Co., 42 B'way, N.Y.C.....Broad 7130
Frankfurt 5s.....	2½	3		Jerome B. Sullivan &

Orange Sugar	55	60	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Central Aguirre Sugar	71	74	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Jardín Sugar Ref.	71	74	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
General Sugar Ref.	101	107	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Aransas Sugar Co.	11%	14	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Continental Sugar Ref.	142	148	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Vanannah Sugar Ref.	45	47	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Vanannah Sugar Ref. Corp.	45	47	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428
Vanannah Sugar Ref. Corp. of	50	54	Farr & Co., 133 Front St., N.Y.C.	John 6428

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Open Security Market—Stocks

STANDARD OIL SECURITIES

Bid	Offered	
18 1/2	19	Anglo-Am. Oil Co., Ltd.
100 1/2	103	Atlantic Refining Co.
115	117	Atlantic Refining Co. pf.
400	415	Burns-Scribner Co.
92	93	Buckeye Pipe Line Co.
190	200	Chesbrough Mfg. Co., Con.
130	135	Continental Oil Co.
33	35	Crescent Pipe Line.
135	140	Cumberland Pipe Line.
32	34	Eureka Pipe Line.
91	92	Galena-Signal Oil Co. pf.
101	105	Galena-Signal Oil Co. pf., old.
108	112	Galena-Signal Oil Co. pf., old.
162	165	Illinois Pipe Line.
88	90	Indiana Pipe Line.
21	21 1/2	International Pet. Co., Ltd.
26	27	National Transit Co.
164	168	New York Transit Co.
97	98	Northern Pipe Line.
278	283	Ohio Oil Co.
35	39	Penn.-Mex. Fuel Co.
570	580	Prairie Oil & Gas.
248	252	Prairie Pipe Line.
340	350	Solar Refining.
91	92	Southern Pipe Line Co.
210	220	South Penn. Oil Co.
60	64	Standard Oil of Cal., \$25 par.
103	104	Standard Oil of Ind., \$25 par.
107	107 1/2	Standard Oil of Ind., \$25 par.
633	643	Standard Oil of Kansas.
93 1/2	94 1/2	Standard Oil of Kentucky.
175	182	Standard Oil of Nebraska.
418	423	Standard Oil of New York.
450	460	Standard Oil of Ohio.
117	119	Standard Oil of Ohio pf.
32	35	Swan & Finch Co.
96	100	Union Tank Car Co.
105	107	Union Tank Car Co. pf.
418	422	Vacuum Oil Co.
24	28	Washington Oil.

*Ex dividend.

PUBLIC UTILITIES

27	30	Adirondack P. & L. Co. com.
152	153	Amer. G. & E. 10% com.
152 1/2	153 1/2	Amer. G. & E. 6% pf.
133	135	Amer. Lt. & Trac. 8% com.
95	97	Amer. Lt. & Trac. pf.
106 1/2	107 1/2	Amer. Lt. & Trac. 6% notes.
100	104 1/2	Amer. Lt. & Trac. ex warrants.
133	135	Amer. Lt. & Trac. warrant.
133	135	Alabama Lt. & Trac. com.
95	97	Amer. Lt. & Trac. 6% pf.
112	116	Amer. Pow. & Lt. Co. com.
86	88	Amer. Pow. & Lt. Co. 6% pf.
13	17	Am. Public Utilities com.
27	30	Am. Public Utilities 6% pf.
19	20 1/2	Appalachian Power Co. com.
132	135	Appalachian Power Co. 7% pf.
19	21	Appalachian Power Co. 6% pf.
20	23	Ark. Lt. & Pow. Co. com.
90	70	Ark. Lt. & Pow. Co. 7% pf.
65	75	Ark. Lt. & Pow. Co. pf.
80	90	Asheville Pow. & Lt. Co. 7% pf.
2	6	Augusta-Alken Ry. & El. com.
4	4	Augusta-Alken Ry. & El. pf.
25	33	Cal. Ry. & Pow. Co. com.
43	46	Carolina Pow. & Lt. Co. com.
26	28	Carolina Pow. & Lt. Co. 7% pf.
48	48	Central Maine Pow. Co.
83	88	Central Maine Pow. Co. 6% pf.
95	102	Cent. Maine Pow. Co. 7% pf.
5	5	Cent. States Elec. Corp. com.
6	9	Cent. States Elec. Corp. 6% pf.
63	68	Cent. States Elec. Corp. 7% pf.
208	208	Cities Service Co. com.
67	67 1/2	Cities Service Co. pf.
207	200	Cities Service Co. pf.
67	67 1/2	Cities Service Co. pf.
209 1/2	204	Cities Service, bankers' shares.
209 1/2	204	Cities Service, bankers' shares.
97	102	Cleve. Elec. Illum. Co. 6% pf.
118	125	Cleve. Elec. Illum. Co. 8% pf.
136	144	Cleve. Elec. Illum. Co. 8% pf.
86	90	Colorado Power Co. 7% pf.
16	17 1/2	Colorado Power Co. com.
129	132	Commonwealth Ed. Co. com.
28 1/2	31	Commonwealth P. Ry. & Lt. com.
61	64	Commonwealth P. Ry. & Lt. 6% pf.
85	90	Consumers Pow. Co. pf. (ex div.)
85	90	Cont. Gas & Elec. com.
70	73	Cont. Gas & Elec. 6% pf.
30	33	Cumberland Co. P. & L. com.
73	78	Cumberland Co. P. & L. 6% pf.
57	60	Dayton Pow. & Lt. com.
83	88	Dayton Pow. & Lt. pf.
105	108	Dayton Pow. & Lt. pf.
105	108	Detroit Ed. 8% capital (ex div.)
105	108	Duluth Edison Co. 6% pf.
15	25	Duluth-Superior Trac. Co. com.
25	35	Duluth-Superior Trac. Co. pf.
104	100	Duquesne Light Co. 7% pf.
88	92	East Tex. Elec. Co. com.
83	86	East Tex. Elec. Co. 6% pf.
95	97 1/2	Empire Gas & Fuel Co.
85	90	Empire Gas & Fuel Co. pf.
30	31	Federal Light & Trac. Co. com.
71	75	Federal Light & Trac. Co. pf.
95	100	Ft. Worth P. & L. 7% pf. (ex div.)
2	4	Gen. Gas & Elec. com.
7	10	Gen. Gas & Elec. conv. 5% pf.
54	58	Gen. Gas & Elec. 7% cum. pf.
90	100	Havana Elec. Ry. & Lt. P. pf.
33	38	Illinois Traction Co. com.
74	78	Illinois Traction Co. 6% pf.
88	92	Iowa Ry. & El. Co. 6% pf.
93	97	Kansas Gas & Elec. 7% pf.
10	20	Kentucky Security Corp. com.
50	60	Kentucky Secur. Corp. 6% pf.
104	104	Lehigh Pow. Secur. Co. capital.
76	76 1/2	Lehigh Power
90	92	Michigan State Ed. Co. pf.
78	83	Milwaukee Elec. & Lt. 6% pf.
23	24 1/2	Miss. River Power Co. com.
23 1/2	25	Miss. River Power Co. 6% pf.
70	82	Miss. River Power Co. 6% pf.
1	4	National Lt. H. & P. com.
25	25	National Ry. & Lt. P. pf.
92	95	Nebraska Power Co. 7% pf.
88	93	New Eng. Pow. Co. 6% cum. pf.
104	107	Niagara Falls & Pow. Co. 7% pf.
15	18	North. Ont. Lt. & Pow. Co. com.
48	53	North. Ont. Lt. & Pow. Co. pf.
89	91	North. States Pow. Co. 8% com.
92	94	North. States Pow. Co. 7% pf.
97	98 1/2	Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. 6% pf.
91	96	Pac. Pow. & Lt. 7% pf.
91	96	Portland Gas & Coke 7% pf.
10	14	Portland Ry. & Lt. & Pow. com.
45	47	Puget Sound Pow. & Lt. com.
101	105	Puget Sound Pow. & Lt. 7% pf.
14	16	Repub. Ry. & Light com.
46 1/2	48 1/2	Repub. Ry. & Light 6% pf.
13	16	Repub. Ry. & Light com.
85	95	Scranton Electric 6% pf.
105	106 1/2	South. Cal. Edison Co. 8% com.
115	119	South. Cal. Edison Co. 8% pf.
194	204	Standard Gas & Elec. Co. com.
49	50	Standard Gas & Elec. Co. 8% pf.
124	134	Tenn. Electric Power, new pf.
90	94	Texas Power & Light 7% pf.
91 1/2	91 1/2	Texas Power & Light 7% pf.
102	105	Utah Edison 8% pf.
100	104	Utah Edison 8% pf.
75	80	Tri-City Ry. & Lt. 6% pf.
53	54	United Light & Ry. Co. com.
71	75	United Light & Ry. Co. pf.

Open Security Market—Stocks

PUBLIC UTILITIES—Continued

Bid	Offered	
52	54	United Light & Ry. Co. com.
74	76	United Light & Ry. Co. pf.
51	54	United Light & Ry. Co. com.
3	3 1/2	United Gas & Elec. com.
43	47	United Gas & Elec. 1st pf.
11 1/2	12 1/2	United Gas & Elec. Co. 2d pf.
92	95	Utah Power & Lt. pf.
29	31	Western Power Co. com.
78 1/2	81	Western Power Co. 6% pf.
29	30 1/2	Western Power Co. com.
83	87	West. States G. & E. 7% cum. pf.
30	40	West Virginia Utilities 7% pf.
35	42	Wisconsin Edison capital
92	96	Wis.-Minn. Lt. & Pow. 7% pf.
90	94	Yadkin River Power 7% pf.

RAILROADS

50 1/2	51 1/2	Ala. Gt. Southern ordinary.
56	58	Ala. Gt. Southern pf.
39	42	Alabama & Susquehanna.
51 1/2	55	Canada Southern.
70	72	Cleveland & Pittsburgh 7%.
40	42	Cleveland & Pittsburgh 4%.
101	105	Ft. Wayne & Jackson pf.
104	108	Illinois Central Leased Line.
103	110	Kalamazoo, Allegan & G. R.
87	90	Det. Tol. & Ironton R. R. 1st pf.
47	52	Kansas City Ry. 1st pf.
48	52	Kansas City Ry. notes 7%.
35	40	Mason City & Ft. Dodge 1st pf.
70	70	Kan. City, Ft. Scott & Mem. pf.
63	66	Mobile & Birmingham pf.
66	66	Minn. St. P. & S.S.M. Leased Line.
77 1/2	80	Morris & Essex.
96	96	New York, Lack. & Western.
75 1/2	77 1/2	Northern Central.
139 1/2	141	Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & C. pf.
110	123	Rensselaer & Saratoga.
56	56	Schuykill Valley Nav. & R. R.
109	111	St. Louis Bridge 1st pf.
53	55 1/2	St. Louis Bridge 2d pf.
109	111	Tunnel R. R. of St. Louis.
96	100	Valley R. R.
196	205	United N. J. R. R. & Canal.

INDUSTRIAL AND MISCELLANEOUS

102	106	Aluminum Mfg. Co., Inc. 7% pf.
113	113	American Radiator Co. 7% pf.
92	97	American Rolling Mill 7% pf.
92	97	American Type Foundry Co. 7% pf.
89	92	Barnhart Bros. & Spindler 1st pf.
97	100	Borden's Cond. Milk Co. 6% pf.
79	84	Brighton Mills 7% pf. Class A.
95	100	Brunswick-Balke-Cole Co. 7% pf.
94	98	Bucyrus Co. 7%.
171	177	Burgess Adding Machine com.
171	177	Central Aggr. Sugar Co.
103	107	Childs Co. 7% pf.
85	90	Clinchfield Coal Corp. 7% pf.
26	30	Clinchfield Coal Corp.
88	90	Congoleum Co. 7% pf.
138	144	Continental Oil 8% pf.
88	92	Continental Motors 7%.
88	92	Dodge Mfg. Co.
91	96	Douglas Shoe Co. cv. 7% pf.
25	30	Eastern Steel com.
55	65	Eastern Steel 1st pf.
33	39	Eisenman Magneto 7% pf.
92	97	Farrell, Wm. Co. 7% pf.
75	80	Firestone Tire & Rubber com.
75	80	Firestone Tire & Rubber 7% pf.
75	80	Firestone Tire & Rubber 7% pf.
75	80	Firestone Tire & Rubber 7% pf.
390	410	Ford Motor of Canada.
385	400	Ford Motor of Canada.
23 1/2	24 1/2	F. B. Stearns Motor Co. com.
90	92	Foundation Co.
69	71	Goodyear Tire & Rubber 6% pf.
74	79	Godchaux Sugar Co. 7% pf.
32	35	Graton & Knight Mfg. Co. 7% pf.
104	108	Gt. Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. 7% pf.
103	108	Gl. Western Sugar Co. 7% pf.
230	240	Gl. Western Sugar Co. com.
220	230	Gl. Western Sugar Co. com.
45	50	Holly Sugar Co. 7%.
13	16	Holly Sugar Co. com.
100	100	Hupp Motor Co. 7% pf.
30	30	Hydraulic Steel conv. 7% pf.
110	112	Imperial Oil of Canada.
108	110	Imperial Oil of Canada.
55	60	Ind. & Ill. Coal Co. 7%.
130	130	Libby-Owens Glass com.
102	106	Libby-Owens Sheet Glass 7%.
75	75	Mass. Baking Co. 7% com.
60	71	Merck & Co. 8%.
22	24	New York Oil.
85	89	Packard Motor Car Co. 7% pf.
88	88	Packard Motor Car Co. 7% pf.
78	82	Paige Detroit Motor Co. 7% com.
20	23	Paige Detroit Motor Co. com.
96	100	Penney (J. C.) 7% com.
130	130	Procter & Gamble 8%.
100	106	Procter & Gamble 6% pf.
138	141	Procter & Gamble com.
25	35	Repub. Motor Truck Co. 7%.
33	38	Rolls-Royce 7% pf.
95	98	Royal Baking Powder 6% pf.
41	44	Savannah Sugar Ref. Co. com.
45	47	Savannah Sugar Ref. Co. com.
88	90	Savannah Sugar Ref. Co. 7%.
90	101	Sherwin-Williams 7% pf.
97	100	Sherwin-Williams 7% pf.
32	35	Virginia Ry. Co. com.
75	82	Welch Grape Juice Co. 7% pf.
82	86	West. Pa. Trac. & Water P. pf.
27	28	West. Pa. Trac. & Water P. com.
46	46	West India Sug. Fin. Corp. 8% pf.
25	30	Willis Corp. 8% pf.
65	70	Winchester Co. 7% pf.
97	100	Winn-Dixie Mills 7% pf.

TOBACCO SECURITIES

Bid	Offered		Bid	Offered	
133	135	American Tobacco scrip.	53	55	Porto Rico-American Tobacco.
63	67	American Cigar common.	34 1/2	35 1/2	Porto Rico-American Tobacco scrip.
81	85	American Cigar pf.	116	118	Schulte Retail Stores.
150	150	George W. Helme common.	100	101	Universal Leaf Tobacco common.
100	102	George W. Helme pf.	8	8 1/2	Universal Leaf Tobacco pf.
95	96	MacAndrews & Forbes pf.	92	94	J. S. Young common.
20	30	MacAndrews & Forbes pf.			

Bank Stocks

Gilbert Elliott & Co.

Members New York Stock Exchange
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24, 1922